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Users and providers benefit considerably from public Wi-Fi hotspots. Users receive
wireless Internet access and providers draw new prospective customers. While users are
able to enjoy the ease of Wi-Fi Internet hotspot networks in public more conveniently,
they are more susceptible to a particular type of fraud and identify theft, referred to as
evil twin attack (ETA). Through setting up an ETA, an attacker can intercept sensitive
data such as passwords or credit card information by snooping into the communication
links. Since the objective of free open (unencrypted) public Wi-Fi hotspots is to provide
ease of accessibility and to entice customers, no security mechanisms are in place. The
public’s lack of awareness of the security threat posed by free open public Wi-Fi hotspots
makes this problem even more heinous. Client-side systems to help wireless users detect
and protect themselves from evil twin attacks in public Wi-Fi hotspots are in great need.
In this dissertation report, the author explored the problem of the need for client-side
detection systems that will allow wireless users to help protect their data from evil twin
attacks while using free open public Wi-Fi. The client-side evil twin attack detection
system constructed as part of this dissertation linked the gap between the need for
wireless security in free open public Wi-Fi hotspots and limitations in existing client-side
evil twin attack detection solutions. Based on design science research (DSR) literature,
Hevner’s seven guidelines of DSR, Peffer’s design science research methodology
(DSRM), Gregor’s IS design theory, and Hossen & Wenyuan’s (2014) study evaluation
methodology, the author developed design principles, procedures and specifications to
guide the construction, implementation, and evaluation of a prototype client-side evil
twin attack detection artifact. The client-side evil twin attack detection system was
evaluated in a hotel public Wi-Fi environment. The goal of this research was to develop
a more effective, efficient, and practical client-side detection system for wireless users to
independently detect and protect themselves from mobile evil twin attacks while using
free open public Wi-Fi hotspots. The experimental results showed that client-side evil
twin attack detection system can effectively detect and protect users from mobile evil
twin AP attacks in public Wi-Fi hotspots in various real-world scenarios despite time
delay caused by many factors.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Background
The use of IEEE 802.11 based Wi-Fi or wireless local area networks (WLANs) has
grown to become the predominant method of access to the Internet in the last few years
(Hossen & Wenyuan, 2014). Mobile users can have Internet access anywhere there is
service and anytime there is not an outage. Public places, such as hotels, restaurants,
cafes, airports and others have made open (unencrypted) Wi-Fi Internet access available
at no cost to either attract customers or better serve current customers. Locations that
provide open and free Wi-Fi Internet access are called public Wi-Fi hotspots. According
to JiWire Mobile Audience Insights Report (2013), Internet access via public Wi-Fi
networks has become widely available and largely free of charge, with over 81 percent of
all public Wi-Fi hotspots offering free connections as an alternative to paid.
Additionally, user demand for free, high speed Internet connections is growing rapidly as
mobile devices that require higher bandwidth continue to increase. Simultaneously, the
number of public Wi-Fi hotspots are expanding. Industry research overwhelmingly
demonstrates that Wi-Fi is now the preferred free-access technology for travelers’ mobile
devices. Worldwide public Wi-Fi hotspot deployments have reached a total of 5.69
million in 2014 and will grow at a Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of 11.2%
between 2015 and 2020. This includes public Wi-Fi hotspots deployed by mobile and
fixed-line carriers as well as third-party Wi-Fi service providers. ABI Research expects
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the number of worldwide carrier Wi-Fi hotspots will reach 13.3 million in 2020 (ABI
Research, 2015).
Han, Sheng, Tan, Li, and Lu (2009, 2011) indicated that with the increase of users
who come to expect free wireless availability, the security of such networks becomes
increasingly more important. According to a survey by Private Wi-Fi in partnership with
The Identity Theft Resource Center (ITRC) (2013), U.S. consumers are three times more
likely to connect to a Wi-Fi network if it is free. The ITRC calls this trend “The
Convenience Factor”, which describes the fact that Wi-Fi hotspots are available in many
public places, which affords users the ability to get and stay connected at no cost,
wherever they are.
Additionally, Kim, Park, Jung, and Lee (2012) and Nikbakhsh, Zamani, Abdul Manaf,
and Janbeglou (2012) stated in their studies that the growing popularity of WLANs,
increases the risk of wireless security attacks. Since the goal of free open public Wi-Fi
hotspots is to provide convenience and to attract customers, no security tools are in place.
For instance, most public Wi-Fi hotspots provide free, open, and zero liability Internet
access to customers (Hossen and Wenyuan, 2014). Wi-Fi’s popularity makes it an
attractive target for attackers to access and capture wireless client information. For a
wireless user, it is impossible to determine the safety of an open public Wi-Fi hotspot and
identify the ones that are dangerous. Unfortunately, Wi-Fi users have to take
responsibility for their own security when connecting to free open public Wi-Fi networks.
While users are able to access free open Wi-Fi Internet hotspot connections in public
more conveniently, they are more vulnerable to a particular type of fraud and identity
theft, referred to as evil twin attacks (ETA). An evil twin attack in a wireless LAN is a
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reference to a hard- or software-based 802.11 rogue Wi-Fi access point (AP) that looks
like a legitimate one offered on the premises, but actually has been set up by a hacker to
eavesdrop all wireless communications done by the victims. Evil twin attacks can
significantly threaten the security of wireless users of public Wi-Fi hotspots (Song, Yang,
and Gu, 2010, 2012; Hossen and Wenyuan, 2014; Nakhila, Dondyk, Amjad, and Zou,
2015; Hsu, Wang, Hsu, Cheng, and Hsneh, 2015). Moreover, lack of knowledge and
awareness possessed by the Wi-Fi hotspot users make this issue extremely disturbing
(Nikbakhsh et al., 2012). Many Wi-Fi hotspot users are oblivious to the hidden risks that
the technology poses, such as identity theft, hacking, and stolen bank accounts. Due to its
gravity, the evil twin attack has gained a notable interest in the media and research
community (Han et al., 2009, 2011; Song et al., 2010, 2012; Lanze, Ponce-Alcaide,
Panchenko, and Engel, 2014).
The detection of ETA has been researched for many years. Researchers have been
investigating detection methods that can alert the wireless network administrator or the
user about the presence of this type of attack. Song et al. (2010, 2012) found that existing
evil twin detection solutions are mainly for network administrators (administrator-side)
instead of for a wireless client or user (client-side) to detect an evil twin attack.
According to Song et al. (2010, 2012) and Hsu et al. (2015), administrator-side solutions
are expensive, limited by requiring the knowledge of authorization users and AP list,
hardly maintained, difficult to protect users timely when the attack is launched, and not
available for many cases.
Kim et al. (2012) indicated that administrator-side methods utilize extra devices,
sometimes referred to as Wireless Intrusion Detection System (WIDS) nodes. The WIDS
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nodes monitor the wireless traffic and route the gathered traffic to their servers. The
servers get to know the wireless environment in order to detect evil twin APs using
wireless traffic from WIDS nodes. However, if a user moves to other locations where
there are no WIDS nodes, the administrator-side methods can no longer assure secure
communication in WLANs for mobile users. Although there are WIDS nodes for secure
communication, the detection methods hardly detect the evil twin access points (APs)
when the servers have not yet learned the wireless environments. In support of Kim et
al.’s (2012) study, Hossen and Wenyuan (2014) found that businesses offer public Wi-Fi
hotspots to provide free Internet service to attract customers. They have little motivation
to pledge secure Internet surfing or to setup more devices or install detection hardware
and software in their infrastructure to detect an evil twin access point (AP) attack. In
addition, Hossen and Wenyuan (2014) found that administrator-side solutions are not
applicable to public Wi-Fi hotspots and more practicable in environments such as
infrastructure networks, e.g. corporate networks. In public Wi-Fi networks, wireless users
should not assume that the network provider will deploy any type of security protections
against evil twin attacks. Furthermore, according to Nakhila et al. (2015), administratorside detection solutions will add more cost to the total wireless network construction
price. This is because network administrators need to implement wireless devices that act
as wireless sensors to continuously scan the airwaves and gather information about the
transmitting APs.
Monica and Ribeiro (2011) found that administrator-side solutions are not real-time,
allowing short-term evil twin attacks to remain unnoticed. Additionally, even if the
detection is done in a timely manner, many users can still be victims of the attack, since
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there is no automatic way of denying access to the evil twin APs or even to advise users
of the attack. Additionally, Song et al. (2010, 2012) and Monica and Ribeiro (2011)
indicated that administrator-side approaches still have the risk of falsely claiming a
normal neighbor AP as a rogue AP with a high probability.
To address this problem, Song et al. (2010, 2012) suggested that traveling users who
use wireless networks at free open public hotspots need to protect themselves from evil
twin attacks, instead of having any reliance on the providers of free open public Wi-Fi
hotspots, which typically do not provide security for public Wi-Fi hotspot users. Song et
al. (2010, 2012) claimed that a lightweight and effective client-side solution for traveling
users is highly desirable. According to Nikbakhsh et al. (2012) and Kim et al. (2012),
client-side solutions help the user of public Wi-Fi (who neither has an AP authorization
list nor any sophisticated software or hardware) to independently determine whether an
AP is legitimate or not without any help from network administrators. Public Wi-Fi users
are vulnerable to big security risks such as connecting to a hacker’s rogue access point.
This is due to users not having prior knowledge of the public Wi-Fi hotspot’s network
they are connecting to. Rogue access points expose wireless users to evil twin attacks in
which the hacker can capture all the user’s network traffic. Nakhila et al. (2015) further
indicated that client-side detection is more appropriate than administrator-side detection
since it gives security-sensitive users more control over their Wi-Fi connection security.
Monica and Ribeiro (2011) found that public Wi-Fi hotspots are beneficial for
wireless users as well as service providers that wish to attract clients. However, under
evil twin attacks, the wireless user innocently associates to an attacker’s wireless access
point and the attacker proceeds to compromise user’s sensitive information. According
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to Monica and Ribeiro (2011), client-side detection solutions that are efficient and
effective are in great need.
Kim et al.’s (2012) study indicated that recently several evil twin AP detection
methods have been designed in order to overcome the administrator-side problems on
the client-side. However, most of the existing client-side solutions only target multihop
attacks where the attacker uses a legitimate AP for accessing the Internet to pass through
client’s data (Nakhila et al., 2015). According to Nakhila et al. (2015), these detection
methods will fail when the attacker launches a mobile attack which uses a different
gateway compare with the legitimate AP. Evil twin attacks that use their mobile Internet
(mobile attacks) will become more popular nowadays due to the increase in the Internet
access speed of mobile connections, such as 3G/4G Long Term Evolution (LTE).
Additionally, in support of Nakhila et al. (2015), Szongott, Henne, and Smith (2012) and
Hossen & Wenyuan (2014) indicated that the inclusion of mobile hotspot capabilities in
virtually all new mobile devices opens the door to mobile evil twin attacks.
Unfortunately, there is limited research focused on client-side solutions that will allow
wireless users to verify the authenticity of access points at free open public Wi-Fi
hotspots and protect themselves from mobile evil twin attacks. Additionally, the clientside detection solutions proposed so far have limitations regarding requirements,
assumptions, and evaluation approaches.

Problem Statement
The problem explored in this dissertation report is the need for client-side detection
solutions for wireless users to be able to protect themselves from evil twin attacks while
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using free open public Wi-Fi. Existing literature mainly focus on client-side evil twin
attack detection methods for multihop attacks. These detection methods will fail when
the attacker launches a mobile attack. Mobile evil twin attacks will become more popular
nowadays due to the increase in the Internet access speed of mobile connections and the
inclusion of mobile hotspot capabilities in virtually all new mobile devices (Szongott et
al., 2012; Hossen & Wenyuan, 2014; Nakhila et al., 2015). Unfortunately, there is
limited research focused on client-side evil twin attack detection solutions for mobile
attacks. Additionally, existing solutions have limitations regarding requirements,
assumptions, and evaluation approaches. As a result, wireless users of free open public
Wi-Fi hotspots are vulnerable to mobile evil twin attacks in which the attacker can
intercept, collect, and manipulate user’s sensitive data.
The problem exists due to the lack of more effective, efficient and practical evil twin
attack detection systems for mobile attacks on the client side. According to Hossen &
Wenyuan (2014) and Szongott et al. (2015), existing client-side detection solutions are
impractical and thus have not seen any adoption. As the literature in proceeding
paragraphs and chapters will reveal, there are two types of evil twin attack scenarios
(Song et al., 2010, 2012; Nikbakhsh et al., 2012; Hossen & Wenyuan, 2014; Nakhila et
al., 2015). The first scenario is when the attacker uses the legitimate AP for Internet
access. In this scenario, the evil twin AP can itself behave as a normal Wi-Fi client and
uses the legitimate AP to connect to the Internet. All the wireless traffic from the victim
will pass through the attacker’s node. In the literature, this type of attack is denoted as
multihop attack. The second scenario is when the attacker uses mobile Internet (e.g.
3G/4G LTE) as the access network for connecting to the Internet. In this scenario, the
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evil twin AP uses a different gateway compared with the legitimate AP. A hotspot router
can act as an evil twin AP. Also, a smartphone with mobile AP functionality built in
operating systems such as Android or iOS, can act as an evil twin AP and the setup is
trivially easy. In the literature, this type of attack is denoted as mobile attack.
Most of the existing client-side evil twin detection methods fall under the first
scenario. Han et al. (2009, 2011), Song et al. (2010, 2012), Monica & Ribeiro (2011),
Nikbakhsh et al. (2012), Kim et al. (2012), Lanze et al. (2014), and Hsu et al. (2015)
assume in their studies that the attacker uses the legitimate wireless network gateway to
pass through client data traffic (multihop attacks). However, their detection methods will
fail when the attacker uses a different gateway (mobile attack) with a faster Internet
connection compared to the legitimate wireless network (Nakhila et al., 2015).
Additionally, according to Szongott et al. (2012), Hossen & Wenyuan (2014), and
Nakhila et al. (2015), mobile attacks will become more popular nowadays due to the
increase in the Internet access speed of mobile connections and the inclusion of mobile
hotspot capabilities in virtually all new mobile devices.
Han et al. (2009, 2011) developed a client-side timing-base method for detection of
rogue access points based on round-trip time (RTT) calculation between the wireless user
and the DNS server, and does not require administrator assistance. Their RTT-based
method helps distinguish the route through a rogue AP from that through a legitimate AP
(one hop versus two-hop wireless channels). However, the issue with timing-based
methods is that with the increase in wireless networks speeds, transmission delay
differences between a wireless node and a wired node will eventually fade. This means
that a multihop setting may become indistinguishable from a one-hop setting (Monica &
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Ribeiro, 2011). Timing-based detection will be unreliable when the attacker uses a faster
Internet connection as the evil twin AP (Nakhila et al., 2015). Also, their approach
utilizes the training detection technique which requires pre-gathering the information of
the target wireless network. This method could not be applied to public Wi-Fi users at
the client side, since once users are in different areas, the network situation may have
significantly changed. The trained knowledge in one wireless network can be hardly
applicable to another network (Song et al., 2010, 2012).
Song et al. (2010, 2012) also developed a client-side timing-base method called
“ETSniffer” (Evil Twin Sniffer) based on Interpacket Arrival Time (IAT) to detect evil
twin access points by distinguishing a one-hop from a two-hop wireless network setting
between the wireless client and the remote IAT server (custom server). Their method
does not require administrator assistance. However, their method requires setting up
additional equipment such as a custom server within the LAN with their software
installed for measuring server IAT and for detecting an evil twin AP. According to Han
et al.’ (2009, 2011), Kim et al.’ (2012), Nikbakhsh et al.’ (2012), Lanze et al.’ (2014),
Hossen & Wenyuan’ (2014), and Nakhila et al.’ (2015) studies, to guarantee usability and
availability to the client, a client-side detection method must discover evil twin APs using
their Wi-Fi enabled devices (e.g. laptops, smartphones, tablets, etc.) without any
additional equipment.
Monica & Ribeiro (2011) developed a client-side evil twin detection system called
“WiFiHop”. Their method does not require network administrator assistance. This
detection system is based on the behavior of the legitimate AP without depending on
timing to detect a multihop setting between the wireless user and the Internet. However,
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their solution requires the implementation of an echo-server deployed through the use of
a script on any public hosting server; therefore, requiring hotspot network modification.
According to Hossen & Wenyuan (2014), a client-side detection solution must be able to
verify an access point in a hotspot and thus cannot assume any custom infrastructure
support. Further, Hossen & Wenyuan stated that designing an infrastructure-side solution
would require hotspot providers to re-design existing hotspots, which is unlikely to
happen because most hotspots are free services with no independent revenue.
Nikbakhsh et al. (2012) developed a client-side approach based on traceroute that
compares the gateways and routes that a packet travels to determine whether an access
point is legitimate or not. Their method does not require administrator assistance.
However, according to Nakhila et al. (2015), the attacker can capture traceroute results
transmitted to the wireless client using the legitimate wireless network and convey those
results to the wireless client by means of the rogue wireless network. This will give the
same route information for both gateways. Also, as mentioned previously this method
provides limited client-side detection targeted only to the specific evil twin attack
scenario where the attacker uses the legitimate AP for Internet access instead of a more
popular scenario where the attacker uses mobile Internet as the access network for
connecting to the Internet (Nakhila et al., 2015). Lastly, Nikbakhsh et al.’s (2012)
approach was not implemented or evaluated in a lab environment or in the field.
Therefore, no conclusions can be drawn of its effectiveness.
During the same time, Kim et al. (2012) developed a client-side evil twin attack
detection method for smartphones based on received signal strengths (RSSs), and does
not require administrator assistance. Their method measured RSSs from both the
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legitimate and evil twin access points on the smartphone and used normalization of
collected signal strengths for accurate measurement. Highly correlated RSSs are
considered fake signals from an evil twin access point. However, their method was also
based on the attacker using the legitimate wireless network gateway to pass through
client data traffic. In addition, Kim et al.’ (2012) method only works with smartphones
associated with a mobile communication network.
Lanze et al. (2014) developed a client-side method for detection of evil twin attacks
operated by software. Their method does not require administrator assistance. Their
method separates software access points from legitimate hardware access points.
However, their approach was only evaluated in a lab environment. Therefore, no final
conclusions can be drawn on its effectiveness.
Hsu et al. (2015) proposed a client-side evil twin attack detection system called “ET
Detector” based on redirection behavior, and does not require administrator assistance.
By operating the wireless network interface controller (WNIC) in monitor mode (which
is able to capture all packets that conform to its monitoring channel and protocol) and
through analyzing the captured packets, users can easily and precisely detect evil twin
attacks. However, the system has two detection mechanisms: default testing and
secondary device testing. Default testing only works when a user is not the only one
using public Wi-Fi in a hotspot. Otherwise, the system will be forced to use secondary
testing which requires an extra Wi-Fi device with no sensitive data on it to associate to
the target AP to make the detection. Therefore, the system is not automated and requires
intervention from users. According to Han et al.’ (2009, 2011), Monica & Ribeiro’
(2011), Kim et al.’ (2012), Nikbakhsh et al.’ (2012), Lanze et al.’ (2014), Hossen &
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Wenyuan’ (2014), and Nakhila et al.’ (2015) studies, to guarantee usability and
availability to the client, a client-side detection method must discover evil twin APs
without additional equipment. Also, Monica & Ribeiro (2011), as well as Kim et al.
(2012), Hossen & Wenyuan (2014), Nakhila et al. (2015), and Szongott et al. (2015)
indicated that the client-side evil twin detection system must be automated with no
intervention from users. Lastly, this method provides limited client-side detection
targeted only to the specific evil twin attack scenario where the attacker uses the
legitimate AP for Internet access.
Szongott et al. (2015) proposed a detection system called Mobile Evil Twin Detection
System (METDS) for smartphones based on context-based recognition, which uses as
much environmental data of smartphones as possible during the association process to
help decide if the access point is legitimate or the user needs to be warned of a potential
attack. Their method does not require administrator assistance. However, their method
requires previous knowledge of the network in order to assist the user and also an
external server to store learned data. Studies conducted by Hossen & Wenyuan (2014)
and Nakhila et al. (2015), indicated that to detect an evil twin AP, the system should not
require any training knowledge of the target wireless network. Also, according to Han et
al.’ (2009, 2011), Kim et al.’ (2012), Nikbakhsh et al.’ (2012), Lanze et al.’ (2014),
Hossen & Wenyuan’ (2014), and Nakhila et al.’ (2015) studies, to guarantee usability and
availability to the client, a client-side detection method must discover evil twin APs using
their Wi-Fi enabled devices (e.g. laptops, smartphones, tablets, etc.) without any
additional equipment. Lastly, their method only works with smartphones associated with
a mobile communication network.
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As the literature review in proceeding paragraphs and chapters will reveal, Nakhila et
al. (2015) and Hossen & Wenyuan (2014) are the only existing studies that assume the
attacker using a different gateway from a legitimate AP (mobile attacks). Nakhila et al.
(2015) presented a client-side detection method for mobile attacks that detects whether or
not different gateways are used by multiple APs in one hotspot location that have the
same SSID. Their method does not require administrator assistance. Their detection
technique relies on an SSL/TCP connection to a remote public server, and detects the
changing of wireless network gateway’s public IP address in the middle of the SSL/TCP
connection. However, Nakhila et al.’s method does not take into account that the attack
can be executed before the client establish a secure connection to the remote server.
Additionally, Nakhila et al. assume that the BSSID (MAC address) of the hotspot APs is
unique and use that as a reference in their method to switch between different APs with
the same SSID in the hotspot. Nakhila et al. did not assume the scenario when the
attacker uses the same SSID and BSSID of a hotspot legitimate AP. According to
Szongott et al. (2015) and Kumar and Paul (2016), SSIDs and BSSIDs can easily be
spoofed by an attacker as the legitimate APs always transmit the SSIDs and the BSSIDs.
Furthermore, Nakhila et al. did not cover the scenario when the attacker blocks access to
the public website. Nakhila et al. assume that all the hotspot APs with the desired SSID
are detected during the initial wireless network scanning and that the client is able to
associate to all the APs in the public Wi-Fi network, which in practice is not always the
case. Nakhila et al.’s (2015) method only works when the mobile evil twin AP is in the
same subnet as the legitimate AP. Lastly, their approach was only evaluated in a lab
environment. Therefore, no final conclusions can be drawn on its effectiveness.
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Furthermore, Hossen & Wenyuan (2014) introduced a method called Client End Evil
Twin Access Point Detector (CETAD) to detect evil twin attacks, and does not require
administrator assistance. Their detection technique relies on a public server. Their
application included two detection techniques: ISP-based and timing-based. The
application utilized the ISP-based detection technique, and if not successful, used the
timing-based detection technique. The ISP-based technique was used to detect mobile
attacks as the ISP information of a legitimate AP and an evil twin AP are different.
Similar to Nakhila et al.’s method, it detects whether or not different gateways are used
by multiple APs in one hotspot location that have the same SSID. Timing-based
technique was used to detect multihop attacks because the attacker’s evil twin AP uses
the legitimate AP as the gateway. However, as stated previously, timing measurements
are technology dependent (Monica & Ribeiro, 2011). Also, Hossen & Wenyuan’s
assume that the BSSID of the hotspot APs is unique and use that as a reference to switch
between different APs with the same SSID in the hotspot. Hossen and Wenyuan did not
assume the scenario when the attacker uses the same SSID and BSSID of a hotspot
legitimate AP. Hossen & Wenyuan’s assumed that the mobile twin AP is in a different
subnet as the legitimate AP. Furthermore, Hossen & Wenyuan assumed that all the
hotspot APs with the desired SSID are detected during the initial wireless network
scanning and that the client is able to associate to all the APs in the public Wi-Fi network,
which in practice is not always the case. Lastly, Hossen & Wenyuan’s ISP-based method
for mobile attacks uses a public website to gather the global IP address shared by the
legitimate APs. However, Hossen & Wenyuan’s method does not cover the scenarios
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when the attacker blocks access to the public website or when the attacker presents an
invalid certificate while ISP information is retrieved from the public website.
Hossen & Wenyuan’s (2014) and Nakhila et al.’s (2015) evil twin attack detection
methods for mobile attacks do not protect the public Wi-Fi users for the duration of the
Wi-Fi connection, discovering and reporting on new mobile evil twin access points.
Protection is only provided to the user at the beginning based on the assumption that the
attacker with a mobile evil twin AP will be in the hotspot when the user initially runs the
detection system. In a real life environment, an attacker may not be present when the
user connects to the hotspot. An attacker with an evil twin AP could arrive at the public
Wi-Fi hotspot at a later time.
Additionally, all existing client-side approaches assumed that the client has not
connected to the target public Wi-Fi network in the past. According to Kumar & Paul
(2016), the operating system stores the SSID and BSSID with which it was previously
connected to in the client’s preferred network list, and it is always in the exploration of
the same and whenever detects attempts to connect to it. Therefore, the client will
automatically connect to a potential evil twin AP when using the public Wi-Fi hotspot.
Also, existing client-side detection systems only warn the user of the presence of an evil
twin AP. After detection, they do not allow the client to connect to a legitimate AP to
access the Internet. Specifically, in regards to mobile attack approaches, Nakhila et al.’s
method is not able to identify which AP is rogue and which one is legitimate arguing that
since both the legitimate AP and the rogue AP provide Internet access that could have
similar quality, it is very difficult to further tell them apart. In addition, Hossen &
Wenyuan (2014) claim that after the attack has been detected, the system allows the
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wireless user to connect to the legitimate AP; however, this was not included in their
algorithm. Finally, existing studies used their own mobile evil twin APs on their lab and
field evaluations. They did not aim at detecting real mobile evil twin APs in the wild.
The client-side detection system constructed as part of this dissertation linked the gap
between the need of wireless security in free open public Wi-Fi hotspots and limitations
in existing client-side evil twin attack detection solutions.

Dissertation Goal
The goal of this dissertation was to develop a more effective, efficient, and practical
client-side evil twin attack detection system for wireless users to independently detect
and protect themselves from mobile evil twin attacks while using free open public Wi-Fi
hotspots. To resolve the problem statement above, the author focused on developing a
client-side evil twin attack detection system for users of free open public Wi-Fi hotspots
based on the following requirements gathered from the literature review:
1. It protects users from attackers that use a different gateway from a legitimate AP
(mobile attack).
2. It protects users whether or not they have connected to a free open public Wi-Fi
network in the past.
3. It protects users when not all the hotspot APs with the desired SSID are detected
during the initial wireless network scanning.
4. It protects users when the client is not able to associate to all the APs in the public
Wi-Fi network.
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5. It protects users when the attacker sets up the mobile evil twin AP with the same
SSID, BSSID (MAC address), and subnet of a legitimate AP.
6. It protects users when the attacker blocks access to the public website used to get
ISP information.
7. It protects users when the attacker presents an invalid certificate while retrieving
ISP information from a public website.
8. After mobile evil twin AP attack detection, it connects the user to a legitimate AP.
9. It protects users for the duration of the public Wi-Fi connection, discovering and
reporting on new mobile evil twin access points.
10. It is evaluated in the wild aiming to detect real mobile evil twin APs. In case of
not detecting real mobile evil twin APs during the field evaluation period, it is
evaluated with the mobile evil twin AP used in the lab.
11. It is not based on timing or traceroute.
12. It does not require any additional equipment.
13. It does not require modification of the hotspot network infrastructure (custom
infrastructure support).
14. It does not require trained knowledge of the target wireless hotspots
infrastructure.
15. It is automated with no intervention from users.
In support of the goal, this study leveraged DSR literature, Hevner, March, Park, and
Ram (2004) seven steps of effective DSR, Peffers, Tuunanen, Rothenberger, and
Chatterjee’s (2008) DSR Methodology (DSRM), Gregor and Jones (2007) IS Design
Theory, and Hossen & Wenyuan’s (2014) study evaluation methodology to promote
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guiding design principles, procedures and specifications for the construction,
implementation and evaluation of the prototype client-side evil twin attack detection
artifact.

Research Questions
The research questions identify the specific objectives this dissertation report
addressed and helped shape the conceptual framework for the study. This study focused
on the design, development, and evaluation of a client-side evil twin attack detection
system for public Wi-Fi users to protect themselves from mobile evil twin attacks and
answered the following questions:

Peffers, Tuunanen, and
Research Questions
Rothenberger (2008) DSRM Activity
Define the objectives for 1. What requirements must the product meet in order to
a solution
address the problem?
Design & Develop

2. What are the major decision points in the design and
development process?

Demonstrate & Evaluate 3. In what way does the product developed meet and fail to
meet the requirements specified?

Relevance and Significance
The problem in this dissertation is both meaningful and research-worthy since
connecting to public Wi-Fi hotspots leaves users vulnerable to evil twin attacks from
hackers. According to the Identity Theft Resource Center (2013), an evil twin is the
wireless version of a “phishing” scam: an attacker tricks wireless users into connecting
their mobile devices by impersonating as a legitimate access point to eavesdrop on
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wireless communications. Wireless users make the assumption that using a Wi-Fi
hotspot at a hotel or at an airport is no different than logging into the network at home or
at the office. Business travelers willing to connect to public Wi-Fi networks that provide
free Internet access are specifically vulnerable to evil twin attacks. It is impossible to tell
the safe networks from the bad ones. Wireless eavesdropping can occur anywhere. Many
public Wi-Fi hotspots pass responsibility entirely to wireless users for their mobile device
security.
Challenges exist in tracing a hack that occurs on a free open public Wi-Fi network.
Song et al. (2010, 2012) and Monica & Ribeiro (2011) indicated that evil twin attacks can
be hard to trace. The attacker can shut off the attacks suddenly or randomly after
accomplishing the malicious goals. In a very short time frame, the attacker may already
have compromised public Wi-Fi user’s sensitive information, such as passwords or credit
card information. Nevertheless, Norton Cybercrime Report (2011) stated that over three
quarters 77% of those who use free open public Wi-Fi have experienced cybercrime in
comparison to 62% of those who do not.
A study conducted by The Guardian in 2011, launched two evil twin attacks
conducted with volunteers, in which they successfully gather users’ usernames,
passwords, messages and even credit card information. This study reinforced that many
public Wi-Fi hotspots have no forms of identification, except their wireless network
names (SSID), which can be easily impersonated. Additionally, one recent study from
Private Wi-Fi (2011) found that over 56% of laptops were broadcasting the name of their
trusted Wi-Fi networks, and that 34% of them were willing to connect to unsecure public
Wi-Fi networks. Consequently, to quantify the scale of the threat of evil twin attacks on
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victims, Szongott et al. (2015) completed a field study with 92 participants to gather their
Wi-Fi usage patterns. With this data, Szongott et al. (2015) revealed the number of
participants potentially exposed to an evil twin attack. The authors collected data from
223,877 connections that were initiated to access points during the study and gathered
anonymous statistics about all configured networks on the participants’ devices. Figure 1
shows the amount of configured wireless networks per user. They are differentiated by
unencrypted networks like open (unencrypted) public access points and encrypted
networks, that use encryption schemes like WPA2 (Szongott et al., 2015). In total
Szongott et al. (2015) gathered data about 239 open (unencrypted) Wi-Fi networks from
all of the 92 participants’ devices. The study demonstrates that a significant number of
users are exposed to evil twin attacks and that the mobile devices automatically initiated
most connections to popular open access points without the user being aware of the
connection (Szongott et al., 2015).

Figure 1. Number of configured Wi-Fi networks on participants’ devices, divided into
unencrypted (green) and encrypted (blue) networks.
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To strengthen the relevance of this problem, there are a number of academic studies
supporting the argument that client-side evil twin attack detection architecture supports
public Wi-Fi hotspots, improves public Wi-Fi user security, and is significant. Song et al.
(2010, 2012) and Hsu et al. (2015) indicated that existing evil twin attack detection
solutions are mostly for wireless network administrators instead of for a wireless client to
detect an evil twin attack at public Wi-Fi hotspots. The researchers also indicate that
administrator-side solutions are expensive, limited by requiring the knowledge of
authorization users and AP list, hardly maintained, difficult to protect users timely when
the attack is launched, and not available for many public hotspots scenarios.
Additionally, Song et al. (2010, 2012) indicate that traveling users who use public Wi-Fi
hotspots need to protect themselves from evil twin attacks and that a lightweight and
effective client-side solution for these users is highly desired.
Furthermore, Nikbakhsh et al. (2012) indicate that public Wi-Fi users are vulnerable
to security risks such as connecting to a hacker’s rogue access point. Users do not have
prior knowledge of the public Wi-Fi hotspot’s network they are connecting to and usually
connect to the wireless access point with the best signal strength. Further, Nikbakhsh et
al. (2012) found that rogue access points expose wireless users to evil twin attacks in
which the hacker can capture all the user’s network traffic and that wireless users lack of
knowledge of this security issue. Nikbakhsh et al. (2012) indicate that client-side
methods such as the client-side artifact proposed in this study will need to be designed
and constructed to warn wireless users to connect to rogue access points in public Wi-Fi
hotspots.
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Additionally, Hossen and Wenyuan (2014) found that there is no security
authentication mechanism of Wi-Fi access points available in open public Wi-Fi hotspots,
which makes wireless users vulnerable to evil twin attacks. This type of attack allows a
hacker to steal sensitive data from wireless users. Currently, there is not a method that
will allow a user to verify the integrity of an access point at wireless hotspots.
Consequently, the relevancy of evil twin attack detection solutions using client-side
architecture is evident and supports the primary driver for advancing the research through
this dissertation report.
According to Hossen & Wenyuan (2014) and Szongott et al. (2015), existing clientside detection solutions are impractical and thus have not seen any adoption. Most of
existing client-side solutions protect users from multihop attacks. These detection
methods will fail when the attacker launches a mobile attack (Nakhila et al., 2015).
According to Szongott et al. (2012), Hossen & Wenyuan (2014), and Nakhila et al.
(2015), mobile evil twin attacks will become more popular nowadays due to the increase
in the Internet access speed of mobile connections and the inclusion of mobile hotspot
capabilities in virtually all new mobile devices. Unfortunately, there is limited research
focused on client-side solutions for mobile attacks. Additionally, existing solutions have
limitations regarding requirements, assumptions, and evaluation approaches. As a result,
wireless users of public Wi-Fi hotspots are vulnerable to mobile evil twin attacks in
which the attacker can intercept, collect, and manipulate user’s sensitive data. To address
the research problem, this study developed a more effective, efficient, and practical
client-side evil twin attack detection system for wireless users to independently detect
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and protect themselves from mobile evil twin attacks while using free open public Wi-Fi
hotspots.
Finally, Hevner (2007) stated that DSR is essentially pragmatic in nature due to its
emphasis on relevance; making a clear contribution into the application environment.
The relevance cycle initiates DSR with an application context that not only provides the
requirements for the research as inputs but also defines acceptance criteria for the
ultimate evaluation of the research results. Therefore, deriving artifact and process
building to facilitate the construction and evaluation of the client-side evil twin attack
detection architecture based on DSR developed in this study made a clear contribution to
problems that span public Wi-Fi.

Barriers and Issues
Despite the fact that the equipment, network, and facilities are accessible to design,
construct, and evaluate the effectiveness of the prototype production system, challenges
exist in evaluating the system using public Wi-Fi users (as users of the detection system)
and at a large scale. In order to analyze and evaluate the artifact using public Wi-Fi users
and at a large scale, the system would need to be made available to a large number of
actual traveling users who can test the system in many public Wi-Fi locations for a
defined period and report back to the researcher on detection effectiveness and efficiency.
Furthermore, before the study, the author would need to instruct the actual public Wi-Fi
users on how to operate the system, and at that point, the study would contain bias,
because the author would have made the users more attentive to security risks related to
an evil twin attack.
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The client-side evil twin attack detection artifact reported in this study aimed at
detecting mobile evil twin attacks in the wild. Since no mobile evil twin APs were
detected in the wild, the author proceeded to evaluate the artifact with the mobile evil
twin AP used in the lab. The system was designed and developed based on DSR with the
objective of principally addressing the study research questions. The system performance
was evaluated extensively at a public Wi-Fi hotspot and using a researcher-participant
approach. The author received consent from the public Wi-Fi hotspot to perform the
evaluation. This is a requirement even when the evaluation is performed in public Wi-Fi
hotspots.

Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations
The first assumption made in this study is that, since the artifact was going to be
evaluated in the wild at a hotel that offered free open public Wi-Fi, attackers were going
to perform mobile evil twin AP attacks in the hotel public Wi-Fi hotspots during the
evaluation time period. The second assumption was that the attacker was going to use his
smartphone with mobile AP functionality to launch an evil twin AP attack (mobile
attack). Since no mobile evil twin APs were detected in the wild during the field
evaluation period, the author proceeded to evaluate the artifact with the mobile evil twin
AP used in the lab.
The first limitation is that since the artifact was evaluated in the wild, the researcher
could not control when the attackers would appear at the hotel to perform the evil twin
AP attacks. This limitation was mitigated by using the lab mobile evil twin AP in the
field evaluation. Similar approach was used by Hossen & Wenyuan’s study and the
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remainder of the client-side evil twin attack detection studies referenced in this
dissertation.
The second limitation was that the client-side evil twin attack detection system built as
part of this study is not applicable under the scenario that the attacker performs an evil
twin attack using the legitimate AP’s Internet access. The author proposed that
combining the detection method with other methods that were used to detect evil twin
attacks using the legitimate AP’s Internet access, such as the ones referenced in this
dissertation, will provide a complete evil twin attack detection system.
The study was delimited to only a hotel public Wi-Fi hotspot located in Ecuador who
provide free open public Wi-Fi in hotel public areas. The conclusions reached could be
extrapolated to other public Wi-Fi hotspots, as long as the design assumptions
documented in this study apply. Generalization to other free open public Wi-Fi hotspots
may not be warranted. Another delimitation is that the client-side evil twin attack
detection system was built and evaluated using a laptop platform with Linux operating
system. Generalization to other mobile platforms and operating systems may not be
warranted.
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Definition of Terms
Accuracy: indicates how accurately the system detects evil twin AP attacks (Hossen
& Wenyuan, 2014).
Artifact: anything that humans have created that has value to accomplish a definite
function (Chandrasekaran, 1990).
Basic service set: a combination of an access point and one or more wireless devices
(NIST, 2008).
Eavesdropping: an attacker monitors wireless data transmissions between devices for
message content, such as authentication credentials or passwords (NIST, 2008).
Extended service set: a multi-BSS network (NIST, 2008).
Evil twin attack: an evil twin attack in a wireless local area network is a reference to a
hard- or software-based 802.11 rogue Wi-Fi access point that looks like a legitimate one
offered on the premises, but actually has been set up by a hacker to eavesdrop all wireless
communications done by the victims (Song et al., 2010).
Precision: the fraction of positively detected attacks to all positively detected attacks
(correctly or incorrectly) (Hossen & Wenyuan, 2014).
Prototype system: pilot system that is assembled, analyzed, refined, and reproduced
before implementation in a production environment (Beck & Weber, 2013).
Public Wi-Fi hotspots: locations that provide open and free Wi-Fi internet access
(Hossen & Wenyuan, 2014).
Recall: the fraction of positively detected attacks to all attacks that should be
positively detected (Hossen & Wenyuan, 2014).
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Social lobby: hotel areas open to the public that provide amenities and services like
free Wi-Fi, comfortable chairs, waiter service, restaurant, a bar, and coffee shop (Kelley,
2012).
Wi-Fi: a trademark of the Wi-Fi Alliance and the brand name for products using the
IEEE 802.11 family of standards (Singh et al., 2014).
Wi-Fi network: network employing the IEEE 802.11 family of standards for creating
WLAN with internet facility (Singh et al., 2014).
Wi-Fi devices: devices used in the Wi-Fi network (Singh et al., 2014).
Wireless local area network: a group of wireless networking nodes within a limited
geographic area, such as an office building or campus, that are capable of radio
communication (NIST, 2008).

Abbreviations
AP

Access Point

BSS

Basic Service Set

BSSID

Basic Service Set ID

DHCP

Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol

DNS

Domain Name System

DS

Distribution System

DSRM

Design Science Research Methodology

DSR

Design Science Research

ESS

Extended Service Set

ETA

Evil Twin Attack
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FN

False Negative

FP

False Positive

HTTPS

Hyper Text Transfer Protocol Secure

IP

Internet Protocol

IS

Information System(s)

ISP

Internet Service Provider

IT

Information Technology

LAN

Local Area Network

MAC

Media Access Control

NIC

Network Interface Card

RSSI

Received Signal Strength Identifier

SSID

Service Set Identifier

TN

True Negative

TP

True Positive

URL

Uniform Resource Locator

WLAN

Wireless Local Area Network
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Summary
Chapter one of the dissertation report outlined the background for the study
incorporating the problem statement which describes the need for client-side detection
solutions for wireless users to be able to protect themselves from mobile evil twin attacks
while using free open public Wi-Fi and the goal to develop a more effective, efficient,
and practical client-side detection system linking the gap between the need for wireless
security in free open public Wi-Fi hotspots and limitations in existing client-side evil
twin attack detection solutions. The research questions determined the specific objectives
the dissertation report focused on and were instrumental in forming the conceptual
framework for the study. The first chapter also shaped the relevance and significance of
the dissertation report and barriers and issues that were tackled to effectively complete
the study. Finally, assumptions, limitations, and delimitations that have an overall impact
on the dissertation report were presented, key terms defined and abbreviations listed.
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Chapter 2
Brief Review of the Literature
Overview of Topics
As groundwork to support the problem statement and research questions in this
dissertation report, this section presents a review of the literature, analyzed, synthesized
and organized into four main topics. The literature review focuses on justification of
literature, identification of existing studies, strengths and weaknesses, gaps in literature,
research methods in similar studies, and synthesis of the literature all related to the four
main topics of (a) wireless security; (b) need for security in free open public Wi-Fi
hotspots; (c) client-side evil twin attack detection solutions; and (d) design science
research principles and methodology. The overall goal of the literature review was to
guide the development of a client-side evil twin attack detection system for wireless users
to independently detect and protect themselves from mobile evil twin attacks while using
free open public Wi-Fi hotspots. The design science research literature helped with the
creation of DSR principles, procedures and specifications that supported the artifact
construction, implementation and evaluation of the client-side evil twin attack detection
system that is central to the study and has the potential to protect Wi-Fi users from
mobile evil twin attacks in free open public Wi-Fi hotspots.

Justification of Literature
The literature was selected mainly based on relevancy to design science research,
client-side evil twin attack detection systems, need for security in free open public Wi-Fi
hotspots, and wireless security in general. In order to support the quality of the literature
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review, scholarly and industry publications such as journal articles, textbooks, conference
proceedings, technical reports, research reports, and online newspapers, related to the
problem statement and research questions were included. Several selected studies were
also required to include observed evidence so that the researcher of this study could have
support that it has been accepted by the academic community. Most of the papers chosen
in this literature review were published no earlier than 2009 because references authored
before that would in all likelihood not be relevant to the industry and ongoing academic
practices.

Identification of Existing Studies
There are a number of existing studies that address the four main topics discussed in
this literature review: (a) wireless security; (b) need for security in free open public Wi-Fi
hotspots; (c) client-side evil twin attack detection solutions; and (d) design science
research principles and methodology. This section will begin with a summary of the
studies in each of the four main topic areas and will help provide the groundwork for
synthesis of the literature at the end of the section.

Wireless Security
This section presents a review of the literature relevant to wireless local area network
(WLAN) security in general. This section begins with an introduction to WLAN, the
basic WLAN components, and architecture of WLAN. Subsequently, it describes various
security threats of WLAN, standards for WLAN security, and concludes with several
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practical solutions for securing WLAN. The studies chosen for this section offer an
introductory backdrop on the topic of wireless security.
Introduction to WLAN
Wireless local area network (WLAN) is a group of wireless networking nodes within a
limited geographic area, such as an office building or campus, that are capable of radio
communication. In 1997, IEEE first approved the IEEE 802.11 international
interoperability standard for WLANs. In 1999, IEEE ratified two amendments to the
IEEE 802.11 standard, IEEE 802.11a and IEEE 802.11b, that define radio transmission
methods and modulation techniques. WLAN equipment based on IEEE 802.11b rapidly
became the leading wireless technology. IEEE 802.11b equipment transmits in the 2.4
GHz band, offering data rates of up to 11 Mbps. IEEE 802.11b was proposed to deliver
performance, throughput, and security features comparable to wired LANs. IEEE
802.11a operates in the 5 GHz Unlicensed National Information Infrastructure (UNII)
frequency band, delivering data rates up to 54 Mbps. In 2003, IEEE announced the IEEE
802.11g amendment, which details a radio transmission method that also operates in the
2.4 GHz ISM band and can sustain data rates of up to 54 Mbps. Furthermore, IEEE
802.11g-compliant products are backward compatible with IEEE 802.11b-compliant
products (NIST, 2008).
In 2006, the first IEEE 802.11n draft was offered to enhance the range and speed of
WLANs up to theoretical speeds of 300 Mbps. IEEE 802.11n maintains backward
compatibility with IEEE 802.11a/b/g WLANs because it runs on both the 2.4 GHz ISM
band and the 5.0 GHz UNII band. Throughput is enhanced over its predecessors by
exploiting wider bandwidth channels and devices supplied with multiple antennas to
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better tap into RF signal. Moreover, IEEE 802.11n almost doubles the effective range of
the WLAN (NIST, 2008). In 2014, IEEE approved IEEE 802.11ac which is planned to
achieve higher multi-user throughput in wireless local area networks (WLANs). IEEE
802.11ac is intended to enhance WLAN user experience by offering data rates up to 7
Gbps in the 5 GHz band, more than 10 times the speed that was previously standardized
(Kelly, 2014).
The network employing the IEEE 802.11 family of standards for creating WLAN with
Internet facility is called Wi-Fi network, and the devices operating in that network are
called Wi-Fi devices. Wi-Fi is a trademark of the Wi-Fi Alliance and the brand name for
products using the IEEE 802.11 family of standards. The advantages of Wi-Fi networks
comprise: convenience, mobility, productivity, deployment, expandability and cost. The
disadvantages of using Wi-Fi networks are: security, range, reliability, and speed
(Kirankumar, Babu, Prasad, and Wishnumurthy, 2012; Singh, Mishra, and Barwal, 2014).
WLAN technology generates new threats. For example, since communications take
place "through the air" riding on radio frequencies, the risk of interception is greater than
with wired networks. If the message is not encrypted, or encrypted with a weak
algorithm, the attacker can read it, thereby conceding confidentiality. Data encryption is
the principal means of security in a WLAN. Without encryption, any ordinary wireless
device can read all traffic in a network, and in 802.11 WLANs, encryption is optional.
The overarching security goals for WLAN are identical to those of wired networks:
preserving confidentiality, ensuring integrity, and maintaining availability of the
information and information systems (Habibi, Seyed, and Samadi, 2009; Kirankumar et
al., 2012).
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WLAN Components
One important advantage of WLAN is the ease of its installation. WLAN systems can
remove the requirements of pulling cable through walls and ceilings. The network
architecture of a WLAN is very basic. Key components of a WLAN are access points
(APs) and network interface cards (NICs) (Feng, 2012; Singh et al., 2014).
Access Point (AP) is the wireless equivalent of a LAN hub. An AP is usually
connected to the Ethernet architecture through an Ethernet port. The AP includes a radio
and antenna for communication with client devices. Access points function within a
particular frequency spectrum and use 802.11 modulation techniques specified in the
standard. It also informs the wireless clients of its availability, and authenticates and
associates wireless clients to the wireless network (Feng, 2012; Singh et al., 2014).
Wireless NICs connect wireless devices such as laptop computers, PDAs, mobile
telephones, and other consumer electronic devices to a wireless network either in ad-hoc
peer-to-peer mode or in infrastructure mode with APs. NICs scan the specified spectrum
for potential connectivity and associate to an AP or another wireless device (Feng, 2012;
Singh et al., 2014).
WLAN Architecture
The IEEE 802.11 standard outlines two basic WLAN topologies: ad-hoc network and
infrastructure network. An ad-hoc network is a peer-to-peer network between wireless
clients, and no APs are part of the architecture. An infrastructure network consists of APs
connected to a distribution system (DS), usually a wired network, and wireless clients.
Infrastructure is the most frequently used mode for WLANs (NIST, 2008).
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Ad-hoc Network
This mode of operation occurs when two or more wireless devices communicate
directly to each other. This is called ad-hoc Wi-Fi transmission. The name ad-hoc is used
because the network is set up typically for express purpose and for a short time. One of
the key advantages of ad-hoc WLANs is that theoretically they can be established
anytime and anywhere, permitting multiple users to create wireless connections cheaply,
quickly, and easily with minimal hardware and user maintenance. Ad-hoc networks have
no connection to the other networks. A set of wireless devices configured in this ad-hoc
manner is known as an independent basic service set (IBSS). Figure 2 represents a
sample IBSS that includes a mobile telephone, laptop computer, and a PDA
interconnecting via IEEE 802.11 technology. The circle in Figure 2 illustrates the signal
range of the devices, which is imperative to consider because this limits the coverage area
within which the stations can continue in communication (NIST, 2008).

Figure 2. Ad-hoc network.
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Infrastructure Network
An infrastructure network involves wireless devices and access points. In an
infrastructure network, the wireless clients connect with each other by having an access
point. An access point is the device that operates as a bridge from the wireless network to
the wired network. When access points connect to a distribution system (such as
Ethernet), they support the creation of multiple coverage cells that enable roaming
throughout a facility. A combination of an AP and one or more wireless devices is called
Basic Service Set (BSS). The use of multiple APs connected to a single distribution
system (DS) allows for the creation of wireless networks of arbitrary size and complexity.
In the IEEE 802.11 specification, a multi-BSS network is referred to as an extended
service set (ESS). Figure 3 conceptually depicts a network with both wired and wireless
capabilities, comparable to the architecture of a public Wi-Fi environment. It displays
two APs with corresponding BSSs, which comprise an ESS. The ESS is joined to the
wired enterprise network or DS, which, in turn, is linked to the Internet. This architecture
could permit various wireless devices, such as laptop computers and PDAs, to access
network resources and the Internet. Also, the use of an ESS affords the opportunity for
IEEE 802.11 WLAN devices to roam between APs while maintaining network
connectivity (NIST, 2008). Public Wi-Fi hotspots usually have multiple wireless access
points and share the same SSID. This allows public Wi-Fi users to move around the
public spaces with their mobile devices without being disconnected from the network.
While moving around the public spaces, the Wi-Fi user will disassociate and associate to
the access point with the best signal strength. All of this is transparent to the user.
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Figure 3. Infrastructure network.
Security Threats of WLAN
Generally, wireless networks are more susceptible to security attacks than wired
networks, attributable to the broadcast nature of the transmission. Despite the
productivity, convenience and cost advantage that WLAN presents, the radio waves used
in wireless networks generate a risk that the network can be hacked. Most threats against
wireless networks include an attacker with access to the radio link between wireless
devices (Kirankumar et al., 2012; Singh et al., 2014).
According to NIST (2008), WLAN technologies usually must support several security
objectives. The most common security objectives for WLANs are:
1. Confidentiality: Ensure that communication cannot be read by unauthorized parties.
2. Integrity: Detect any intentional or unintentional changes to data that occur in transit.
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3. Availability: Ensure that devices and individuals can access a WLAN and its
resources whenever needed.
NIST (2008) indicated that network security attacks against WLANs are usually
divided into passive and active attacks. These two broad classes are then subdivided into
other types of attacks. All are defined below:
1. Passive Attack: An attack in which an unauthorized individual acquires access to an
asset and does not modify its content or actively attack or disrupt a WLAN. There are
two types of passive attacks:


Eavesdropping: The attacker monitors wireless data transmissions between
devices for message content, such as authentication credentials or passwords. An
example of this attack is an intruder monitoring transmissions on a WLAN
between an AP and a connected device.



Traffic analysis: The attacker gains intelligence by monitoring the transmissions
for patterns of communication. A substantial amount of data is contained in the
flow of messages between communicating parties. This method is subtler than
eavesdropping.

2. Active Attack: an attack whereby an unauthorized party makes modifications to a
message, data stream, or file. It is feasible to detect this type of attack, but it may not
be avertible. Active attacks consist of four types (or a combination thereof):


Masquerading: The attacker impersonates an authorized user to gain access to
certain unauthorized privileges.



Replay: The attacker monitors transmissions (passive attack) and retransmits
messages posing as the legitimate user.
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Message modification: The attacker alters a legitimate message by deleting,
adding to, changing, or reordering the message.



DoS: The attacker prevents or prohibits the normal use or management of a
WLAN.

Standards for WLAN Security
This section describes the security features provided by IEEE 802.11 WLAN
standards.
Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP)
Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) is a standard encryption for wireless networking
leveraging the Rivest Cipher 4 (RC4) algorithm with two sides of a data communication.
It is a user authentication and data encryption system from IEEE 802.11 applied to defeat
security threats. Essentially, WEP offers security to a WLAN by encrypting the
information transmitted over the air, so that only the receivers who have the correct
encryption key can decrypt the information (Habibi et al., 2009; Singh et al., 2014).
WEP was originated by the IEEE to deliver the following three basic security services:
(a) authentication to verify the identity of communicating client stations; (b)
confidentiality to use encryption to offer wireless networks with the same or similar
privacy achieved by an unencrypted wired network; and (c) integrity to ensure that
messages were not modified in transit between wireless clients and APs. IEEE 802.11
configurations that rely on WEP have several well-documented security problems. The
IEEE and the Wi-Fi Alliance acknowledged the scope of the problems and developed
short-term and long-term strategies for rectifying the situation. In early 2003, the Wi-Fi
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Alliance, in coordination with the IEEE 802.11 Working Group, developed the Wi-Fi
Protected Access (WPA) security enhancement to replace WEP (NIST, 2008).
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA)
WPA was released as a temporary measure until a robust IEEE 802.11 security
standard could be developed and approved. WPA includes two main characteristics:
IEEE 802.1x and the Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP). The IEEE 802.1x portbased access control provides a framework to allow the use of robust upper-layer
authentication protocols. It also enables the use of session keys that allow the rotation of
cryptographic keys. TKIP contains four new features to enhance the security of IEEE
802.11: TKIP extends the IV space, allows for per-packet key construction, provides
cryptographic integrity, and provides key derivation and distribution. Furthermore, it
addresses the critical need to periodically change encryption keys. However, WPA has
significant flaws and does not provide the level of security that Wi-Fi Protected Access II
(WPA2)/802.11i can (NIST, 2008).
WPA2/ 802.11i
Habibi et al. (2009) stated that the WPA2 and 802.11i terms are often used
interchangeably. According to Habibi et al. (2009), Feng (2012), and Singh et al. (2014),
the WPA2 standard specifies two modes of security:
1. In “personal” mode a pre-shared secret is used, much like WEP or WAP. Access
points and clients are all manually configured to use the same secret of up to 64
ASCII characters, such as “this_is_our_secret_password.” An actual 256-bit
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randomly generated number may also be used, but this is difficult to enter manually
into client configurations.
2. The “enterprise” security is based on 802.1x, the EAP authentication framework, and
secure key distribution. 802.1x was originally designed for wired Ethernet networks.
The following discussion of 802.1x is divided into three separate sections: Point-toPoint Protocol (PPP), Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) and 802.1x itself.
PPP
The Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP) originally emerged as an encapsulation protocol for
transporting IP traffic over point-to point links. PPP also launched a standard for the
assignment and management of IP addresses, asynchronous (start/stop) and bit-oriented
synchronous encapsulation, network protocol multiplexing, link configuration, link
quality testing, and error detection. By any standard, PPP is a good protocol. However, as
PPP usage grew, hackers quickly uncovered its limitation in terms of security. This leads
to the designation of a new authentication protocol, called Extensible Authentication
Protocol (EAP).
EAP
The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) is a general authentication protocol
defined in IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force) standards. It was originally designed
for use with PPP. It is an authentication protocol that presents a generalized framework
for several authentication mechanisms. These consist of Kerberos, public key, smart
cards and one-time passwords. With a standardized EAP, interoperability and
compatibility across authentication methods become simpler. For instance, when a user
dials a remote access server (RAS) and use EAP as part of the PPP connection, the RAS
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does not need to know any of the details about the authentication system. Only the user
and the authentication server have to be synchronized. By supporting EAP authentication,
RAS server does not actively participate in the authentication dialog. Instead, RAS just
re-packages EAP packets to handoff to a remote access dial in user service (RADIUS)
server to make the actual authentication decision.
802.1x
IEEE 802.1x relates to EAP in a way that it is a standard for carrying EAP over a
wired LAN or WLAN. There are four important entities that expound upon this standard:
1. Authenticator: Authenticator is the entity that requires the entity on the other end of
the link to be authenticated. An example is wireless access points.
2. Supplicant: Supplicant is the entity being authenticated by the authenticator and
desiring access to the services of the authenticator.
3. Port Access Entity (PAE): It is the protocol entity associated with a port. It may
support the functionality of authenticator, supplicant or both.
4. Authentication Server: Authentication server is an entity that provides authentication
service to the authenticator. It may be co-located with authenticator, but it is most
likely an external server. It is typically a RADIUS server.
Practical Solutions for Securing WLAN
This section presents the use of hardware and software solutions to help secure the
WLAN environment.
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VPN
An alternate method of realizing confidentiality and integrity protection is using a
virtual private network (VPN). A VPN is a virtual network, built on top of existing
physical networks, that can afford a secure communications mechanism for data and IP
information transmitted between networks. VPNs are often used to enable the secure
transfer of sensitive data across public networks, such as the Internet, for remote access,
telework, and other situations encompassing connecting multiple locations. VPNs can
also be set up within a single network, such as a WLAN, to safeguard sensitive
communications from other parties on the network. A variety of VPN technologies exist,
such as Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) VPNs and Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) VPNs.
One way to use VPNs to protect WLAN communications is to establish a VPN tunnel
between the WLAN client device and a VPN concentrator that is behind the AP. With an
IPsec VPN, security services are provided at the network layer of the protocol stack,
which will secure all applications and protocols operating at layer 3 and above. The VPN
security services are independent of layer 2 wireless security and are recommended to be
used if the underlying wireless security mechanisms are weak (NIST, 2005).
Universal Authentication Mechanism (UAM)
With UAM, any device is permitted to associate to the Wi-Fi access point and is
allotted an IP address and other network information such as the standard gateway
automatically via DHCP. After association, the user opens a web browser and enters any
URL. A transparent HTTP proxy (also called captive portal) on the AP (or the underlying
infrastructure) captures the request and redirects it to a login page. In the case of free
open public Wi-Fi, the user is usually just required to accept the terms of use. Now the
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user’s primary HTTP request is sent and the response is delivered to the user (Szongott et
al., 2012).

Need for Security in Free Open Public Wi-Fi Hotspots
The review of the literature in this section will attempt to discover the need for
security in free open public Wi-Fi hotspots. The studies included in this section were
chosen because they demonstrate a significant trend toward the need for wireless security
in free open public Wi-Fi hotspots.
In order to build the foundation supporting the need for wireless security in free open
public Wi-Fi, Han et al. (2009, 2011), Song et al. (2010, 2012), and Kim et al. (2012)
indicated in their studies that the Internet has become a part of our everyday life and the
use of IEEE 802.11 based wireless local area networks, WLANs, or Wi-Fi has rapidly
increased in popularity in recent years for accessing the Internet. In recent years, Internet
usage shifted from stationary to mobile devices such as laptops, tablets, or smartphones
with a wireless connection to the network (Lanze et al., 2014). Wi-Fi market reached 6.4
billion in 2011 and a rapid growth is forecasted in the upcoming years as most of mobile
devices (e.g., laptops, tablets, smartphones, etc.) have Wi-Fi capability (Myslewski,
2011; IDC, 2017).
Wi-Fi’s popularity is due to the following reasons: mobility, flexibility, scalability,
and ease of installation (Nikbakhsh et al., 2012). Although mobile cellular networks (e.
g., 3G/4G LTE) have gained an increasing influence, the importance of Wi-Fi networks
remains crucial. Wi-Fi networks provide faster connectivity, offer unmetered service
whenever mobile networks are unavailable, overloaded, or overpriced (e.g., in roaming)
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and are indispensable for devices that do not have hardware to access mobile cellular
networks, e. g., laptops or many tablets (Lanze et al., 2014).
Both users and providers benefit significantly from public Wi-Fi hotspots. Users
receive wireless Internet access and providers attract new potential clients (Monica &
Ribeiro, 2011). Many public avenues have set up Wi-Fi access points to provide free
wireless Internet service in order to attract and better serve their customers (Hossen &
Wenyuan, 2014; Lanze et al., 2014; Nakhila et al., 2015).
Han et al. (2009, 2011) indicated that as users’ expectations of wireless availability
increases, the security of such networks becomes even more important. Additionally,
Kim et al. (2012) and Nikbakhsh et al. (2012) stated in their studies that the growing
popularity of WLANs increases the risk of wireless security attacks. Furthermore, there is
a negative incentive for providers to implement security mechanisms, because the goal of
the hotspots is to provide convenience and to attract customers. For instance, public WiFi hotspots provide free, open, and zero liability Internet access to customers (Hossen &
Wenyuan, 2014). Nakhila et al. (2015) indicated that clients will only need to search the
airwave and connect to the wireless network. No means of encryption or authentication
is used besides the wireless network name. Wi-Fi’s popularity makes it an attractive
target for intruders to compromise and to eavesdrop wireless client information (Nakhila
et al., 2015).
According to Song et al. (2010, 2012), Hossen & Wenyuan (2014), and Nakhila et al.
(2015), while users can access Wi-Fi Internet hotspot connections in public more easily,
they become more vulnerable to fraud and identity theft, referred to as evil twin attacks
(ETA). This is a threat that can severely compromise the security of wireless users.
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Moreover, lack of knowledge and awareness possessed by the user make this issue
extremely disturbing (Nikbakhsh et al., 2012). Due to its severity, the evil twin attack
has gained a significant amount of interest in the media and research community (Han et
al., 2009, 2011; Song et al., 2010, 2012; Lanze et al., 2014).
Evil Twin Attack
An evil twin attack in a wireless LAN refers to a hard- or software-based 802.11 rogue
Wi-Fi access point (AP) that appears to be a legitimate one offered on the premises, but
actually has been set up by a hacker to “eavesdrop” on all wireless communications done
by the victims (Song et al., 2010, 2012; Monica & Ribeiro, 2011; Lanze et al., 2014;
Hossen & Wenyuan, 2014; Nakhila et al., 2015; Hsu et al., 2015). An evil twin AP
mimics the identity of a legitimate AP by cloning its characteristics, such as SSID, MAC,
or IP address, to be able to trap users to hijack their Internet connection for monetary gain
(Nikbakhsh et al., 2012; Kim et al., 2012; Lanze et al., 2014). In the existing literature,
the terms evil twin AP, rogue AP, fake AP and spoofed AP are used synonymously.
Attack Scenarios
Song et al. (2010, 2012), Nikbakhsh et al. (2012), Hossen & Wenyuan (2014), and
Nakhila et al. (2015) discovered the following attack scenarios:
1. Using the legitimate AP’s Internet access (Multihop attack): The attacker connects
his device to a legitimate AP for accessing the Internet. In this scenario, the evil twin
AP can itself behave as a normal Wi-Fi client and uses the legitimate AP to connect
with the Internet. All the wireless traffic from the victim will pass through the
attacker’s node. In the literature, this type of attack scenario is denoted as multihop
attacks. Figure 4 illustrates the multihop attack scenario.
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2. Using mobile Internet access (Mobile attack): The attacker uses mobile Internet, e.g.
3G/4G LTE, as the access network for connecting to the Internet. A hotspot router
can act as an evil twin AP. Also, a smartphone with mobile AP functionality built in
operating systems such as Android or iOS, can act as an evil twin AP and thus can
allow Wi-Fi clients to use mobile Internet service of the smartphone. In the literature,
this type of attack scenario is denoted as mobile attacks. Figure 5 illustrates the
mobile attack scenario.
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Evil Twin AP Set Up
It is easy for an adversary to create an evil twin AP in a public Wi-Fi hotspot using a
Wi-Fi enabled device, e.g., laptop, smartphone, etc. (Song et al., 2010, 2012; Lanze et al.,
2014). By using a free, fully-automated software (e.g. aircrack-ng), an attacker can
simply configure a Wi-Fi enabled device to be an evil twin AP to mimic the legitimate
access point used in a free public Wi-Fi area (Song et al., 2010, 2012; Hossen &
Wenyuan, 2014; Lanze et al., 2014). Additionally, all common mobile operating systems
including Android and iOS are capable of creating a wireless AP using mobile hotspot
functionality. Hence, this process can be performed directly from smartphones, without
attracting the attention of anybody in the vicinity (Lanze et al., 2014).
Launch of Evil Twin Attacks
An evil twin attack is easy to launch at public places due to the lack of security
mechanisms. Han et al. (2009, 2011), Song et al. (2010, 2012), Monica & Ribeiro
(2011), and Hsu et al. (2015) stated in their studies that there are three strategies for
attackers to attract victims into connecting to their rogue access points. The first strategy
is by having a rogue AP with the SSID of the targeted public Wi-Fi network physically
set closer to clients so that its signal can be stronger than the legitimate access points. The
attacker can also intensify the transmission power of the evil twin AP. This strategy
works, since several operating systems choose the AP with the strongest signal strength
when several APs with the same SSID are available, as these operating systems believe
different APs with the same SSID belong to the same hotspot. Also, wireless users tend
to choose the network with the highest signal strength when manually selecting a network
to connect to. The wireless users basically assume that all the APs are legitimate. The
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second strategy uses the automatic re-association feature that several end-user systems
provide. These systems have preferred network lists, containing the SSID names of the
networks a user has connected to in the past. The attacker simply choses the evil twin AP
SSID name as the most commonly used SSID names, and waits for victims to connect.
Finally, the third strategy involves using a denial-of-service attack against 802.11
networks. The rogue AP can passively wait for users to connect to it, or actively send
fake de-associate frames to force users to change connections. The loss of connectivity
caused from the continuous disassociations, forces wireless users to choose other
available wireless networks.
Song et al. (2010, 2012) and Monica & Ribeiro (2011) indicated that evil twin attacks
can be hard to trace. The attacker can shut off the attacks suddenly or randomly after
accomplishing the malicious goals. In a very short time frame, the attacker may already
have compromised public Wi-Fi user’s sensitive information, such as passwords or credit
card information. According to Hsu et al. (2015), when a user connects to an evil AP, it
is exposed under an open connection to the attacker causing privacy data leakage.
Detecting evil twin access points is the first step in dealing with this problem.
In addition, Song et al. (2010, 2012), Monica & Ribeiro (2011), Choi, Chang, Ko, and
Hu (2011), Cheng, Wang, Cheng, Mohapatra, and Seneviratne (2013), Lanze et al.
(2014), and Hossen & Wenyuan (2014) found that WPA2, VPN and UAM solutions are
not appropriate for protecting against evil twin attacks. WPA2 is a mechanism that has to
be configured and carefully maintained by an operator, and operators of public Wi-Fi
hotspots in particular have no incentive to provide such a service. Additionally, VPN
technology is not easily accessible for all users since security service providers usually
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charge a monthly fee. Finally, with UAM, the initial URL accessed by the user is
redirected to a captive portal page to only accept terms of use of free Wi-Fi. This page
can be easily emulated by an attacker. In addition, UAM at hotspots does not allow the
user to confirm the integrity of the hotspot or its provider. Hence, this method does not
offer any security at all for the user pertaining to the evil twin attack.

Client-side Evil Twin Attack Detection Solutions
The client-side evil twin detection studies selected and summarized in this section
provide insight on limitations of existing client-side detection solutions and also direction
related to the design, construction, deployment, and evaluation of a client-side detection
artifact that can be used to detect an evil twin attack in free open public Wi-Fi
environments. All the studies found related to this domain focus on the construction of a
client-side detection artifact based on best practices and industry standards but not on
design principles derived from DSR since there are no studies that effectively address this
innovative method of artifact construction, implementation and evaluation.
In an early study, Han et al. (2009) developed a client-side timing-base method for
detection of rogue access points based on round trip time (RTT) calculation between the
wireless user and the DNS server, and does not require network administrator assistance.
Their RTT-based method helps distinguish the route through a rogue AP from that
through a legitimate AP (one hop versus two-hop wireless channels). Han et al. (2009)
found that this additional hop introduces an unavoidable time delay. In a later study, Han
et al. (2011) extended their work by using an outlier algorithm to reduce false detection,
and dynamically adjusting the number of samples in each test to reduce detection time
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without sacrificing accuracy. Their method requires knowledge of the wireless hotspot
network infrastructure. Also, their method is based on the attacker using the legitimate
wireless network gateway to pass through client data traffic, assumes the attacker is
connected when the wireless user connects to the public Wi-Fi hotspot, warns the
wireless user of an evil twin attack before any traffic is transmitted, and after detection, it
does not allow the user to connect to a legitimate AP. Their method works with any type
of IEEE 802.11 based wireless networks, Wi-Fi enabled devices, and with free open
public Wi-Fi networks. Their method assumes that the user has not connected to the
target public Wi-Fi network in the past. Han et al. (2009, 2011) evaluated their solution
in the lab and field using their own evil twin AP. Their study set a benchmark for
creating client-side detection methods that allow wireless users to use their station to
independently detect whether an AP is legitimate or not without additional equipment and
the assistance of a wireless network administrator in free open public Wi-Fi hotspots.
Additionally, using timing measurements and also based on the evil twin AP utilizing
the legitimate AP to connect to the Internet, Song et al. (2010) introduced a prototype
system called “ETSniffer” (Evil Twin Sniffer) based on Interpacket Arrival Time (IAT)
to detect evil twin access points by distinguishing a one-hop from a two-hop wireless
network setting between the wireless client and the remote IAT server (custom server).
Their method does not require administrator assistance. Two methods were presented as
part of this study. The first method is called Trained Mean Matching (TMM) and
requires knowing the distribution of server IAT as trained knowledge and the second
method is called Hop Differentiating Technique (HDT) and does not have such a
requirement. Their study suggested that HDT improves TMM by removing the training
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requirement. Both algorithms utilize the wireless IAT network statistic, consider the
influencing factors of received signal strengths (RSSs) and wireless network saturation,
and employ Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT) technique to make the final
detection. As an improvement, Song et al. (2012) provided additional options for IAT
remote servers that can be utilized to measure IAT statistics. Their method works with
any type of IEEE 802.11 based wireless networks, Wi-Fi enabled devices, and with free
open public Wi-Fi networks. Their method assumes the attacker is connected when the
wireless user connects to the public Wi-Fi hotspot, warns the wireless user of an evil twin
attack before any traffic is transmitted, and after detection, it does not allow the user to
connect to a legitimate AP. Their method assumes that the user has not connected to the
target public Wi-Fi network in the past. Song et al. (2010, 2012) evaluated their solution
in the lab and field using their own evil twin AP. Their work made an important
contribution by proposing the first client-side evil twin attack detection solution that did
not require prior knowledge of the wireless hotspot network infrastructure and network
administrator assistance.
As the technology continued to move toward client-side evil twin detection systems,
Monica & Ribeiro (2011) developed a detection solution called “WiFiHop”. Their
method does not require network administrator assistance. This detection system is based
on the behavior of the legitimate AP without depending on timing to detect a multihop
setting between the wireless user and the Internet. Their solution requires the
implementation of a script (echo server) on a public hosting server. Their method is
based on the evil twin AP relaying traffic to the Internet using the legitimate AP and is
technology independent. Monica & Ribeiro found that when an evil twin attack is in
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place, the user’s data must transit the wireless channel between the evil twin and the
legitimate AP. If an extra wireless hop is detected, then the presence of an evil twin AP is
confirmed. Their method was based on the attacker using the legitimate wireless network
gateway to pass through client data traffic. Their system is automated with no
intervention from users. Their method works with any type of IEEE 802.11 based
wireless networks and Wi-Fi enabled devices. Furthermore, their method assumes the
attacker is connected when the wireless user connects to the public Wi-Fi hotspot, warns
the wireless user of an evil twin attack before any traffic is transmitted, and after
detection, it does not allow the user to connect to a legitimate AP. Their method assumes
that the user has not connected to the target public Wi-Fi network in the past. Monica &
Ribeiro (2011) evaluated their solution in the lab and field using their own evil twin AP.
Their major contribution was to develop a solution that does not depend on timing to
detect a multihop setting, does not require network administrator assistance, and that it
operates in both free open and encrypted public Wi-Fi networks.
In support of warning users to avoid connecting to evil twin access points in public
Wi-Fi hotspots, Nikbakhsh et al. (2012) developed a client-side approach based on
traceroute that compares the gateways and routes that a packet travels to determine
whether an access point is legitimate or not without the assistance from a wireless LAN
operator. If the legitimate AP and evil twin AP have the same IP addresses with different
trace route (IP spoofing), their method does not have any references to check which one
is the authorized access point, therefore it just warns the user about an evil twin attack.
Their method was based on the attacker using the legitimate wireless network gateway to
pass through client data traffic. Their method works with any type of IEEE 802.11 based
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wireless networks, Wi-Fi enabled devices, and with free open public Wi-Fi networks.
Furthermore, their method assumes the attacker is connected when the wireless user
connects to the public Wi-Fi hotspot, warns the wireless user of an evil twin attack before
any traffic is transmitted, and after detection, it does not allow the user to connect to a
legitimate AP. Their method assumes that the user has not connected to the target public
Wi-Fi network in the past. Their approach was not implemented or evaluated in a lab
environment or in the field.
During the same time, Kim et al. (2012) developed a client-side evil twin attack
detection method for smartphones only based on received signal strengths (RSSs), an
online detection algorithm, and does not require network administrator assistance. Their
method measured RSSs from both the legitimate and evil twin access points on the
smartphone and used normalization of collected signal strengths for accurate
measurement. Finally, the method classified signal strengths that are highly correlated to
others based on a defined threshold value. Highly correlated RSSs are considered fake
signals from an evil twin access point. Kim et al. (2012) made the assumption that the
attacker was using the legitimate wireless network gateway to pass through client data
traffic. Their system is automated with no intervention from users. Their method works
with any type of IEEE 802.11 based wireless networks, Wi-Fi enabled devices, and with
free open public Wi-Fi networks. Additionally, their method assumes the attacker is
connected when the wireless user connects to the public Wi-Fi hotspot, warns the
wireless user of an evil twin attack before any traffic is transmitted, and after detection, it
does not allow the user to connect to a legitimate AP. Their method assumes that the user
has not connected to the target public Wi-Fi network in the past. Kim et al. (2012)
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evaluated their solution in the lab and field using their own evil twin AP. Their work
made an important contribution by proposing the first client-side evil twin detection
solution for a smartphone that works on open and encrypted networks.
A recent study conducted by Lanze et al. (2014) addresses the problem of lack of
client-side evil twin attack detection solutions for public Wi-Fi hotspot users to
independently verify whether an access point is legitimate or not through a method for
detection of software-based evil twin attacks (e.g. aircrack-ng) and without network
administrator assistance. Their method separates software access points from legitimate
hardware access points. Lanze et al. (2014) found that when software emulates hardware
behavior, it presents a significant timing inaccuracy due to processing delays and leaks
information that can be used for detection. Further, their method explains why airbase-ng
fails to imitate a hardware AP in regards to the accuracy of Timing Synchronization
Function (TSF) timestamps in beacon frames. Their method works with any type of
IEEE 802.11 based wireless networks, Wi-Fi enabled devices, and with free open public
Wi-Fi networks. In addition, their method assumes the attacker is connected when the
wireless user connects to the public Wi-Fi hotspot, warns the wireless user of an evil twin
attack before any traffic is transmitted, and after detection, it does not allow the user to
connect to a legitimate AP. Their method assumes that the user has not connected to the
target public Wi-Fi network in the past. Their solution was only implemented in a lab
environment. Lanze et al. (2014) used their own evil twin AP on the evaluation.
Similarly, using the legitimate AP to connect to the Internet, Hsu et al. (2015)
proposed a client-side evil twin attack detection system called “ET Detector” based on
redirection behavior. Their method does not require administrator assistance. By
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operating the wireless network interface controller (WNIC) in monitor mode (which is
able to capture all packets that conform to its monitoring channel and protocol) and by
examining the captured packets, users can simply and accurately discover the evil twin
attack. The system has two detection mechanisms: default testing and secondary device
testing. Default testing only works when a user is not the only one using public Wi-Fi in
a hotspot. Otherwise, the system will be forced to use secondary testing which requires
an extra Wi-Fi device with no sensitive data on it to associate to the target AP to make
the detection. Their method works with any type of IEEE 802.11 based wireless
networks, Wi-Fi enabled devices, and with free open public Wi-Fi networks. Their
method assumes the attacker is connected when the wireless user connects to the public
Wi-Fi hotspot, warns the wireless user of an evil twin attack before any traffic is
transmitted, and after detection, it does not allow the user to connect to a legitimate AP.
Their method assumes that the user has not connected to the target public Wi-Fi network
in the past. Hsu et al. (2015) evaluated their solution in the lab and field using their own
evil twin AP.
Szongott et al. (2015) proposed a detection system called Mobile Evil Twin Detection
System (METDS) for smartphones based on context-based recognition that can help
mitigate evil twin attacks, and does not require administrator assistance. To detect evil
twin APs, the algorithm of the METDS utilizes the following parameters to describe and
verify an access point's environment: SSID, BSSID, cell tower information, and device’s
location. Their method only works if the METDS system has previously been run in the
hotspot. In this case, METDS already has an appropriate dataset that can be used to
verify the current environment. Their method requires previous knowledge of the target
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network and also an external server to store learned data. Their system is automated with
no intervention from users. Also, their method works with any type of IEEE 802.11
based wireless networks, Wi-Fi enabled devices, and with free open public Wi-Fi
networks. Their method assumes the attacker is connected when the wireless user
connects to the public Wi-Fi hotspot, warns the wireless user of an evil twin attack before
any traffic is transmitted, and after detection, it does not allow the user to connect to a
legitimate AP. Their method assumes that the user has not connected to the target public
Wi-Fi network in the past. Their solution was evaluated in a lab using simulations based
on real-world data.
Continuing in the domain of client-side evil twin detection, Hossen & Wenyuan
(2014) introduced a method called Client end Evil Twin Access Point Detector (CETAD)
to detect evil twin attacks without network administrator assistance. Their method
leverages public servers and was implemented as an application in a smartphone. Their
application included two detection techniques: ISP-based and timing-based. The
application utilized the ISP-based detection technique, and if not successful, used the
timing-based detection technique. The ISP-based technique was used to detect mobile
attacks as the ISP information of a legitimate AP and an evil twin AP are different. It
detects whether or not different gateways are used by multiple APs in one hotspot
location that have the same SSID. Hossen & Wenyuan’s ISP-based method for mobile
attacks uses a public website to gather the global IP address shared by the legitimate APs.
Timing-based technique was used to detect multihop attacks because the attacker’s evil
twin AP uses the legitimate AP as the gateway. Hossen & Wenyuan (2014) claim that
when the evil twin attack is launched utilizing the victim’s Internet, RTT values vary

58
significantly. Hossen & Wenyuan assume that the BSSID of the hotspot APs are unique
and use that as a reference to switch between different APs with the same SSID in the
hotspot. Hossen & Wenyuan assume that the evil twin AP is in a different subnet as the
legitimate AP. Their method assumes detection of all the APs in the public Wi-Fi
network during the initial wireless network scanning and that the client is able to
associate to all the APs in the public Wi-Fi network. Their system is automated with no
intervention from users. Their method works with any type of IEEE 802.11 based
wireless networks, Wi-Fi enabled devices, and with free open Wi-Fi networks.
Furthermore, their method assumes the attacker is connected when the wireless user
connects to the public Wi-Fi hotspot, and warns the wireless user of an evil twin attack
before any traffic is transmitted. Hossen & Wenyuan (2014) claim that after the attack
has been detected, the application allows the wireless user to connect to the legitimate
AP, but this was not included in their algorithm. Furthermore, their method does not
cover the scenarios when the attacker blocks access to the public website or when the
attacker presents an invalid certificate while ISP information is retrieved from the public
website. Their method assumes that the user has not connected to the target public Wi-Fi
network in the past. Hossen & Wenyuan (2014) was evaluated in the lab and field using
their own evil twin AP. Their main contribution was evaluating the effectiveness of the
client-side detection system at a large scale in uncontrolled environments.
In a similar study, Nakhila et al. (2015) also presented a client-side detection method
for mobile attacks that does not require network administrator assistance and detects
whether or not different gateways are used by multiple APs in one hotspot location that
have the same SSID. Their detection technique relies on an SSL/TCP connection to a

59
remote public server, and detects the changing of wireless network gateway’s public IP
address in the middle of the SSL/TCP connection. Nakhila et al. (2015) assume that a
mobile attack is not executed before the client establish a secure connection to the remote
server. Also, Nakhila et al. assume that the BSSID of the hotspot APs are unique and use
that as a reference in their method to switch between different APs with the same SSID in
the hotspot. Nakhila et al.’s (2015) method only works when the evil twin AP is in the
same subnet as the legitimate AP. Their method assumes the attacker uses a different
gateway from a legitimate AP. If the attacker uses a legitimate gateway to pass wireless
client data, the proposed detection method will not work. Their method assumes
detection of all the APs in the public Wi-Fi network during the initial wireless network
scanning and that the client is able to associate to all the APs. Nakhila et al.’s method
does not cover the scenario when the attacker blocks access to the public website. Their
system is automated with no intervention from users. Their method works with any type
of IEEE 802.11 based wireless networks, Wi-Fi enabled devices, and with free open WiFi networks. Furthermore, their solution assumes the attacker is connected when the
wireless user connects to the public Wi-Fi hotspot, warns the wireless user of an evil twin
attack before any traffic is transmitted, and after detection, it does not allow the user to
connect to a legitimate AP. Their method assumes that the user has not connected to the
target public Wi-Fi network in the past. Their solution was only implemented in a lab
environment. Nakhila et al. (2015) used their own evil twin AP on the evaluation.
The client-side detection artifact constructed as part of this dissertation linked the gap
between the need of wireless security in free open public Wi-Fi hotspots and limitations
in existing client-side evil twin attack detection solutions.
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Appendix A shows existing studies requirements and limitations mapping based on
the literature review.

Design Science Research Principles and Methodology
Design theory played a significant role in the development of DSR principles that
were used in the effective construction, implementation, and evaluation of a client-side
evil twin attack detection system to allow wireless users of free open public Wi-Fi to
detect mobile evil twin attacks.
According to Walls, Widmeyer, and El Sawy (1992), IS design theories are
prescriptive, which integrates normative and descriptive theories into design paths
intended to produce more effective information systems. IS design theories prescribe
effective development practices (methods) and a type of system solution (instantiation)
for a particular class of user requirements (models). Further, Walls et al. (1992) indicated
that explanatory theories tell “what is”, predictive theories tell “what will be”, normative
theories tell “what should be”, and design theories tell “how to/ because”.
In support of Walls et al.’s (1992) study, March and Smith (1995) found that design
science offers prescriptions and creates artifacts that embody those prescriptions. Design
science attempts to create things that serve human purposes, it is technology oriented and
its products (constructs, models, methods, and implementations) are assessed against
criteria of utility to a community of users (e.g. does it work? is it an improvement?).
However, March and Smith (1995) argued that DSR should be concerned both with
utility, as a design science, and with theory, as a natural science explaining how and why
IT systems work within their operating environments. March and Smith (1995) found
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that DSR contribution lies in the novelty of the artifact and in the persuasiveness of the
claims that it is effective. Along the same thread, Markus, Majchrzak, and Gasser (2002)
found that a new IS design theory was required for a class of user requirements called
emergent knowledge processes (EKPs), which are defined as patterns of organizational
activity that exhibit three characteristics in combination: “deliberations” with no best
structure or sequence; highly unpredictable potential users and work contexts; and
information requirements that include general, specific, and tacit knowledge distributed
across experts and non-experts.
From a different view on design theory, Hevner, March, Park, and Ram (2004)
indicated that DSR is informed by both existing theory (produced by natural or
behavioral science research) and by identified business needs. According to Hevner et al.
(2004), such theories explain or predict organizational and human phenomena related to
the identified business need and inform researchers and practitioners of the interactions
among people, technology, and organizations that must be managed if an information
system is to achieve its stated purpose, namely improving the effectiveness and efficiency
of an organization. Hevner et al. (2004) further noted that DSR is a problem solving
paradigm and knowledge and understanding of a problem domain and its solution are
achieved in the building and evaluation of an IT artifact to meet the identified business
need. The goal of behavioral science research is truth. The goal of design science
research is utility. Hevner et al. (2004) argued that truth and utility are inseparable. Truth
informs design and utility informs theory. According to Gregor & Jones (2007), Hevner
et al. (2004) argue with the use of the word “theory” for design type knowledge,
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preferring to restrict the word to the possibly more familiar natural science (and, later,
social science) types of theory.
According to Venable (2006), design theory building is a central activity related to
problem diagnosis, technology invention or design (to solve problems), and technology
evaluation. Venable (2006) indicated that theory building occurs before, during,
throughout, and at the end as a result of Design Science Research. Venable argues that
design theory should be in the form of utility theories, which relate improvements
expected from applying a particular type or types of technologies to a particular type of
problem. During the same year, Gregor (2006) examined the structural nature of theory
in the discipline of Information Systems and proposed a taxonomy for classifying
developed theories. Using the primary goals of theory (analysis, explanation, prediction,
and prescription), Gregor (2006) distinguished five interrelated types of theory: (1) theory
for analyzing; (2) theory for explaining; (3) theory for predicting; (4) theory for
explaining and predicting (EP); and (5) theory for design and action. The theory for
design and action says how to do something. It is about the principles of form and
function, methods, and justificatory theoretical knowledge that are used in the
development of IS. Models and methods can be evaluated for completeness, simplicity,
consistency, ease of use, and the quality of results obtained through use of the method.
According to Gregor and Jones (2007), IS design theory allows the prescription of
guidelines for further artifacts of the same type and that design theories can be about
artifacts that are either products or methods. As the word “design” is both a noun and a
verb, a theory can be about both the principles underlying the form of the design and also
about the act of implementing the design in the real world. According to Gregor & Jones
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(2007), researchers in design science have tended not to speak of theory in relation to
design knowledge at all, but have focused more on design research as an activity that
results in artifact construction. One year later, based on Hevner et al.’s (2004) work,
Peffers, Tuunanen, Rothenberger, and Chatterjee’s (2008) developed a design science
research methodology (DSRM) resulting from theory that incorporates principles,
practice rules, and procedures required to carry out such design science (DS) research and
a mental model for its presentation. DSRM may support with the recognition and
legitimization of DS research and its objectives, processes, and outputs and it should help
researchers to present research with reference to a commonly understood framework,
rather than justifying the research paradigm on an ad hoc basis with each new paper.
According to Gregor and Hevner (2013), theory is only one form that a DSR
contribution can take. They argued that contributions to knowledge could be partial
theory, incomplete theory, or even some particularly interesting and perhaps surprising
empirical generalization in the form of a new design artifact. Based on Gregor and
Hevner’s (2013) findings, what is likely to be the most critical part of a DSR article is
how the author stakes the claim to a knowledge contribution and provides convincing
evidence that the research makes a practical contribution to the application context.

Strengths and Weaknesses
Several studies exist in the literature review that are sound and support the problem
statement and research questions. However, there are some studies that are less valuable
and this section will endeavor to encapsulate both the strengths and weaknesses of some
of the key studies related to the four main topics mentioned in the literature review: (a)
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wireless security; (b) need for security in free open public Wi-Fi hotspots; (c) client-side
evil twin attack detection solutions; and (d) DSR principles and methodology.
Supporting the topic of wireless security in general, Kirankumar et al. (2012) and
Singh et al. (2014) indicate that wireless networks are more vulnerable to security attacks
than wired networks, due to the broadcast nature of the transmission, and that despite the
productivity, convenience and cost advantage that WLAN offers, the radio waves used in
wireless networks create a risk where the network can be hacked. NIST (2008) indicated
that a passive security attack against WLAN such as “eavesdropping” allows the attacker
to monitor wireless data transmissions between devices for message content, such as
authentication credentials or passwords. An example of this attack is an attacker listening
to transmissions on a WLAN between an AP and a client. Detecting evil twin access
points is the first step in dealing with this problem.
Supporting the need for wireless security in free open public Wi-Fi hotspots, several
authors such as Song et al. (2010, 2012), Hossen & Wenyuan (2014), Hsu et al. (2015)
and Nakhila et al. (2015) emphasize the need for mechanisms to protect users against evil
twin attacks that can severely compromise their security by making them more vulnerable
to fraud and identity theft. Song et al. (2010, 2012) described an evil twin attack in a
wireless LAN as a hard- or software-based 802.11 rogue Wi-Fi access point (AP) that
looks like a legitimate one offered on the premises, but actually has been set up by a
hacker to “eavesdrop” all wireless communications done by the victims. Han et al. (2009,
2011), Nikbakhsh et al. (2012), and Kim et al. (2012) indicate that the growing popularity
of WLANs, has increased the risk of evil twin attacks and the lack of knowledge and
awareness of this threat possessed by users make this issue extremely disturbing. Monica
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& Ribeiro (2011) indicate the importance of detecting evil twin attacks to prevent
attacker’s effective interception of all kinds of sensitive data such as passwords or credit
card information.
The client-side evil twin access point detection studies indicated strength based on
systems that have been recently developed by academic researchers. Hossen and
Wenyuan (2014) and Nakhila et al. (2015) developed client-side solutions, CETAD and
SSL/TCP protocol-based, for the most popular evil twin attack scenario where the
attacker’s evil twin AP uses broadband cellular service, e.g. 3G/4G LTE, to access the
Internet. Based on the review of the literature, Hossen & Wenyuan and Nakhila et al. are
the only existing studies that assume the attacker using a different gateway from a
legitimate AP. Evil twin attacks that use a different gateway from a legitimate AP
(mobile attacks) will become more popular nowadays due to the increase in the Internet
access speed of mobile connections, such as 3G/4G LTE, and the inclusion of mobile
hotspot capabilities in virtually all new mobile devices (Szongott et al., 2012; Nakhila et
al., 2015). Unfortunately, there is limited research focused on client-side solutions that
will allow wireless users to verify the authenticity of access points at free open public
Wi-Fi hotspots and protect themselves from mobile evil twin attacks. CETAD was the
only solution evaluated at a large scale in public Wi-Fi hotspots.
Early studies conducted by Han et al. (2009, 2011) and Song et al. (2010, 2012) are
considered weak because they developed a client-side detection system based on timing
measurements which are mainly characterized for technology dependency and low
efficiency impacting detection results. Nikbakhsh et al. (2012) developed a client-side
detection solution based on traceroute results that can be captured by an attacker and send
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to the wireless client using the rogue wireless network. Han et al. (2009, 2011) and
Szongott et al. (2015) require previous knowledge of the public Wi-Fi network.
Additionally, in studies by Han et al. (2009, 2011), Song et al. (2010, 2012), Monica and
Ribeiro (2011), Nikbakhsh et al. (2012), Kim et al. (2012), and Hsu et al. (2015), RTTbased, ETSniffer, WiFiHop, traceroute, multiple signal detection systems, and ET
Detector provided limited client-side detection targeted only to the specific evil win
attack scenario where the attacker uses the legitimate AP for Internet access instead of a
more popular scenario where the attacker uses a different gateway from a legitimate AP
such as broadband cellular service, e.g. 3G/4G LTE, to access the Internet. Studies by
Song et al. (2010, 2012), Monica and Ribeiro (2011), and Szongott et al. (2015) had
problems providing client-side evil twin detection solutions that require to install a server
within the hotspot LAN, the implementation of a script in a service provider hosting
service, or extra Wi-Fi devices. Han et al. (2009, 2011), Song et al. (2010, 2012),
Monica & Ribeiro (2011), Nikbakhsh et al. (2012), Kim et al. (2012), Lanze et al. (2014),
Hossen & Wenyuan (2014), Nakhila et al. (2015), Hsu et al. (2015), and Szongott et al.
(2015) developed client-side detection systems that could not distinguish which AP is
evil twin and which is legitimate, and as result could not offer the user to connect to a
legitimate AP after detection. Additionally, all existing client-side approaches assume
that the user has not connected to the target public Wi-Fi network in the past. Also, none
of the studies protect the user for the duration of the Wi-Fi connection, discovering and
reporting on new mobile evil twin access points. Protection is only provided to the user
at the beginning based on the assumption that the attacker will be connected when the
user connects to the public Wi-Fi network. Lastly, existing solutions were evaluated in a
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lab environment and in the field (universities, cafes, restaurants, and airports) using their
own evil twin APs. Researchers did not evaluate their solution in hotel public Wi-Fi
environments and did not aim at detecting real evil twin APs.
Several strengths and a weakness related to the problem and research question in this
dissertation report are identified in the design science research section of the literature
review. The strengths associated with the literature review of design theory are that
Walls et al. (1992) and Markus et al. (2002) both used IS design theories targeted to
develop executive information systems (EIS) and systems to support emergent
knowledge process (EKPs), respectively. Hevner et al. (2004) defined the limitations of
design science within the IS discipline via a conceptual framework for understanding IS
research and established a set of guidelines for conducting, evaluating and presenting
DSR. Gregor (2006) and Venable (2006) underscores the role and structural nature of
theory in design science research. Peffers et al. (2008) addressed the lack of a
methodology to serve as a framework for carrying out DS research in information
systems and a template for its presentation.
The weakness related to the literature of design theory was identified in the study by
March and Smith’s (1995) contending that in order to insure IT research is both relevant
and effective, both design science and natural science activities are needed. In addition,
the study by Gregor and Hevner (2013) was largely concentrated on presenting practical
guidance on how to comprehend, position, and present DSR knowledge contributions and
publishing unrelated to this study’s problem.
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Gaps in the Literature
Most of the studies presented in the literature review for this dissertation report did not
include a thorough review of the existing client-side evil twin attack detection solutions
and limitations. Therefore, the artifacts developed as part of these studies are not robust
since they are based on a very limited number of requirements and assumptions. In
addition, there are no client-side evil twin attack detection studies that are based on DSR
principles and methodology. The design science research literature helped with the
creation of DSR principles, procedures and specifications supported the artifact
construction, implementation, and evaluation of the client-side evil twin attack detection
system that is central to the study.

Research Methods in Similar Studies
Peffers et al.’s (2008) DSRM has been adopted for this dissertation report. The DSR
methodology is based on Hevner et al.’s DSR principles and includes the following
process elements: (1) problem identification and motivation; (2) define the objectives for
a solution; (3) design and development; (4) demonstration; (5) evaluation; and (6)
communication. This study used the Peffers et al.’s (2008) research methodology as a
model to extrapolate on various DSR approaches and presents on Table 1 a comparison
of the process elements from methods in similar studies to Peffers et al.’s DSRM process
elements. This comparison approach guided the creation of design specifications and
procedures to develop, implement, and evaluate the client-side evil twin attack detection
system at the center of this study.
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Table 1
Comparison of DSRM approaches
Peffers, Tuunanen,
Rothenberger, and
Chatterjee (2008)
– design process
elements
1. Problem
identification and
motivation

Walls,
Widmeyer,
and El
Sawy
(1992)
Kernel
theories

March and
Smith
(1995)

Markus,
Hevner,
Majchrzak, and March, Park,
Gasser (2002) and Ram
(2004)

Gregor and
Jones
(2007)

Venable
(2006)

Gregor and
Hevner
(2013)

Theorize

Characteristics
of emergent
knowledge
processes
(EKPs)

Important and
relevant
problems

Kernel
theories

Problem
space

Purpose and
Scope

Requirements
for IT support
of EKPs

Implicit in
relevance

Solution
technology

Literature
survey

EKP support
system design
and
development
principles for
EKPs

Rigorous
Principles of Technology
artifact
implementa- invention
iterative
tion
search process

2. Objectives of a
solution

3. Design and
Development

Design
Method

Build
artifact:
constructs,
model,
method, and
instantiation

Purpose and
Scope

Design
artifact
description
and design
search
(developme
nt) process
(continued)
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Peffers, Tuunanen,
Rothenberger, and
Chatterjee (2008)
– design process
elements
4. Demonstration

Walls,
Widmeyer,
and El
Sawy
(1992)

5. Evaluation

Testable
design
process
hypotheses

6. Communication

March and
Smith
(1995)

Evaluate
artifact

Markus,
Hevner,
Majchrzak, and March, Park,
Gasser (2002) and Ram
(2004)

Gregor and
Jones
(2007)

Effective EKP
support system

Rigorous
evaluation
methods

Expository
instantiation

Evaluate

Testable
propositions

Communicate

Venable
(2006)

Technology
evaluation

Gregor and
Hevner
(2013)

Novel
artifact
proof of
concept
demonstration
Summative
(final)
testing

Communicate

71
Synthesis of the Literature
Since the artifact design in this dissertation is based on wireless security, the need for
security in free open public Wi-Fi hotspots, client-side evil twin attack detection
solutions, and design science research principles and methodology involved in the artifact
construction; the literature was required to be synthesized precisely related to the problem
domain to provide a high-level, rational point of view.
Wireless security in general is strongly supported in studies conducted by NIST
(2005), NIST (2008), Habibi et al. (2009), Feng (2012), Kirankumar et al. (2012), Kelly
(2014), Szongott et al. (2012), and Singh et al. (2014). Their work describes existing
solutions such as Wi-Fi Protected Access II (WPA2), Virtual Private Networks (VPN),
and Universal Authentication Mechanism (UAM). However, according to Song et al.
(2010, 2012), Monica & Ribeiro (2011), Choi et al. (2011), Cheng et al. (2013), Lanze et
al. (2014), and Hossen & Wenyuan (2014), these solutions are not appropriate for
protecting against evil twin attacks.
WPA2
In personal mode, a pre-shared key (PSK) is established to encrypt traffic between
client and AP. Such a mechanism can only protect against the evil twin attack if the PSK
is hidden from the attacker. The PSK has to be supplied to potential users by some
method, e.g., printed on a receipt. Therefore, in the case of public hotspots, the attacker
can obtain the key by the same means as a public user and mount the attack unimpeded.
In a public Wi-Fi environment, pre-shared keys are arduous to distribute and this differs
with the hotspot’ business goals (Choi et al., 2011; Lanze et al., 2014; Hossen &
Wenyuan, 2014). In enterprise mode, the wireless AP acts as authenticator between a
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client and an authentication server using RADIUS and EAP. With EAP, a certificate
authority (CA) certificate is to be used by devices to authenticate with the server before
submitting credentials. Theoretically, evil twin attacks become impossible by this setup
since the attacker cannot easily imitate the authentication server, as it is protected by
strong cryptographic means. Nevertheless, there is a major weakness of this solution in
practice. The mechanism has to be configured and carefully maintained by the operator,
and operators of public hotspots in particular have no incentive to provide such a service.
Furthermore, the validation of the server certificate by the client, the crucial element of
the authentication process, is optional. If this is not done carefully by the user (i.e., the
certificate check is activated and the user rejects the connection on seeing a certificate
warning), imitation of the authentication server is possible, e.g., by harvesting and
cracking handshakes. In addition, 802.1x needs a trustable authentication server to
validate the wireless devices, which may not be feasible or suitable for the huge amount
of traveling users to detect evil twin attacks by themselves in public Wi-Fi hotspots (Song
et al., 2010, 2012; Choi et al., 2011; Lanze et al., 2014).
VPN
VPNs become the standard when there is the requirement for connecting to the
Internet through potentially untrustworthy wireless operators. Besides certificate-based
attacks such as those on SSL, an attacker can terminate a VPN session (e.g., by dropping
management packets) such that the connection returns to plain mode, usually without a
noticeable notification to the user. The use of VPN solutions, is much more complex in
terms of implementation and still leaves users susceptible to layer 2 and denial-of-service
attacks. A user can configure their wireless device to setup a VPN connection through a
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public access point and all the traffic between the wireless device and the AP will be
encrypted. However, VPN technology is not easily accessible for all users since such
security service providers usually charge a monthly fee (Monica & Ribeiro, 2011; Cheng
et al., 2013; Lanze et al., 2014).
UAM
Free public Wi-Fi hotspots commonly provide a UAM. Usually, the initial URL
accessed by the user is redirected to a captive portal, a website hosted by the operator that
provides a disclaimer requiring the acceptance of the terms of use. However, the attacker
can easily emulate this sort of page. UAM at hotspots does not allow the user to confirm
the integrity of the hotspot or its provider. Hence, this method does not offer any security
at all for the user pertaining to the evil twin attack (Lanze et al., 2014).
The need for security in free open public Wi-Fi hotspots is strongly supported in
studies conducted by Han et al. (2009, 2011), Kim et al. (2012) and Nikbakhsh et al.
(2012). Their findings indicate that as people’s expectation of free open public Wi-Fi
availability increases, the security of such networks becomes more important increasing
the risk of wireless security attacks. According to JiWire’s Mobile Audience Insights
Report Q4 2013, nearly 85% of U.S. public Wi-Fi hotspots are free. Since the goal of
free open public Wi-Fi hotspots is to provide convenience and to attract customers,
security mechanisms are not in place.
Hossen and Wenyuan’s (2014) study findings indicate that public Wi-Fi provides free,
open, and zero liability Internet access to customers. However, generally consumers are
oblivious to the danger on public Wi-Fi networks, such as evil twin attacks, causing
identity theft, hacking, and breeched bank accounts (Private Wi-Fi, 2013). Public Wi-Fi
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users need to protect themselves from such threats. Particularly, a study conducted by
The Guardian in 2011, launched two evil twin attacks conducted with volunteers, in
which they successfully gather users’ usernames, passwords, messages and even credit
card information. This study reinforced that many public Wi-Fi hotspots have no forms
of identification, except their wireless network names (SSID), which can be easily
impersonated.
According to Harris poll (2014), 39% of U.S. adults have accessed or transmitted
sensitive information while on public Wi-Fi without taking any steps to protect their data.
Table 2 presents ways in which adults have accessed sensitive information while using
public Wi-Fi.

Table 2
Ways in which adults have accessed sensitive information while using public Wi-Fi

1.

Activity
Say they have checked a bank
account

Percentage
26%

2.

Say they paid a bill

3.

Say they have sent an email with
sensitive information such as
their Social Security number or
an account number

8%

4.

Say they have filed their taxes

6%

5.

Say they have done so in another
way

19%

10%

The survey conducted by Harris poll (2014) also revealed U.S. adults’ perceptions and
attitudes toward potential threats when accessing free public Wi-Fi. This survey proves
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that despite their concern over the potential threats that public Wi-Fi poses, many users
still perform activities that could make them vulnerable to identity theft. Table 3 shows
U.S. adults’ perceptions of potential threats when accessing free public Wi-Fi.

Table 3
U.S. adults’ perceptions of potential threats when accessing free public Wi-Fi

1.

Potential threat
U.S. adults mentioned identify
theft

Percentage
88%

2.

Answered compromised
accounts

76%

3.

Noted that fraudulent tax filings
could be a potential issue

39%

Based on the literature and surveys, there is evidently a need for security on free open
public Wi-Fi networks. Most of the public Wi-Fi hotspots are open, free and do not have
security protections in place against wireless security attacks (Monica & Ribeiro, 2011;
Hossen & Wenyuan, 2014; Nakhila et al., 2015). Wi-Fi’s popularity makes it an
attractive target for attackers to compromise and to eavesdrop wireless client information
since many Wi-Fi hotspot users are unaware of the hidden risks that the technology
poses, such as evil twin attacks, making users vulnerable to fraud and identity theft.
Users enjoy the benefits of free open public Wi-Fi; however, they are not able to
differentiate the ones that are safe from the ones that are not. Wi-Fi users must assume
the responsibility for device protections in the light of these types of attacks.
Several researchers have been exploring detection methods of evil twin attacks for
free open public Wi-Fi networks. However, existing solutions are mainly for network
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administrators instead of wireless users. According to Hossen & Wenyuan (2014),
administrator-side solutions are not applicable to public Wi-Fi hotspots and more feasible
in environments such as infrastructure networks, e.g. corporate networks. Kim et al.’s
(2012) study indicated that recently several evil twin AP detection methods have
been designed in order to overcome the administrator-side problems in a client-side
solution. However, Kim et al. stated that existing client-side solutions have a
cumbersome process in detecting fake APs in practice. Similarly, Lanze et al. (2014)
indicated that existing solutions have limitations regarding requirements, ease of
deployment, attacker model, and detection efficacy.
Han et al. (2009, 2011), Song et al. (2010, 2012), and Hossen & Wenyuan (2014)
discovered that a client-side evil twin detection method based on timing measurements
(e.g. RTT, IAT) is able to distinguish a one-hop from a multihop setting. However,
Monica & Ribeiro (2011), discovered that timing measurement methods are technology
dependent. According to their study, with the increase in wireless networks speeds,
transmission delay differences between a wireless node and a wired node will eventually
fade. This means that a multihop setting may become indistinguishable from a one-hop
setting. Nakhila et al. (2015) indicated that timing-based methods need to monitor many
packets in order to obtain accurate measurement, which makes the evil twin attack
detection take a longer time to complete. In addition, Nakhila et al. (2015) stated that
timing-based detection will be unreliable when the attacker uses a faster Internet
connection such as broadband cellular service as the evil twin AP. The detection system
developed as part of this study is not based on timing.
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Han et al. (2009, 2011), Song et al. (2010, 2012), Monica & Ribeiro (2011),
Nikbakhsh et al. (2012), Kim et al. (2012), Lanze et al. (2014), Hossen & Wenyuan
(2014), and Hsu et al. (2015) assume in their studies that the attacker will use the
legitimate wireless network gateway to pass through client data traffic (multihop attack).
Nakhila et al. (2015) found that their detection methods will fail especially when the
attacker uses a faster Internet connection (i.e. cellular broadband connection) compared
to the legitimate wireless network. The attacker can delay the response time of the
transmitting packets between the server and the wireless client to match the transmission
time of the packets passing through the legitimate AP (Nakhila et al., 2015). Szongott et
al. (2012), Hossen & Wenyuan (2014), and Nakhila et al. (2015) further indicated that
evil twin attacks that use their cellular broadband connection will become more popular
nowadays due to the increase in the Internet access speed of mobile connections, such as
3G/4G LTE or WiMAX and the inclusion of mobile hotspots capabilities in virtually all
new mobile devices. The detection system developed as part of this study protects users
from attackers that utilize a different gateway from a legitimate access point (mobile
attack).
Han et al.’s (2009, 2011) and Song et al.’s (2010, 2012) client-side evil twin detection
methods rely on existing networking protocols to work and can be executed by end users
without any help from network administrators. Similarly, Monica & Ribeiro (2011), Kim
et al. (2012), Nikbakhsh et al. (2012), Lanze et al. (2014), Hsu et al. (2015), Hossen &
Wenyuan (2014), Szongott et al. (2015), and Nakhila et al. (2015) developed secure
client-side evil twin detection methods that do not require network administrator
privileges or network administrator assistance from hotspots networks. According to
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their studies, client-side evil twin detection methods must not require any administrative
access to modify the routers or wireless access points. There is no need to modify the
network architecture, hardware or software on either client or server side applications.
Furthermore, Monica & Ribeiro (2011), as well as Kim et al. (2012), Hossen & Wenyuan
(2014), Nakhila et al. (2015), and Szongott et al. (2015) indicated that the client-side evil
twin detection system must be an automated application for whenever the user joins a
public Wi-Fi hotspot. The detection system developed as part of this study does not
require network administrator assistance or privileges and is automated with no
intervention from users to ensure usability.
As mentioned previously, Han et al. (2009, 2011) developed a detection method that
calculates the round trip time between the wireless user and the DNS server to
independently determine whether an AP is legitimate or not without wireless
administrator assistance. However, Song et al. (2010, 2012) found that since this work
mainly utilizes the training detection technique and uses a relatively static threshold to
differentiate normal and malicious scenarios, it needs to pre-gather the information of the
target wireless network. Song et al. (2010, 2012) further indicated that Han et al.’s
(2009, 2011) method could not be applied to those traveling users at the client side, since
once the traveling users are in different areas, the network situation may have
significantly changed. The trained knowledge in one wireless network can be hardly
applicable to another network. Additionally, Szongott et al.’s (2015) system will not
work if the user connects to a public Wi-Fi network for the first time since it requires
previous knowledge of the network to assist the user. Recent studies conducted by
Hossen & Wenyuan (2014) and Nakhila et al. (2015) also found that to detect an evil
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twin AP, the system should neither require any training knowledge of the target wireless
network nor depend on the types of wireless networks to guarantee free open public
hotspots. The detection system developed as part of this study does not require
knowledge of the wireless hotspots infrastructure, AP list and/or user/hosts (trained
knowledge) and works on any type of IEEE 802.11-based wireless networks.
From an equipment requirement perspective, Song et al.’s (2010, 2012) study
presented an evil twin detection solution that require to install a server within the hotspot
LAN with ETSniffer for measuring Inter-packet arrival time (IAT) and detecting an evil
twin AP. In addition, this custom server must be available for the solution to work
properly. Monica & Ribeiro’s (2011) method requires the implementation of a script in a
service provider hosting service. Hsu et al.’s (2015) method requires an additional Wi-Fi
device with no sensitive data to assist with the detection. Szongott et al. (2015) requires
an external server to store learned data. A recent study conducted by Hossen & Wenyuan
(2014) indicated that a client-side detection solution must be able to verify an access
point in a hotspot and thus cannot assume any custom infrastructure support (e.g.
hardware or software). Hossen & Wenyuan (2014) further stated that designing an
infrastructure-side solution would require hotspot providers to re-design existing
hotspots, which is unlikely to happen because most hotspots are free services with no
independent revenue. According to Han et al.’ (2009, 2011), Monica & Ribeiro’ (2011),
Kim et al.’ (2012), Nikbakhsh et al.’ (2012), Lanze et al.’ (2014), Hossen & Wenyuan’
(2014), and Nakhila et al.’ (2015) studies, to guarantee usability and availability to the
client, a client-side detection method must discover evil twin APs using their Wi-Fi
enabled devices (e.g. laptops, smartphones, tablets, etc.) without additional equipment.
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Hossen & Wenyuan’ (2014) and Nakhila et al.’ (2015) methods do not have the rigid
requirement of having a custom server inside the LAN, rather their study leverage a
public web server. However, their method does not cover the scenarios when the attacker
blocks access to the public website. Furthermore, Hossen & Wenyuan’s method did not
cover the scenario when the attacker presents an invalid certificate while ISP information
is retrieved from the public website. The detection system developed as part of this study
does not require any additional equipment or custom infrastructure support, leverages
public servers, addresses blocked public website and invalid certificate scenarios, and
works on any type of Wi-Fi enabled devices.
According to Han et al. (2009, 2011), Song et al. (2010, 2012), Monica & Ribeiro
(2011), Kim et al. (2012), Nikbakhsh et al. (2012), Lanze et al. (2014), Hsu et al. (2015),
Szongott et al. (2015), Hossen & Wenyuan (2014), and Nakhila et al. (2015), a client-side
evil twin detection solution must warn the end user of an evil twin attack immediately in
real time, before any data is transmitted, to avert being exposed to the attacker in the
least, even when the attack may last for a short period of time. Song et al. (2010, 2012)
found that evil twin attacks are hard to trace, because they can suddenly and randomly be
launched and shut down, and last only for a short time after the attacker achieves his goal.
Nakhila et al. (2015) indicated that once the attack has been detected, it is very
challenging to identify which AP is rogue and which is legitimate because both provide
Internet access that could have comparable quality. Furthermore, Hossen & Wenyuan
(2014) claims that after the attack has been detected, their method allows the wireless
users to connect to a legitimate AP. However, Hossen & Wenyuan (2014) did not
include this in their algorithm. Additionally, Hossen & Wenyuan (2014) and Nakhila et
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al. (2015) assume that all the APs will be detected in the initial wireless network scanning
and that they will be able to associate to all the APs in the public Wi-Fi network, which
in practice is not always the case. All the studies assume that the attacker is already in the
hotspot and is connected when the wireless user connects to the public Wi-Fi network.
None of the studies addresses the case where the attacker appears later in the hotspot.
Existing solutions do not protect the public Wi-Fi users for the duration of the Wi-Fi
connection, discovering and reporting on new mobile evil twin access points.
Additionally, all existing client-side approaches assume that the user has not connected to
the target public Wi-Fi network in the past. According to Kumar & Paul (2016), the
operating system stores the SSID and BSSID with which it was previously connected to
in the client’s preferred network list, and it is always in the exploration of the same and
whenever detects attempts to connect to it. Therefore, the client will automatically
connect to a potential evil twin AP when using the public Wi-Fi hotspot. The detection
system developed as part of this study warns the wireless user of an evil twin attack
before any traffic is transmitted and in addition, after evil twin detection, the system
connects the user to a legitimate AP. The detection system also protects the users while
they are connected to the public Wi-Fi network. The detection system protects the users
when they have connected to a previous target network in the past. Lastly, the detection
system protects the user in the case that not all the APs are detected in the initial wireless
network scanning and when the client is not able to associate to all the APs in the public
Wi-Fi network.
Han et al.’ (2009, 2011), Song et al.’ (2010, 2012), Monica & Ribeiro’ (2011), Kim et
al.’ (2012), Nikbakhsh et al.’ (2012), Lanze et al.’ (2014), Hsu et al.’ (2015), Szongott et
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al.’ (2015), Hossen & Wenyuan’ (2014), and Nakhila et al.’ (2015) solutions work with
free open public Wi-Fi networks. Monica & Ribeiro (2011) and Hsu et al. (2015)
indicated in their studies that the evil twin attack is usually launched at public places
where open Wi-Fi networks are available. Public Wi-Fi hotspots are ideal networks as
there is no way for the users to distinguish rogue from legitimate APs (Abdollah, 2007).
The detection system developed as part of this study works with free open (unencrypted)
public Wi-Fi networks.
Han et al. (2009, 2011) and Song et al. (2010, 2012) indicated that client-side evil twin
detection methods must be resistant to environment change and consider influencing
factors such as network saturation and receive signal strengths fluctuation. If the
workload of the legitimate AP is extremely heavy, this may adversely affect the response
time and lead to incorrect rogue AP detection. The time difference between legitimate
and evil twin scenarios becomes less distinguishable. According to Song et al. (2010,
2012), when multiple devices synchronously attempt to send packets to the same AP,
medium access collisions emerge and spur the phenomenon of network saturation. This
phenomenon stochastically increases the time for transmitting packets from a client to the
AP. According to Monica & Ribeiro (2011), in multi-hop wireless networks, especially
with high traffic load, packet losses are frequent. The detection system developed as part
of this study is technology independent (e.g. received signal strength fluctuation, network
saturation, or network traffic conditions).
Hossen & Wenyuan (2014) and Nakhila et al. (2015) assumed that the BSSID of a
hotspot legitimate AP is unique and use that as a reference to switch between different
APs with the same SSID in the hotspot. According to Szongott et al. (2015), Lanze et al.
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(2014), and Kumar and Paul (2016), SSIDs and BSSIDs can easily be spoofed by an
attacker as the legitimate AP always transmits the SSID and the BSSID. Further, Nakhila
et al. (2015) method will not work when the evil twin AP is in a different subnet from the
legitimate AP. The detection system developed as part of this study considers the
scenario when the attacker uses the same SSID, BSSID, and subnet of a hotspot
legitimate AP.
Most of the existing client-side evil twin attack detection solutions have been
evaluated at small scales and in lab environments. Additionally, Han et al. (2009, 2011)
evaluated their method at two universities in the United States and China. Song et al.
(2010, 2012) evaluated their method at one university in the United States. Monica &
Ribeiro’s (2011) method was evaluated at one university. Kim et al.’s (2012) study was
evaluated at cafes and universities but details were not provided. Nikbakhsh et al.’s
(2012) method was evaluated in neither a lab nor the field. Lanze et al.’s (2014) method
was evaluated solely in a lab. Hsu et al. ‘s (2015) method was evaluated at a university.
Hossen & Wenyuan (2014) evaluated their method at thirty locations, among them
restaurants, cafes, universities and airports in the United States and China. Nakhila et
al.’s (2015) method was evaluated in a lab. Szongott et al.’s (2015) evaluated their
method in a lab using a simulator with real-world data. All the studies used their own evil
twin APs on evaluation. None of the studies have been evaluated in hotel public Wi-Fi
environments and aimed at detecting real evil twin APs. The detection system developed
as part of this study was evaluated extensively in a lab and at a hotel (public Wi-Fi
hotspot) in Ecuador. The detection system aimed at detecting real evil twin APs. Since
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no mobile evil twin APs were detected in the wild during the field evaluation period, the
author proceeded to evaluate the artifact with the mobile evil twin AP used in the lab.
Han et al.’ (2009, 2011), Song et al.’ (2010, 2012), Monica & Ribeiro’ (2011), Kim et
al.’ (2012), Hossen & Wenyuan’ (2014), and Hsu et al.’ (2015) solutions were evaluated
for performance (effectiveness and efficiency). Hossen & Wenyuan’s (2014) ISP-based
solution was based on the attacker using cellular broadband connection as the network
gateway. Hossen & Wenyuan (2014) did not measure the artifact’s effectiveness in a
controlled environment, but instead in an uncontrolled environment. In their study,
Hossen & Wenyuan (2014) provided comprehensive metrics for the performance
evaluation of their client-side detection method using the following standard metrics: (a)
Accuracy indicates how accurately the method detects evil twin AP attacks; (b) Precision
is the fraction of positively detected attacks to all positively detected attacks (correctly of
incorrectly); and (c) Recall (also called in the literature True Positive Rate or TPR) is the
fraction of positively detected attacks to all attacks that should be positively detected. To
calculate these metrics, Hossen & Wenyuan (2014) used True Positive (TP), True
Negative (TN), False Positive (FP), and False Negative (FN). The TP and TN represent
correct classification, and FP and FN represent incorrect classification. In regards to
efficiency, Hossen and Wenyuan’s time delay analysis included both detection of evil
twin APs that use mobile Internet as the access network for connecting to the Internet and
detection of evil twin APs that use the legitimate AP for Internet access. Additionally,
only DHCP configuration time information was provided. Association time was not
included in their calculations. Also, time information on the rest of the algorithm steps
were not provided. Hossen & Wenyuan claimed that connection to a legitimate AP was
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included in their time delay analysis; however, Hossen & Wenyuan did not include this
step in their detection algorithm. Information on all the factors impacting efficiency was
not included in their time delay analysis. Lastly, it is not clear whether the time delay
calculation included data collection, detection, and connection to a legitimate AP after
detection; data collection and detection; or only detection. Nakhila et al.’s time delay
technique provided a complete list of measurements and factors impacting efficiency.
The detection system developed as part of this study was evaluated for performance
effectiveness using Hossen & Wenyuan (2014)’s evaluation technique and Nakhila et
al.’s technique was leveraged to improve upon Hossen and Wenyuan’s to measure time
delay.
Han et al. (2009, 2011), Song et al. (2010, 2012), Monica & Ribeiro (2011), Lanze et
al. (2014), Nakhila et al. (2015), and Hsu et al. (2015) developed their client-side
detection solutions using a laptop platform. Han et al. (2009, 2011), Monica & Ribeiro
(2011), and Nakhila et al. (2015) used Linux OS. Hsu et al. (2015) used Windows 7.
Nakhila et al. (2015) used C language. Szongott et al. (2015) used Java. Kim et al.
(2012) and Hossen & Wenyuan (2014) developed their client-side detection solutions
using a smartphone platform with Android OS. The client-side evil twin attack detection
system discussed in this study was constructed in a prototype environment to support
public Wi-Fi users. The detection system central to this study was built on a laptop
platform with Linux OS and Java.
Appendix A shows existing studies requirements and limitations mapping based on
the literature review.

86
Building an effective client-side evil twin attack detection artifact required that
procedures and specifications based on DSR principles be developed to guide the
successful construction, implementation, and evaluation of this type of artifact. These
DSR principles that are grounded in design theory are important because according to
Venable (2006), theory building occurs before, during, throughout, and at the end and as
a result of DSR. According to Venable (2006), theory building in DSR begins with the
spark of an idea, a nascent concept for a not-yet-existing (or not-yet-applied) technology
as the solution for a problem or type of problem. This spark of an idea may come from
(1) recombining ideas and conceptualizations of problem spaces; (2) realizing new
possibilities for solutions; (3) recombining existing solutions/technologies; (4) imagining
new technologies; and (5) realizing new applications for existing technologies.
Hevner et al.’s (2004) study states that artifacts are not exempt from behavioral
theories. To the contrary, the creation of design artifacts relies on existing kernel theories
that are applied, tested, modified, and extended through the experience, creativity,
intuition, and problem solving capabilities of the researcher (Markus et al., 2002; Walls et
al., 1992).
According to Gregor and Jones (2007), an IS design theory is something in an abstract
world of man-made things, including abstract ideas such as models and algorithms.
Gregor and Jones (2007) further indicate that a design theory instantiated would have a
physical existence in the real world. According to their research, theories for design and
action continue to be highly influential in IS, despite the fact that they are not always
recognized as theories. Gregor and Jones (2007) stated that the main the characteristic of
theories for design and action is that they focus on “how to do something” providing
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specific guidelines on how to design and develop an IT artifact such as a client-side evil
twin attack detection artifact constructed as part of this study. In their work, Gregor and
Jones (2007) emphasized the importance of design work and design knowledge to be
expressed as theory when building IT artifacts such as a client-side detection system.
The work of Gregor and Jones (2007) indicates that IS design theory shows the
principles inherent in the design of an IT artifact that accomplishes some end, based on
knowledge of both IT and human behavior. Gregor and Jones (2007) further indicate that
as the word “design” is both a noun and a verb, a theory can be about both the principles
underlying the form of the design and also about the act of implementing the design in
the real world. According to Gregor and Jones (2007), any design theory should include
the following components: (1) the purpose and scope; (2) the constructs; (3) the
principles of form and function; (4) the artifact mutability; (5) testable propositions; (6)
justificatory knowledge; (7) principles of implementation; and (8) expository
instantiation. Table 4 describes each of the eight components of a design theory in the
context of this study.
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Table 4
Eight Components of Information Systems Design Theory

1.

Component
Purpose and Scope

Description
The system will be used to provide traveling
wireless users with a client-side detection tool to
detect mobile evil twin attacks during their
connection to free open public Wi-Fi networks.

2.

Constructs

The system will help users detect mobile evil
twin attacks and protect them during their
connection to free open public Wi-Fi networks.

3.

Principle of Form and Function

The system will be designed to detect and protect
public Wi-Fi users from mobile evil twin attacks
by providing them with a client-side detection
tool.

4.

Artifact Mutability

Suggestions for improving the system will be
given for future work.

5.

Testable propositions

6.

Justificatory Knowledge

How effective and efficient is the client side
system in detecting mobile evil twin attacks in
hotel public spaces?
The proposed system will be based on design
science theory from design sciences that
provides an explanation for the design.

7.

Principles of Implementation

The system will be implemented in a lab and in
the field using the following steps: (1) establish
system objectives; (2) define system
functionality; (3) develop the system; and (4)
evaluate the system.

8.

Expository Instantiation

Examples of the client-side system in action will
be provided to help explain the design and
illustrate how the system function.
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Gregor and Hevner’s (2013) study indicates that theory is seen as an abstract entity, an
intermeshed set of statements about relationships among constructs that aims to describe,
explain, enhance understanding of, and, in some cases, predict the future (Gregor 2006).
The type of theory that formalizes knowledge in DSR is termed design theory, the fifth of
the five types of theory in Gregor’s taxonomy. This type of theory gives prescriptions for
design and action, it says how to do something such as building a client-side evil twin
detection artifact.
Peffers et al.’s (2008) design methodology would provide guidance for IS researchers
to produce and present DS research in IS that is recognized as valuable, rigorous, and
publishable in IS research outlets. For DS research, a methodology would include
three elements: (a) conceptual principles to define what is meant by DS research; (b)
practice rules; and (c) a process for carrying out and presenting the research. According
to Gregor (2006), a design methodology can build on particular idiographic studies of
what has worked in practice, on predictive relationships that are known but not fully
understood, and on fully developed theories such as those relating to data representation
or human behavior. Along the same thread, Gregor and Hevner (2013), stated in their
study that the Peffers et al. research process offers a useful synthesized general model,
building on other approaches.
Table 5 presents some examples of how DSR has been used in Security research.
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Table 5
How DSR has been used in IS
Article
Repairing trust in an e-commerce
and security context: an agent-based
modeling approach (Choi and
Nazareth, 2014)
A secure portable execution
environment to support teleworking
(James and Griffiths, 2013)
Snakes and ladders for digital
natives:
information
security
education for the youth (Reid and
Van Niekerk, 2013)
Secure
activity
resource
coordination: empirical evidence of
enhanced security awareness in
designing secure business processes
(D’Aubeterre, Singh, and Iyer, 2008)

Knowledge Contribution
This study examines whether customers are
willing to transact with an eCommerce vendor
in light of security and trust violations.
This study presents the design, development and
trialing of the mobile execution environment
(MEE), a secure portable execution environment
designed to support secure teleworking.
This study presents and evaluates a braincompatible, information security educational
game that can be used to introduce information
security concepts to the youth from a very
young age.
This study examines the gap between systems
development and systems security and develops
an artifact that can be used to create business
process models characterized by the secure
exchange of information within and across
organizational boundaries.

Summary
In Chapter two, the study emphasizes the identification of literature that expounds on
what is already known about the problem and synthesizing the literature to identify
potential solutions that support the problem statement and research questions. The
chapter began with the justification for the study by selecting papers for the review based
on relevancy to design science, client-side evil twin detection systems, wireless security,
and need for security in free open public Wi-Fi hotspots. The chapter then formed the
summarization of existing studies based on the four main topic areas of (a) wireless
security; (b) need for security in free open public Wi-Fi hotspots; (c) existing client-side
evil twin detection solutions; and (d) DSR principles and methodology. The chapter
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further identified the strengths and weaknesses as well as gaps in the literature reviewed
as they related to the four main topic areas and the problem statement. The overall goal of
the literature review was met by synthesizing the foundational studies that were used to
guide the development of a client-side evil twin attack detection system for wireless users
to independently detect and protect themselves from mobile evil twin attacks while using
free open public Wi-Fi hotspots. The design science research literature helped with the
creation of DSR principles, procedures and specifications that supported the artifact
construction, implementation, and evaluation of the client-side evil twin attack detection
system that is central to the study.
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Chapter 3
Methodology
Overview of Research Methodology
To address the research problem and the methodology of how to accomplish the stated
goal of designing and building a more effective, efficient, and practical client-side artifact
to be used to detect mobile evil twin attacks, the author utilized a two phased research
approach. In phase one, the author developed design principles, procedures and
specifications to guide the design, construction, implementation, and evaluation of the
prototype client-side evil twin detection artifact using Hevner’s seven guidelines of DSR,
Peffer’s design science research methodology (DSRM), and Hossen & Wenyuan’s (2014)
study evaluation methodology. In phase two, the author extensively evaluated the
performance of the client-side evil twin attack detection method by implementing a
prototype system. The prototype system was implemented and evaluated in two
environments. First, in a lab to analyze the requirements and demonstrate its
effectiveness in a controlled environment. Second, in the field at a hotel public Wi-Fi
hotspot to extensively evaluate the robustness of the system in practice. The prototype
system aimed at detecting real mobile evil twin APs in the wild at a hotel property that
provide free open public Wi-Fi in its public spaces. Since no mobile evil twin APs were
detected during the field evaluation period, the author proceeded to evaluate the system
with the mobile evil twin AP used in the lab. Hotel public Wi-Fi users spend a
significant amount of time in hotel public spaces, also called social lobbies. Social
lobbies define areas open to the public and contiguous to hotels’ main lobbies. In these
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lobbies, hotels provide amenities and services like free Wi-Fi, comfortable chairs, waiter
service, restaurant, a bar, and coffee shop (Kelley, 2012).
The techniques to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of the system were based
on Hossen & Wenyuan’s (2014) evaluation methodology which has been published and
validated. Nakhila et al.’s technique was leveraged to improve upon Hossen and
Wenyuan’s to measure time delay. The client-side evil twin detection method developed
as part of this dissertation was tested against Hossen & Wenyuan’s (2014) method for
detecting mobile evil twin attacks. The experiments aimed at showing that the detection
system developed can detect mobile evil twin attacks more effectively and efficiently.

Design Science Research Guidelines
To conduct, evaluate and present this research, the author used the seven guidelines
for design science in information systems research developed by Hevner et al. (2004).
The seven guidelines were reviewed and mapped to enable the development of the clientside evil twin attack detection system at the center of this study. The seven guidelines of
Hevner et al. are based on the fundamental principle of design-science research that
knowledge and understanding of a design problem and its solution are achieved in the
building and application of a designed artifact in the form of a construct (vocabulary and
symbols), model (abstractions and representations), method (algorithms and practices), or
an instantiation (implemented and prototype systems). The seven design guidelines of
Hevner et al. provide a structure to demonstrate the IS artifact via evaluation methods.
Hevner et al.’s research indicates that the IT artifact defines the ideas, practices, technical

94
capabilities, and products through which the analysis, design, implementation, and
evaluation of information systems can be effectively accomplished.

Guideline 1: Design as an Artifact
The result of a design-science IS research is a purposeful IT artifact created to address
an important research problem. In support of guideline number one, this report
developed a more effective, efficient, and practical client-side evil twin attack detection
system for wireless users to independently detect and protect themselves from mobile evil
twin attacks while using free open public Wi-Fi hotspots. Additionally, it provided the
framework to facilitate the design, implementation, and evaluation of an effective
prototype client-side detection system to detect mobile evil twin attacks in hotel public
Wi-Fi environments. A recent study conducted by Hossen & Wenyuan (2014) indicated
that a client-side detection solution must be able to verify an AP in a hotspot and thus
cannot assume any custom infrastructure support (e.g. hardware or software). Hossen &
Wenyuan (2014) further stated that designing a solution with infrastructure support
would require hotspot owners to modify hotspots, which is unlikely to happen because
most hotspots are free services. According to Kim et al.’ (2012) and Nikbakhsh et al.’
(2012) studies, to guarantee usability and availability to the client, a client-side detection
method must discover evil twin APs using their Wi-Fi enabled devices (e.g. laptops,
smartphones, tablets, etc.) without extra devices. Although this study leveraged some of
the key features of Hossen and Wenyuan’s (2014) method, its main focus was on
improving its limitations with a novel approach. The prototype developed as part of this
study is multi-vendor and open source.

95
Guideline 2: Problem Relevance
The key objective of IS research is to acquire knowledge and understanding that
enable the development of technology-based solutions to important and unsolved
business problems. Design science delivers on this objective through the construction of
innovative artifacts intended to change the phenomena that occur. The technology-based
solution that addresses the problem in this report is the primary motivation of the study
and potentially impacts wireless security protection in hotel free open public Wi-Fi since
the artifact is specifically designed to help wireless users to independently detect mobile
evil twin attacks. Thus, the IT artifact constructed as part of this study helps solve a
business problem by equipping traveling users with a client-side detection system to
protect themselves from mobile evil twin attacks in hotel free open public Wi-Fi
networks.

Guideline 3: Design Evaluation
The utility, quality, and efficacy of a design artifact must be rigorously demonstrated
via well executed evaluation methods. According to Hevner et al. (2004), because design
is inherently an iterative and incremental activity, the evaluation phase provides essential
feedback to the construction phase as to the quality of the design process and the design
product under development. Hevner et al. (2004) identified five design evaluation
methods to evaluate artifacts: (a) observational (case study or field study); (b) analytical
(static analysis, architecture analysis, optimization, or dynamic analysis); (c)
experimental (controlled experiment or simulation); (d) testing (functional (black box)
testing or structural (white box) testing); and (e) descriptive (informed argument or
scenarios). To evaluate the artifact in depth in a hotel environment, the author used
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Hossen & Wenyuan’s (2014) study evaluation methodology that has been published and
validated.

Guideline 4: Research Contributions
Effective design-science research must provide clear contributions in the areas of the
design artifact, design construction knowledge, and/or design evaluation knowledge.
Design-science research holds the potential for three types of research
contributions based on the novelty, generality, and significance of the designed artifact.
Hevner et al. (2004) indicates that in a given research project, one or more of these
contributions must be found: (1) the design artifact (it must enable the solution
of unsolved problems and extend the knowledge base or apply existing knowledge in new
and innovative ways); (2) foundations (the creative development of novel, appropriately
evaluated constructs, models, methods, or instantiations); and/or (3) methodologies (the
creative development and use of evaluation methods and new evaluation metrics).
Hevner et al. (2004) stated in their research that artifacts must accurately represent the
business and technology environments used in research and must be “implementable”,
hence the importance of instantiating design science artifacts. In other words, the artifact
must demonstrate a clear contribution to the business environment, solving an important,
previously unsolved problem. In this study, the artifact adds value to the hotels because
it potentially provides a client-side evil twin detection solution to help users of hotel free
open public Wi-Fi to independently detect mobile evil twin attacks and connect them
only to legitimate APs while using Wi-Fi at hotel public spaces.
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Guideline 5: Research Rigor
Rigor addresses the way in which research is conducted. DSR requires the application
of rigorous methods in both the construction and evaluation of the designed artifact.
According to Hevner et al. (2004), rigor is derived from the effective use of the
knowledge base and success is predicated on the researcher’s selection of appropriate
techniques to construct an artifact and the selection of appropriate means to evaluate the
artifact. Hevner et al. (2004) indicates the construction of effective metrics is an
important part of DSR and that researchers must constantly assess the appropriateness of
their metrics. In this study, the artifact construction used design procedures and
specifications based on DSR to provide Wi-Fi users with a client-side detection system to
independently detect mobile evil twin attacks while connected to hotel public Wi-Fi
spaces. After design and construction, the artifact was evaluated extensively for
performance effectiveness in a lab and a hotel using the following performance metrics
(Hossen & Wenyuan, 2014): (a) Accuracy indicates how accurately the method detects
evil twin AP attacks; (b) Precision is the fraction of positively detected attacks to all
positively detected attacks (correctly or incorrectly); and (c) Recall (also called in the
literature True Positive Rate or TPR) is the fraction of positively detected attacks to all
attacks that should be positively detected. To calculate these metrics, the author used
True Positive (TP), True Negative (TN), False Positive (FP), and False Negative (FN).
The TP and TN represent correct classification, and FP and FN represent incorrect
classification.
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Guideline 6: Design a Search Process
Design is essentially a search process to discover an effective solution to a problem.
Problem solving can be viewed as utilizing available means to reach desired ends while
satisfying laws existing in the environment. Means are the set of actions and resources
available to construct a solution. Ends represent goals and constraints on the solution.
Laws are uncontrollable forces in the environment (Hevner et al., 2004). Effective design
requires knowledge of both the application domain (e.g., requirements and constraints)
and the solution domain (e.g., technical and organizational). In this study, the author
described the search process in terms of iteratively identifying limitations in existing
client-side detection solutions and creatively developing a solution to address them. The
author employed design principles, procedures and specifications based on DSR to
facilitate construction, implementation and evaluation of a client-side evil twin attack
detection system.

Guideline 7: Communication of Research
DSR must be presented both to technology-oriented as well as managementoriented audiences. According to Hevner et al. (2004), technology-oriented
audiences need sufficient detail to enable the described artifact to be constructed and used
within an appropriate organizational context. This allows end users to test and enjoy the
benefits offered by the artifact and it enables researchers to build a cumulative
knowledge base for further extension and evaluation. Additionally, the audiences should
also understand the methods in which the artifact was constructed and evaluated. This
creates repeatability of the research project and builds the knowledge base for further
research extensions by design-science researchers in IS. Management-oriented audiences
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need sufficient detail to determine if the organizational resources should be committed to
constructing and using the artifact within their specific organizational context (Hevner et
al., 2004). The client-side evil twin detection system design, construction,
implementation, and evaluation process developed in this study is communicated in the
form of a solution manual attached as an appendix in this dissertation report.

Specific Research Methods
Design Science Research Methodology
The DRSM used to tackle the research problem as well as the design procedures and
specifications used to construct the artifact in this study was resultant of design science
principles using an organized method for building client-side detection architecture
addressing the problem. Considering a mixing and condensing of design science process
elements synthesized from the literature review, a set of design procedures and
specifications were developed based on DSR principles and methodologies that were
used to enable the construction, implementation, and evaluation of the client-side
detection artifact. The overall goal was to evolve the emergent DSR into design
application that was lifted and used to direct the construction and evaluation of the
artifact.
According to Peffers et al. (2008), a DS research methodology would include
three elements: conceptual principles to define what is meant by design science research,
practice rules, and a process or procedure for carrying out and presenting the research.
Hevner et al. (2004) introduced principles that define what DS research is, and what goals
it should pursue, as well as practice rules (guidelines) that provide guidance for
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conducting it. The missing part was a process or procedure (methodology) that provides a
generally accepted framework for carrying out research (Peffers et al., 2008).
Peffers et al.’s (2008) DSR methodology (DSRM) based on Hevner et al.’s DSR
principles was adopted for carrying out this study. Peffers et al.’s (2008) DSRM
incorporates principles, practices, and procedures and meets three objectives: it is
consistent with prior DSR literature, it provides a nominal process model for doing DS
research, and it provides a mental model for presenting and evaluating DS research in IS.
According to Peffers et al. (2008), a mental model for the conduct and presentation of DS
research will help researchers to conduct it effectively. Peffers et al. (2008) stated that “a
mental model is a "small-scale model" of reality that can be constructed from perception,
imagination, or the comprehension of discourse” (p. 10). Table 6 illustrates a model for
the construction process of the artifact reported in this study guided by Hevner et al.’s
DSR principles literature that was used to answer the study research questions. Figure 6
illustrates the design topology for this study.
Based on Peffers et al.’s DSRM, a set of design procedures and specifications were
developed to facilitate the client-side evil twin attack artifact construction,
implementation, and evaluation phases. Table 7 shows an outline of the knowledge base
principles that were followed during each phase.
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Table 6
Artifact Construction Methods and Technologies Associated with Hevner’s Design
Principles
Hevner’s design
Methods
Technologies
principles
1. The research must
 Apply design
 Visio
produce an artifact created
principles to the
 Cisco Router
to address a problem.
design and
 Cisco LAN Switch
construction of the
 Cisco Wireless
5. Rigor must be applied
prototype system
Controller
in both the construction of
 Procure the network
 Cisco Access Points
the artifact and its
devices, laptops,
 Lenovo laptops
evaluation.
smartphone, and
 Motorola Android
software
smartphone
 Assemble and
 Linux Centos OS
interconnect devices
 Java SE
based on design
Development Kit
topology
(JDK)
 Install and configure
 Netbeans IDE
Linux, Java SE
 Wireshark packet
Development Kit
analyzer
(JDK), Netbeans
 Kali Linux
IDE, and Wireshark
(Aircrack-ng)
on client laptop
 Hostapd
 Install and configure
 Android Mobile
Kali Linux
Hotspot & Tethering
(Aircrack-ng) and

Cat5e cables
Hostapd on ETA
 USB wireless
laptop
adapter
 Configure Android

Ping and Traceroute
Mobile Hotspot &
Tethering on
smartphone
 Apply class C
logical addressing
scheme to devices
across the topology
 Test connectivity
through the use of
the ping and
traceroute utilities
 Develop client-side
detection system
 Test algorithm and
Repeat
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ETHERNET/DSL

Internet
Router

INTERNET

Switch

3G/ 4G LTE

Legitimate
AP 1
Lobby

Attacker
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Figure 6. Design topology.
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Table 7
Peffers’ DSRM Activity combined with Activity Description and Knowledge Base
Principles
DSRM Activity
Activity Description
Knowledge Base
Principles
1. Problem identification
The need for client-side
Literature review to
and motivation
detection systems that will understand the problem’s
allow wireless users to
relevance, existing
protect against mobile evil solutions, and limitations.
twin attacks while using
free open (unencrypted)
public Wi-Fi.
2. Define the objectives
1. The system must not be Literature review to help
for a solution
based on timing or
define the objectives.
traceroute.
2. The system must protect
users from attackers that
utilize a different gateway
from a legitimate access
point (mobile attack).
3. The system must not
require network
administrator assistance or
privileges.
4. The system must be
automated with no
intervention from users.
5. The system must not
require knowledge of
wireless hotspots
infrastructure, AP list
and/or user/hosts (trained
knowledge).
6. The system must not
require any additional
equipment or custom
infrastructure support.
7. The system must
leverage public servers.
(continued)
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DSRM Activity

Activity Description

Knowledge Base
Principles

8. The system must work
on any type of 802.11based wireless networks.
9. The system must work
with Wi-Fi enabled
devices.
10. The system must work
with free open
(unencrypted) public Wi-Fi
networks.
11. The system must be
technology independent.
12. The system must
protect the user when the
attacker sets up the mobile
evil twin AP with the same
SSID, BSSID, and subnet
of a legitimate AP.
13. The system must
protect the user when the
attacker blocks access to
the public website used to
get ISP information.
14. The system must
protect the user when the
attacker presents an invalid
certificate while retrieving
ISP information from
public website.
15. The system must
protect the user when not
all the hotspots APs with
the desired SSID are
detected during the initial
wireless network scanning
and also when the client is
not able to associate to all
the APs in the public Wi-Fi
network.
(continued)
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DSRM Activity

Activity Description

Knowledge Base
Principles

16. The system must
protect the users whether
or not they have connected
to a free open public Wi-Fi
network in the past.
17. The system must
protect the user while they
are connected to the public
Wi-Fi network.
18. The system must warn
the user of an evil twin
attack before any traffic is
transmitted.
19. The system, after
detection, must connect the
user to a legitimate AP.
20. The system must be
evaluated in the lab and in
the field.
21. The system must aim
at detecting real evil twin
APs.
22. The system must be
evaluated for performance
using standard metrics.
3. Design and
development

Design and construction of
the system.

4. Demonstration

Demonstrate the use of the
system in the lab.

Application of principles,
methods, and technologies
to create the artifact.
Indicate how the system
can be used in hotel
environments to solve the
problem.

(continued)
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DSRM Activity

Activity Description

Knowledge Base
Principles
Evaluate the performance
Evaluation technique from
of the system at a hotel:
literature review to
How effective and efficient evaluate the artifact.
is the client-side system in
detecting mobile evil twin
attacks in hotel public
spaces.
Communicate the problem Knowledge of hospitality
and its importance for
environments related to
replication in hotel
client-side evil twin attack
environments.
detection systems.

5. Evaluation

6. Communication

The proposed design methodology presented on Figure 7 is based on Peffers et al.’s
(2008) DSRM and was used as a model to document the design procedures and
specifications that guided the construction of the client-side evil twin attack detection
system in this study.

Derive design
principles to develop
a client-side evil twin
detection solution.
Client-side evil twin
detection design and
construction of the
system

PROBLEM
CENTERED
APPROACH

Research Entry Point

Figure 7. Proposed Design Methodology.

DEMONSTRATION
Testing the system in
the lab

EVALUATION
Evaluate the
performance
effectiveness of the
system in a hotel

Disciplinary Knowledge

Develop a client-side
evil twin attack
detection solution

DESIGN &
DEVELOPMENT

Metrics, Analysis Knowledge

DEFINE
OBJECTIVES OF A
SOLUTION

Theory

The need for clientside evil twin
detection systems for
wireless users to
protect against mobile
evil twin attacks while
using free open public
Wi-Fi

Inference

Nominal
Process
Sequence

IDENTIFY
PROBLEM &
MOTIVATE

How to knowledge

Process Iteration

COMMUNICATION
Scholarly
publications
Professional
publications
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Based on Hevner et al.’s (2004) DSR principles 3 and 5, Table 8 presents the methods
and techniques that were leveraged to collect and analyze data to show the effectiveness
of the artifact.
Table 8
Artifact Effectiveness Evaluation Methods Associated with Hevner’s Design Principles
Hevner’s design
principles
3. The utility, quality, and
efficacy of a design
artifact must be rigorously
demonstrated via well
executed evaluation
methods.

Methods to collect data





5. Rigor must be applied
in both the construction of
the artifact and its
evaluation.

Evaluation
Methodology
(Hossen &
Wenyuan, 2014)
Wireshark packet
analyzer
Researcherparticipant approach
(Richey & Klein,
2007)

Techniques to analyze data


Performance
analysis metrics: (a)
Accuracy; (b)
Precision; and (c)
Recall (Hossen &
Wenyuan, 2014)

Design Procedures and Specifications
Based on previous chapters and sections of this study, design procedures and
specifications derived from Hevner et al.’s (2004), Peffers et al.’s (2008), and Hossen &
Wenyuan’s (2014) including technologies, procedures, and techniques required to guide
the design, construction, implementation, and evaluation of the client-side evil twin
attack detection artifact otherwise known as CSMETAD (Client-Side Mobile Evil Twin
Attack Detection) system at the center of this study are presented in Table 9.
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Table 9
Design Procedures and Specifications

Specifications
1. Design the
artifact (physical
and logical
diagrams)

Procedures
Apply DSR derived
principles to guide
the design of the
client-side ETA
detection system

Techniques
Apply Industry
Best Practice to
design the clientside ETA
detection system

Technologies
Microsoft Visio

2. Develop artifact
specifications

Apply DSR derived
principles to guide
the development of
the client-side ETA
detection system
specifications

Resources
calculation for
network, laptops
and smartphone

Laptops,
smartphone and
network devices
specifications

3. Procure
equipment for
client-side evil twin
attack detection
system

Order equipment

Review equipment MS Word (Bill of
specs and pricing
Materials)

(continued)
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Specifications
4. Build and
configure the clientside ETA detection
system

Procedures
Assemble and
interconnect network
devices
Install and configure
Linux, JDK, Netbeans
IDE and Wireshark on
client laptop
Install and configure
Kali Linux (Aircrackng) and Hostapd on
ETA laptop
Configure Android
Hotspot & Tethering
on smartphone
Apply class C logical
addressing scheme to
devices across the
topology
Develop client-side
evil twin attack
detection system

Techniques
Apply Industry
Best Practice to
develop the
client-side ETA
detection system

Technologies
Wireless client
laptop
Linux, JDK,
Netbeans IDE,
Wireshark
ETA laptop
Kali Linux
(Aircrack-ng),
Hostapd
Smartphone
Android mobile
hotspot & tethering
LAN Router
LAN Switch
Wireless Controller
Wireless Access
Points
Ethernet cables
USB wireless
adapter

5. Test client-side
ETA detection
system

Test local
connectivity and
Algorithm

Network utility
commands
Test cases

TCP/IP Utilities
Ping
Traceroute
Ifconfig
Netbeans IDE
System standard
output

6. Evaluate the
performance
effectiveness of the
client-side ETA
detection system in
the lab and a hotel

Test algorithm and
repeat

Netbeans IDE
System standard
output
Wireshark packet
analyzer

7. Communicate the
process for
replication across
Academia

Create and publish

Researcherparticipant
approach
Monitor and
analyze data
captured using
performance
metrics
Solution manual
attached to
dissertation
appendix

Publish dissertation
– Nova ProQuest
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Artifact Design
The Client-Side Mobile Evil Twin Attack Detection (CSMETAD) system was
designed based on Hevner’s principle 5 through the application of rigorous design
methods.
The design requirements, assumptions, and framework used to build the CSMETAD
system were based on a thorough review of the literature and improved to address
limitations in existing client-side evil twin attack detection solutions. The certified
equipment included in Hossen & Wenyuan’s (2014) study was replaced for the
CSMETAD system to expand and provide protection to traveling users that utilize a
different mobile platform and operating system in free open public Wi-Fi hotspots.
Design Requirements
CSMETAD fulfills the following requirements:
1. It protects users from attackers that use a different gateway from a legitimate AP
(mobile attack).
2. It protects users whether or not they have connected to a free open public Wi-Fi
network in the past.
3. It protects users when not all the hotspot APs with the desired SSID are detected
during the initial wireless network scanning.
4. It protects users when the client is not able to associate to all the APs in the public
Wi-Fi network.
5. It protects users when the attacker sets up the mobile evil twin AP with the same
SSID, BSSID (MAC address), and subnet of a legitimate AP.
6. It protects users when the attacker blocks access to the public website used to get ISP
information.
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7. It protects users when the attacker presents an invalid certificate while retrieving ISP
information from a public website.
8. After mobile evil twin AP attack detection, it connects users to a legitimate AP.
9. It protects users for the duration of the public Wi-Fi connection, discovering and
reporting on new mobile evil twin access points.
10. It is evaluated in the wild aiming to detect real mobile evil twin APs. In the case of
not detecting real mobile evil twin APs during the field evaluation period, it is
evaluated with the mobile evil twin AP used in the lab.
11. It is not based on timing or traceroute.
12. It does not require any additional equipment.
13. It does not require modification of the hotspot network infrastructure (custom
infrastructure support).
14. It does not require trained knowledge of the target wireless hotspots infrastructure.
15. It is automated with no intervention from users.
Design Assumptions
The following are assumptions while designing CSMETAD:
1. The user may or may not have connected to the public Wi-Fi network in the past.
2. The wireless network client does not have any prior knowledge about the public WiFi hotspot infrastructure.
3. The wireless network client may or may not able to detect all the public Wi-Fi
hotspot APs with the desired SSID during the initial wireless network scanning.
4. The wireless network client may or may not be able to associate to all the APs in the
public Wi-Fi network.
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5. The public Wi-Fi hotspot provides free open (unencrypted) Wi-Fi access in its public
spaces.
6. The public Wi-Fi hotspot supports a DHCP server that assigns dynamically network
parameters to the clients (e.g. IP address, subnet mask, gateway, DNS, etc.).
7. The public Wi-Fi hotspot uses multiple AP architecture in which multiple APs
support multiple wireless clients. All of the APs have the same SSID so that wireless
users can automatically switch to another AP with a higher RSSI value when roaming
across APs.
8. The public Wi-Fi hotspot does not use mobile Internet (e.g. 4G LTE).
9. The public Wi-Fi hotspot uses one ISP for Internet connectivity. The legitimate APs
are connected to the same router sharing the same global IP address.
10. The public Wi-Fi hotspot has more than one AP installed in their public Wi-Fi space.
11. The public Wi-Fi hotpots APs have the same configuration (e.g. shared SSID, global
IP address, DNS, etc.) to allow smooth AP association while the user roams
throughout the public areas.
12. The public Wi-Fi hotspot requires acceptance of terms of use to be able to access the
Internet.
13. ISP information of a legitimate AP and evil twin AP is different.
14. The attacker uses his laptop and smartphone with mobile AP functionality to launch
an evil twin AP attack (mobile attack).
15. The attacker arrives later at the public Wi-Fi hotspot after the user has connected to a
legitimate AP.
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16. The attacker sets up the mobile evil twin AP with the same SSID, BSSID, and subnet
of a legitimate AP.
17. The attacker disassociates the user from the legitimate AP and forces the user to
connect to the mobile evil twin AP.
18. The attacker may block access to the public website used to get ISP information.
19. The attacker may present a valid or an invalid public website certificate while
retrieving ISP information from public website.
CSMETAD Framework Overview
The following provides an overview of the CSMETAD system. CSMETAD works in
two phases:


In (Phase 1) data collection, performs the initial wireless network scanning
collecting data of all the access points (APs) in the public Wi-Fi hotspot. In
this phase, CSMETAD categorizes the APs.



In (Phase 2) detection and protection, detects mobile evil twin APs and
connects the user to a legitimate AP. In this phase, CSMETAD protects the
user for the duration of the public Wi-Fi connection discovering and reporting
on new mobile evil twin APs.
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Phase 1 – data collection
1. CSMETAD is designed based on the idea that the global IP addresses of two or more
legitimate APs are the same, but they are different in the case of the legitimate APs
and an evil twin AP. This occurs because the evil twin AP utilizes a different
gateway than a legitimate AP (mobile attack) (Hossen & Wenyuan, 2014; Nakhila et
al., 2015).
2. CSMETAD disables “auto-connections” to all public Wi-Fi networks protecting the
user even when he or she has connected to a free open public Wi-Fi network in the
past. The system iterates through all 802.11 wireless network connections, and after
validating that the connection autoconnect is enabled and unencrypted, the system
disables autoconnect. This requires for the wireless user to initialize CSMETAD
before using the public Wi-Fi network.
3. CSMETAD scans the public Wi-Fi network to discover APs with selected SSID and
adds APs with signal strength equal to or greater than -75 dBm to a list called “AP for
selected SSID” list.
4. CSMETAD validates that the number of APs for the selected SSID is equal to or
greater than 2. If CSMETAD determines that the number of APs for the selected
SSID is less than 2, then CSMETAD displays message: “There is insufficient
information to detect Evil Twin Attacks.” CSMETAD ends. If CSMETAD
determines that the number of APs for the selected SSID is equal to or greater than 2,
then CSMETAD has sufficient information to detect ETAs.
5. CSMETAD goes through an AP iteration from “APs for selected SSID” list and
associates to an AP, gets a Client DHCP address for the user, accepts terms of use to
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access the Internet, and accesses secured public website to retrieve the global IP
address of the AP. During the AP iteration process, if CSMETAD is not able to
associate to an AP, then CSMETAD updates “APs for selected SSID” list with AP
state as “unknown” and associates to the next AP on the “AP for selected SSID” list.
6. If CSMETAD is able to associate to an AP but not able to get a Client DHCP address
for the user, accept terms of use to access the Internet, or access secured public
website to retrieve the global IP address of the AP, then CSMETAD updates “APs for
selected SSID” list with AP state as “unknown”, disassociates from current AP and
associates to the next AP on the “APs for selected SSID” list.
7. If CSMETAD is able to associate to an AP, get a Client DHCP address for the user,
accept terms of use to access the Internet, and access secured public website to
retrieve the global IP address of the AP, then CSMETAD proceeds to verify that the
public website certificate is valid.
8. CSMETAD is designed based on the idea that the attacker may present a valid or an
invalid public website certificate while retrieving the global IP address from a public
website. If CSMETAD determines that the public website certificate is invalid,
CSMETAD updates “APs for selected SSID” list with AP state as “ETA”, adds AP
MAC address to a list called “Learned ETA MAC address” list, disassociates from
current AP and associates to the next AP on the “APs for selected SSID” list. If
CSMETAD determines that the public website certificate is valid, only then,
CSMETAD proceeds to determine the trusted global IP address to be used for the
duration of the public Wi-Fi connection.
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9. CSMETAD determines the trusted global IP address by selecting the global IP
address with maximum number of occurrences. If CSMETAD determines that the
global IP occurrences is less than 2, then CSMETAD displays message: “There is not
enough information to categorize APs.”, updates “APs for selected SSID” list with
AP state as “unknown”, and CSMETAD ends. If CSMETAD determines that the
global IP occurrences is equal to or greater than 2, then CSMETAD proceeds to
categorize APs.
10. CSMETAD categorizes APs by going through an AP iteration and validating whether
the global IP address of an AP is the same as the trusted global IP address. If
CSMETAD determines that the global IP address of an AP is not the same as the
trusted global IP address, then CSMETAD categorizes the AP as “ETA” and add
results to “Learned ETA MAC address” list. If CSMETAD determines that the
global IP address of an AP is the same as the trusted global IP address, then
CSMETAD categorizes the AP as “valid” and add results to the “APs for selected
SSID” list.
11. CSMETAD moves to phase 2 after finishing AP iteration.
Phase 2 – detection and protection
1. CSMETAD re-scans the public Wi-Fi network to rediscover APs with selected SSID
and adds APs with signal strength equal to or greater than -75 dBm to the “APs for
selected SSID” list (new list).
2. CSMETAD validates that the number of APs for selected SSID is equal to or greater
than 1. If CSMETAD determines that the number of APs for selected SSID is less
than 1, then CSMETAD displays message: “Your device is out of range for the
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selected public Wi-Fi hotspot. Please move closer”. CSMETAD rescans the public
Wi-Fi network.
3. If CSMETAD determines that the number of APs for selected SSID is equal to or
greater than 1, then CSMETAD retrieves previously learned ETA MAC addresses
from “Learned ETA MAC addresses” list and removes learned ETA MAC addresses
from “AP for selected SSID” list.
4. After removal, CSMETAD validates that the number of APs for selected SSID is
equal to or greater than 1. If CSMETAD determines that the number of APs for
selected SSID is less than 1, then CSMETAD displays message: “You are located on
the vicinity of Evil Twin Attacks. Please move to a different location within the
public Wi-Fi Hotspot”. CSMETAD rescans the public Wi-Fi network. If
CSMETAD determines that the number of APs for selected SSID is equal to or
greater than 1, then CSMETAD starts iterating across all the APs in the “APs for
selected SSID” list.
5. CSMETAD proceeds to validate APs even if they have the same SSID, MAC
address, and subnet of a legitimate AP. CSMETAD goes through an AP iteration of
“APs for selected SSID” list and associates to the AP with the highest signal strength.
During the AP iteration process, if CSMETAD is not able to associate to an AP, then
CSMETAD associates to the next AP on the “APs for selected SSID” list. If
CSMETAD is not able to associate to any of the APs on the “APs for selected SSID”
list, then CSMETAD rescans the public Wi-Fi network.
6. If CSMETAD is able to associate to the AP but not able to get a Client DHCP address
for the user, confirm access to the Internet, or access secured public website to
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retrieve the global IP address of an AP, then CSMETAD disassociates from current
AP and associates to the next AP on the “APs for selected SSID” list.
7. If CSMETAD is able to associate to an AP, confirm Client DHCP address for the
user, confirm access to the Internet, and access secure public website to retrieve the
global IP address of an AP, only then, CSMETAD proceeds to verify that the public
website certificate is valid.
8. If CSMETAD determines that the public website certificate is invalid, CSMETAD
displays message: “CSMETAD has detected an ETA on the public Wi-Fi hotspot”,
adds AP MAC address to a list called “Learned ETA MAC address” list (if ETA is
not in the list), disassociates from current AP, and associates to the next AP on the
“APs for selected SSID” list. If CSMETAD determines that the public website
certificate is valid, only then, CSMETAD proceeds to get the global IP address of the
AP.
9. If CSMETAD determines that the global IP address of an AP is not the same as the
trusted global IP address, CSMETAD displays message: “CSMETAD has detected an
ETA on the public Wi-Fi hotspot”, adds AP MAC address to “Learned ETA MAC
address” list (if ETA is not in the list), disassociates from the current AP, and
associates to the next AP with the highest signal strength on the “APs for selected
SSID” list. If CSMETAD determines that the global IP address of an AP is the same
as the trusted global IP address, then CSMETAD displays message: “Wi-Fi
connection is safe. You are connected to a legitimate AP”. Then, CSMETAD waits
for a disassociated wireless card event.
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10. If CSMETAD receives a disassociated wireless card event, CSMETAD rescans the
public Wi-Fi network to discover and report on new mobile evil twin access points
for the duration of the public Wi-Fi connection. Algorithm phase 2 repeats (infinite
loop).
The following is a list of replacement hardware and software included in the design of
the CSMETAD system that is central to this dissertation report:
1. Client Platform: Hossen & Wenyuan’s study’s artifact was built for smartphone
platforms. CSMETAD was built for laptop platforms. The client laptop platform for
this study is a Lenovo Thinkpad laptop.
2. Client Operating System (OS): Hossen & Wenyuan’s study’s artifact was built for
Android operating system. CSMETAD was built for Linux operating system. The
Linux OS version for this study is 7.3.1611.
3. Client Programming Language: Hossen & Wenyuan’s study’s artifact’s
programming language was not provided in their study. CSMETAD was built using
Java programming language. The Java SE Development Kit is version 1.8.0_131 (64
bits) and the NetBeans Integrated Development Environment is version 8.1.
4. Mobile Evil Twin AP: Hossen & Wenyuan (2014) performed the evaluation using a
smartphone with mobile AP functionality as the evil twin AP (Nexus 4 Android
smartphone with 3G data subscription and Android mobile hotspot and tethering).
CSMETAD was evaluated using a laptop and smartphone with mobile AP
functionality as the evil twin AP (Lenovo Thinkpad laptop, Kali Linux (Aircrack-ng)
and Hostapd, Motorola Moto e5smartphone with 4G data subscription and Android
mobile hotspot and tethering).
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Artifact Specifications
Wireless Client
The hardware and software specifications for the wireless client are described as
follows:
Hardware
The Lenovo Thinkpad Laptop specifications can be retrieved from
https://support.lenovo.com/mn/en/solutions/pd027202
Software
The Linux OS 7.3.1611 specifications designed for inclusion into the CSMETAD
system can be retrieved from https://wiki.centos.org/Manuals/ReleaseNotes/CentOS7
The Java SE Development Kit 1.8.0_131 (64 bits) programming language
specifications designed for inclusion into the CSMETAD system can be retrieved from
https://docs.oracle.com/javase/specs/jls/se8/jls8.pdf
The NetBeans Integrated Development Environment 8.1 specifications designed for
inclusion into the CSMETAD system can be retrieved from
https://netbeans.org/community/releases/81/relnotes.html
The Wireshark Packet Analyzer 2.0.0 software was installed in the client specifically
for network packet analysis purposes. The specifications can be retrieved from
https://www.wireshark.org/docs/relnotes/wireshark-2.0.0.html
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Mobile Evil Twin AP
The hardware and software specifications for the mobile evil twin AP are described as
follows:
Hardware
The Motorola Moto e5 smartphone specifications can be retrieved from
https://www.motorola.com/us/products/moto-e-plus-gen-5
The Lenovo Thinkpad Laptop specifications can be retrieved from
https://www.lenovo.com/us/en/laptops/thinkpad/thinkpad-x/Thinkpad-X1-Carbon-4thGen/p/22TP2TXX14G
Software
The Android Mobile Hotspot and Tethering specifications can be retrieved from
https://www.verizonwireless.com/support/knowledge-base-217411/
The Kali Linux 4.14.0 (Aircrack-ng) specifications can be retrieved from
https://www.kali.org/news/kali-linux-2018-1-release/
The Hostapd v2.7 specifications can be retrieved from http://w1.fi/hostapd/

Lab Network
The hardware and software specifications for the lab network are described as follows:
The Cisco M10 router specifications documented in an installation guide (Cisco
Systems, 2010) can be retrieved from
http://downloads.linksys.com/downloads/userguide/1224655305646/Valet_Valet_Plus_
M10_M20_UG_US_V10_D-WEB_3425-014530.pdf
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The Cisco 3560 switch specifications documented in a spec sheet (Cisco Systems,
2009) can be retrieved from
http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/collateral/switches/catalyst-3560-seriesswitches/product_data_sheet09186a00801f3d7d.pdf
The Cisco 2504 wireless controller specifications documented in a spec sheet (Cisco
Systems, 2016) can be retrieved from
http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/collateral/wireless/2500-series-wirelesscontrollers/data_sheet_c78-645111.pdf
The Cisco 3502I wireless access point specifications documented in a spec sheet
(Cisco Systems, 2012) can be retrieved from
http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/collateral/wireless/aironet-1250series/data_sheet_c78-594630.pdf
Figure 8 shows Logical Prototype Topology Design Diagram.
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Figure 8. Logical prototype topology design diagram.
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Artifact Equipment Requirement
The components and costs to build the CSMETAD system and lab as defined in this
dissertation report are listed in Table 10.
Table 10
Evil Twin Detection Lab Environment Components and Costs
Component
Quantity
Hardware
Cisco 3560 Switch
1
Cisco Router M10
1
Cisco Wireless
1
Controller 2504
Cisco Access Point
1
3502I-A-K9 (AP1)
(legitimate AP)
Cisco Access Point
1
3502I-A-K9 (AP2)
(legitimate AP)
Lenovo Laptop
2
Motorola Moto e5
1
Android smartphone
USB wireless adapter
1
Ethernet cables
Software
Wireshark Packet
Analyzer 2.0.0
Java SE Development
Kit 1.8.0_131
NetBeans IDE 8.1
Linux Centos 7.3.1611
Kali Linux
4.14.0 (Aircrack-ng)
Hostapd v2.7
Android Mobile
Hotspot &Tethering
Switch IOS
Router IOS
Controller IOS
APs IOS
Total

Estimated Cost
$150
$200
$490
$80

$80

$2,500
$150
$40
$30

1

Free

1

Free

1
1
1

Free
Free
Free

1
1

Free
Free

1
1
1
3

Included
Included
Included
Included
$3,720
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Artifact Construction
Construction of the CSMETAD system was based primarily on Hevner’s principles 1
and 5 through the creation of a viable artifact that relies on the application of rigorous
construction methods.
Lab Environment - Steps:
1. Unpacking and assembling the equipment.
2. The Linux Centos 7.3.1611 OS was installed and configured in the Lenovo Thinkpad
laptop (client) in accordance with the installation guide (Centos, 2016) retrieved from
https://wiki.centos.org/Manuals/ReleaseNotes/CentOS7
3. The Java SE Development Kit 1.8.0_131 (64 bits) software was installed and
configured in the Lenovo Thinkpad laptop (client) in accordance with the installation
guide (Oracle, 2016) retrieved from
http://docs.oracle.com/javase/8/docs/technotes/guides/install/index.html
4. The NetBeans Integrated Development Environment 8.1 software was installed and
configured in the Lenovo Thinkpad laptop (client) in accordance with the installation
guide (Netbeans, 2015) retrieved from
https://netbeans.org/community/releases/81/install.html
5. The Wireshark Packet Analyzer 2.0.0 software was installed and configured in the
Lenovo Thinkpad laptop (client) in accordance with the installation guide (Wireshark,
2014) retrieved from https://www.wireshark.org/docs/wsug_html/
6. The Kali Linux 4.14.0 (Aircrack-ng) was installed and configured in the Lenovo
Thinkpad laptop (ETA) in accordance with the installation guide (Kali, 2018)
retrieved from https://docs.kali.org/category/installation
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7. The Hostapd v2.7 was installed and configured in the Lenovo Thinkpad laptop (ETA)
in accordance with the installation guide (Hostapd, 2013) retrieved from
https://w1.fi/hostapd/
8. The Motorola smartphone was configured with tethering in accordance with the
instructions (Motorola, 2018) retrieved from
https://www.verizonwireless.com/support/knowledge-base-217411/
9. The Cisco M10 router was installed and configured in accordance with the
installation guide (Cisco Systems, 2010) retrieved from
http://downloads.linksys.com/downloads/userguide/1224655305646/Valet_Valet_Plu
s_M10_M20_UG_US_V10_D-WEB_3425-014530.pdf
10. The Cisco 3560 switch was installed and configured in accordance with the
installation guide (Cisco Systems, 2010) retrieved from
http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst3560/hardware/installation
/guide/3560hig.pdf
11. The Cisco 2504 wireless controller was installed and configured in accordance with
the installation guide (Cisco Systems, 2017) retrieved from
https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/support/docs/wireless/2500-series-wirelesscontrollers/113034-2500-deploy-guide-00.html
12. The Cisco 3502I access points was installed and configured in accordance with the
installation guide (Cisco Systems, 2014) retrieved from
http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/wireless/access_point/3500/quick/guide/ap350
0getstart.pdf
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Figure 9. Lab network.

Figure 10. Lab wireless client and mobile evil twin AP.
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Client-side Mobile Evil Twin AP Detection (CSMETAD) Algorithm - Steps:
Phase 1: Data Collection
Basic Flow:
1. System is initialized by the user before using the free open public Wi-Fi network.
2. System detects operating system.
3. System detects wireless network card.
4. System disables “auto-connections” to all public Wi-Fi networks.
5. System scans the public Wi-Fi network to discover available SSIDs (encrypted and
unencrypted).
6. System creates list of SSIDs in range.
7. System presents SSIDs in range to the user.
8. User selects unencrypted public Wi-Fi hotspot SSID.
9. System creates list of APs for selected SSID with signal level equal to or greater than
-75dBm.
10. System validates that the number of APs for selected SSID is equal to or greater
than 2. (Alternative Flow “a”)
11. IF number of APs for selected SSID is equal to or greater than 2 THEN System
displays message: “There is sufficient information to start detecting ETAs.”
12. System stops the network manager.
13. System activates wireless network card.
14. System starts iterating across all the APs in the APs for selected SSID list.
15. System associates to the AP in the APs for selected SSID list. (Alternative Flow
“b”)
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16. IF System is able to associate to the AP THEN System gets a Client DHCP address
for the user. (Alternative Flow “c”)
17. IF System is able to get a Client DHCP address for the user THEN System accepts
terms of use to access the Internet. (Alternative Flow “d”)
18. IF System is able to accept terms of use to access the Internet THEN System connects
to secured public website to retrieve global IP address of the AP. (Alternative Flow
“e”)
19. IF System is able to connect to the secured public website THEN System verifies that
the public website certificate is valid. (Alternative Flow “f”)
20. IF the public website certificate is valid only THEN System is able to get the global
IP address of the AP.
21. IF System ends iterating across APs in APs for selected SSID list THEN System
validates that the number of occurrences of a global IP address is equal to or
greater than 2. (Alternative Flow “g”)
22. IF the number of occurrences of a global IP address is equal to or greater than 2
THEN System has enough information to start categorizing APs and sets global IP as
the trusted global IP address to be used for the duration of the public Wi-Fi
connection.
23. System starts categorizing APs.
24. System starts iterating across all the APs in the APs for selected SSID list.
25. System validates that the global IP address for an AP is the same as the trusted global
IP address. (Alternative Flow “h”)
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26. IF the global IP address for an AP is the same as the trusted global IP address THEN
System categorizes the AP as “valid”. System disassociates from current AP and
associates to the next AP on the APs for selected SSID list.
27. IF System ends iterating across APs in APs for selected SSID list THEN System
moves to Phase 2 detection and protection.
Alternative Flows:
a) number of APs for selected SSID is less than 2
On step 10 of the Basic Flow:
1. IF the number of APs for selected SSID is less than 2 THEN
2. System displays message: “There is insufficient information to detect ETAs.”
3. System ends.
b) system is not able to associate to an AP
On step 15 of the Basic Flow:
1. IF System is not able to associate to an AP THEN
2. System updates the APs for selected SSID list with the following results:
a. Association status = false
b. Client DHCP address = not detected
c. Internet access = not detected
d. Secured public website access = not detected
e. Certificate status = not detected
f. Global IP address = not detected
g. AP state = unknown
3. System associates to the next AP in the APs for selected SSID list.
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4. Flow of events returns to step 15 of the Basic Flow.
5. System ends.
c) system is not able to get a Client DHCP address for the user
On step 16 of the Basic Flow:
1. IF System is not able to get a Client DHCP address for the user THEN
2. System updates the APs for selected SSID list with the following results:
a. Client DHCP address = not detected
b. Internet access = not detected
c. Secured public website access = not detected
d. Certification status = not detected
e. Global IP address = not detected
f. AP state = unknown
3. System disassociates from current AP and associates to the next AP on the APs for
selected SSID list.
4. Flow of events returns to step 15 of the Basic Flow.
d) system is not able to accept terms of use to access the Internet
On step 17 of the Basic Flow:
1. IF System is not able to accept terms of use to access the Internet THEN
2. System updates the APs for selected SSID list with the following results:
a. Internet access = false
b. Secured public website access = not detected
c. Certification status = not detected
d. Global IP address = not detected
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e. AP state = unknown
3. System disassociates from current AP and associates to the next AP on the APs for
selected SSID list.
4. Flow of events returns to step 15 of the Basic Flow.
e) system is not able to access secured public website
On step 18 of the Basic Flow:
1. IF System is not able to access secured public website THEN
2. System updates the APs for selected SSID list with the following results:
a. Secured public website access = false
b. Certification status = not detected
c. Global IP address = not detected
d. AP state = unknown
3. System disassociates from current AP and associates to the next AP on the APs for
selected SSID list.
4. Flow of events returns to step 15 of the Basic Flow.
f) invalid certificate
On step 19 of the Basic Flow:
1. IF System receives an invalid certificate message THEN
2. System updates the APs for selected SSID list with the following results:
a. Certification status = invalid
b. Global IP address = not detected
c. AP state = ETA
3. System adds AP MAC address to the learned ETA MAC address list.
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4. System disassociates from current AP and associates to the next AP on the APs for
selected SSID list.
5. Flow of events returns to step 15 of the Basic Flow.
g) number of occurrences of a global IP address is less than 2
On step 21 of the Basic Flow:
1. IF System determines that number of occurrences of a global IP address is less than 2
THEN
2. System displays message: “There is not enough information to categorize APs”
3. System updates the APs for selected SSID list with the following result:
a. AP state = unknown
4. System ends.
h) global IP address for an AP is not the same as the trusted global IP address
On step 25 of the Basic Flow:
1. IF System determines that the global IP address for an AP is not the same as the
trusted global IP address THEN
2. System categorizes the AP as “ETA”.
3. System updates the APs for selected SSID list with the following result:
a. AP state = ETA
4. System adds the AP MAC addresses to the learned ETA MAC address list.
5. System disassociates from current AP and associates to the next AP on the APs for
selected SSID list.
6. Flow of events returns to step 25 of the Basic Flow.
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Input and Output details:
1. SSIDs in range list = list of AP MAC address, signal level/RSSI, encryption status,
frequency, and channel. This list contains APs with encryption on and off.
2. APs for selected SSID list = list of AP MAC address, signal level/RSSI, encryption
status, frequency, channel, Client DHCP address, Internet access, secured public
website access, certification status, global IP address, and AP state. This list contains
only the APs with encryption off and signal/RSSI level equal to or greater than
-75dBm.
3. Learned ETA MAC address list = list of ETA MAC addresses.
Rule details:
1. Number of APs for selected SSID = the number of APs for selected SSID must be
equal to or greater than 2.
2. Number of occurrences of a global IP address = the number of occurrences of a
global IP address must be equal to or greater than 2.
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Figure 11. CSMETAD Algorithm Flow – Phase 1 Data Collection.
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Phase 2: Detection & Protection
Basic Flow:
1. System rescans the public Wi-Fi network to rediscover APs with selected SSID.
2. System creates list of SSIDs in range.
3. System adds all the APs for selected SSID with signal level equal to or greater than
-75 dBm to the APs for selected SSID list (new list).
4. System validates that number of APs for selected SSID is equal to or greater than 1.
(Alternative Flow “a”)
5. IF number of APs for selected SSID is equal to or greater than 1 THEN System
retrieves learned ETA MAC addresses from learned ETA MAC address list. This
list includes all ETA MAC addresses learned from the beginning of the program.
6. System removes learned ETA MAC addresses from APs for selected SSID list.
7. System validates that the number of APs for selected SSID is equal to or greater
than 1. (Alternative Flow “b”)
8. IF number of APs for selected SSID is equal to or greater than 1 THEN System
starts iterating across all the APs in APs for selected SSID list.
9. Systems associates to the AP with the highest signal strength in the APs for selected
SSID list. (Alternative Flow “c”)
10. IF System is able to associate to the AP THEN System gets a Client DHCP address
for the user. (Alternative Flow “d”)
11. IF System is able to get a Client DHCP address for the user THEN System confirms
access to the Internet. (Alternative Flow “e”)
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12. IF System is able to confirm access to the Internet THEN System connects to secured
public website to retrieve global IP address of the AP. (Alternative Flow “f”)
13. IF System is able to access secured public website THEN System verifies that the
public website certificate is valid. (Alternative Flow “g”)
14. IF the public website certificate is valid only THEN System is able to get the global
IP address for the AP.
15. System validates that the global IP address for the AP is the same as the trusted global
IP address. (Alternative Flow “h”)
16. IF the global IP address for the AP is the same as the trusted global IP THEN the
System displays message: “Wi-Fi connection is safe. You are connected to a
legitimate AP”.
17. System ends iterating across APs in APs for selected SSID list.
18. System waits for a disassociated wireless card event.
19. IF System receives a disassociated wireless card event THEN System proceeds to
rescans the public Wi-Fi network. Algorithm phase 2 repeats (infinite loop).
Alternative Flows:
a) number of APs for selected SSID is less than 1
On step 4 of the Basic Flow:
1. IF the number of APs for selected SSID is less than 1 THEN
2. System displays message: “Your device is out of range for the selected public Wi-Fi
hotspot. Please move closer”.
3. Flow of events returns to step 1 of the Basic Flow.
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b) number of APs for selected SSID is less than 1
On step 7 of the Basic Flow:
1. IF the number of APs with the selected SSID is less than 1 THEN
2. System displays message: “You are located on the vicinity of Evil Twin Attacks.
Please move to a different location within the public Wi-Fi Hotspot”.
3. Flow of events returns to step 1 of the Basic Flow.
c) system is not able to associate to an AP
On step 9 of the Basic Flow:
1. IF System is not able to associate to an AP THEN
2. System associates to the next AP with the highest signal strength on the APs for
selected SSID list.
3. Flow of events returns to step 9 of the Basic Flow.
d) system is not able to get a Client DHCP address for the user
On step 10 of the Basic Flow:
1. IF the System is not able to get a Client DHCP address for the user THEN
2. System disassociates from current AP and associates to the next AP with the highest
signal strength on the APs for selected SSID list.
3. Flow of events returns to step 9 of the Basic Flow.
e) system is not able to confirm access to the Internet
On step 11 of the Basic Flow:
1. IF the System is not able to confirm access to the Internet THEN
2. System disassociates from current AP and associates to the next AP with the highest
signal strength on the APs for selected SSID list.
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3. Flow of events returns to step 9 of the Basic Flow.
f) system is not able to access secured public website
On step 12 of the Basic Flow:
1. IF the System is not able to access secured public website THEN
2. System disassociates from current AP and associates to the next AP with the highest
signal strength on the APs for selected SSID list.
3. Flow of events returns to step 9 of the Basic Flow.
g) invalid certificate
On step 13 of the Basic Flow:
1. IF the System receives an invalid certificate message THEN
2. System has detected an ETA on the public Wi-Fi network. System displays message:
“CSMETAD has detected an ETA on the public Wi-Fi hotspot”.
3. System adds the AP MAC address to the learned ETA MAC address list (if ETA is
not in the list).
4. System disassociates from current AP and associates to the next AP with the highest
signal strength on the APs for selected SSID list.
5. Flow of events returns to step 9 of the Basic Flow.
h) global IP address for an AP is not the same as the trusted global IP address
On step 15 of the Basic Flow:
1. IF the System determines that the global IP address for an AP is not the same as the
trusted global IP address THEN
2. System has detected an ETA on the public Wi-Fi network. System displays message:
“CSMETAD has detected an ETA on the public Wi-Fi hotspot”.
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3. System adds the AP MAC address to the learned ETA MAC address list (if ETA is
not in the list).
4. System disassociates from current AP and associates to the next AP with the highest
signal strength on the APs for selected SSID list.
5. Flow of events returns to step 9 of the Basic Flow.
Input and Output details:
1. APs for selected SSID list = list of AP MAC address, signal level/RSSI, encryption
status, frequency, channel, Client DHCP address, Internet access, secured public
website access, certification status, global IP address, and AP state. This list contains
only the APs with encryption off and signal level equal to or greater than -75dBm.
2. Learned ETA MAC address list = list of ETA MAC addresses.
Rule details:
1. Number of APs for selected SSID = the number of APs for selected SSID must be
equal to or greater than 1.
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Figure 12. CSMETAD Algorithm Flow – Phase 2 Detection & Protection.
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Artifact Testing
Rigorous testing took place with the CSMETAD system based on Hevner’s DSR
principle 5 in order to verify that the architecture components were working effectively
according to the design.
Lab Environment Testing
1. The TCP/IP utility “ifconfig” was used to verify the correct address configuration of
the lab equipment, once the devices in the topology were connected, configured and
developed in the construction phase.
2. The Cisco Operating System “show run” command was used to prove and
troubleshoot the configuration of the router, switch, wireless controller, and wireless
access points.
3. The TCP/IP utility “ping” was used to verify connectivity between router, switch,
wireless controller, and wireless access points.
4. The TCP/IP utility “traceroute” was used to discover the path between devices across
the topology.
Appendix B shows Algorithm test cases and results.
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Artifact Production
After the construction was complete, the CSMETAD system was brought into
production mode. CSMETAD initially aimed at detecting real mobile evil twin AP
attacks in the wild at a hotel property. Since no mobile evil twin APs were detected in
the wild during the field evaluation period, the author proceeded to evaluate the system
with the mobile evil twin AP used in the lab.

Artifact Evaluation
The client-side mobile evil twin attack detection system was evaluated based on
Hevner’s principle 3 that asserts that the utility, quality, and efficacy of a design artifact
must be rigorously validated via well executed evaluation methods. The author
extensively evaluated the performance of the client-side evil twin attack detection method
by implementing a prototype system. The prototype system was evaluated in two
environments. First, in a lab to analyze the requirements and demonstrate the
effectiveness in a controlled environment. Second, in the field at a hotel public Wi-Fi
hotspot to extensively evaluate the robustness of the system in practice. The client-side
mobile evil twin attack detection system aimed at detecting real mobile evil twin AP
attacks in the wild at a hotel property that provide free open public Wi-Fi. Since no real
mobile evil twin AP attacks were detected in the wild during the field evaluation period,
the author proceeded to evaluate the system with the mobile evil twin AP used in the lab.
Similar approach was used by Hossen & Wenyuan’s study and the remainder of the
client-side evil twin attack detection studies referenced in this dissertation.
The client-side evil twin detection method developed as part of this dissertation was
tested against Hossen & Wenyuan’s (2014) method for detecting mobile evil twin
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attacks. The experiments aimed at showing that the detection system developed can
detect mobile evil twin attacks more effectively and efficiently.
The techniques to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of the system were based
on Hossen & Wenyuan’s (2014) evaluation methodology which has been published and
validated and included the following:
1. Collected data from a hotel public Wi-Fi hotspot (public spaces).
2. Ran the experiments on both weekdays and weekends for a period of 5 weeks (2
weeks at the lab and 3 weeks at the hotel).
3. Collected approximately 300 hours of data.
4. Collected more than 151,000 instances of data.
5. Ran the detection system 140 times at the lab and 210 times at a hotel public Wi-Fi
hotspot.
6. Monitored the network with Wireshark packet analyzer.
For efficiency, the author used Hossen and Wenyuan’s technique to measure time
delay but also leveraged Nakhila et al.’s technique to improve upon Hossen and
Wenyuan’s. Nakhila et al. included a complete list of measurements and factors
impacting efficiency.
In this study, the author used a researcher-participant approach. According to Richey
and Klein (2007), researchers are often the designer/ developers. In other words, by
design they “go native” and observe themselves. “The researcher who ceases to be
conscious of the observer role is said to be going native” (Singleton & Straits, 2005). In
this study, the author participated as the user of the client-side evil twin attack detection
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system and the researcher observing the client-side evil twin attack detection system
performance.
Artifact Communication
The CSMETAD system design, implementation, and evaluation process including
specifications and procedures is communicated as a solution manual named CSMETAD
System Solution Manual and is included in Appendix D of the dissertation to be made
available via ProQuest Dissertations database.

Instrument Development and Validation
As a first phase in the assessment, and prior to continuing with testing the research
questions in this study, the validity of the experiment was evaluated. According to
Albright and Malloy (2000), experimental validity is built on the way in which variables
have an influence on both the outcomes of the research and the generality of research
participants. Researchers have divided experimental validity into internal and external
validity.
Internal Validity
Internal Validity of a research study refers to the “extent to which its design and the
data that it yields allow the researcher to draw accurate conclusions about cause-andeffect and other relationships within the data” (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005). Similarly,
according to Briggs & Schwabe (2011), internal validity is the question of whether the
observed results were actually caused by the experimental treatment instead of by
something else.
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To establish internal validity, the researcher of this study examined Criterion Validity,
also known as Instrumental Validity. According to Leedy & Ormrod (2005),
instrumental validity is based on the premise that processes and instruments used in a
study are valid if they parallel similar to those used in previous, validated research.
Following Hossen & Wenyuan’s (2014) validated research evaluation methodology, this
study:
a) demonstrated the artifact in a laboratory setting;
b) evaluated the artifact in an uncontrolled environment;
c) built evaluation steps (such as when to run experiments and collect the data, what
data to collect, how much data to collect, and how many times to run the tests at
the hotspot);
d) analyzed performance (detection effectiveness) using standard metrics (accuracy,
precision, and recall); and
e) used researcher-participant approach.

External Validity
External validity of a research study refers to the “extend to which its results apply to
situations beyond the study itself…the extent to which the conclusions drawn can be
generalized to other contexts” (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005). Also, according to Briggs &
Schwabe (2011), external validity is the degree to which results of the experiment would
generalize to contexts other than those of the experimental conditions. Additionally,
external validity is important to demonstrate that research results are applicable in natural
settings, as contrasted with laboratory settings (King & He, 2005).
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The researcher reached out to a hotel organization in Ecuador that provide free open
public Wi-Fi in their public spaces and requested approval to participate in this study.
Based on the responses, the hotel provided its approval to participate. As far as research
settings, the hotel provides free open public Wi-Fi in their public spaces such as lobbies,
restaurants, bars, and coffee shops. The conclusions reached could be extrapolated to
other public Wi-Fi hotspots, as long as the design assumptions documented in this study
apply. Generalization to other public hotspots may not be warranted. In addition, the
client-side evil twin AP attack detection system built as part of this study is based on
laptop platform with Linux OS. Generalization to other mobile platforms and operating
systems may not be warranted.

Sample Population
The sample population in this study consists of a hotel property located in Ecuador.
The hotel property offers free open public Wi-Fi to wireless users in hotel public areas
such as lobbies, restaurants, bars and coffee shops.

Data Analysis
To assess the prototype system and effectively answer the research questions in this
study, quantitative data was collected and analyzed using Hossen & Wenyuan’s (2014)
performance analysis approach:
1. Used the following standard metrics:
a) Accuracy: indicates how accurately the system detects evil twin AP attacks.
b) Precision: is the fraction of positively detected attacks to all positively
detected attacks (correctly or incorrectly).

148
c) Recall: is the fraction of positively detected attacks to all attacks that should
be positively detected.
2. Used True positive (TP), True negative (TN), False positive (FP), False negative (FN)
to calculate above standard metrics:
a) TP and TN: represent correct classification
b) FP and FN: represent incorrect classification
3. Used the following equations to calculate standard metrics:

Accuracy =

Precision =

Recall =

TP + TN
N
TP + TN + FP + FN
TP
TP + FP
TP
TP + FN

N

N

4. Used diagrams including performance (%) for accuracy, precision and recall to depict
performance results.
5. Answered the research questions based on the performance results. In addition, the
data was gathered and analyzed with the intent of showing that the principles,
processes, methods, and technologies used as well as the issues encountered during
the evaluation apply to other hotel public Wi-Fi environments.

Format for Presenting Results
The design, development, and implementation of the artifact conveyed in this study is
presented in support of Hevner’s guideline 7 through the creation and
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communication of a complete solution manual including design, procedures and
specifications and is made available via ProQuest Dissertations database. The solution
manual includes the following sections:

1. Physical network connectivity design
2. Logical prototype topology design diagram
3. Artifact construction specifications
4. Minimum hardware and software requirements
5. Step-by-step artifact construction procedures
6. Step-by-step artifact testing procedures
7. Transition client-side mobile evil twin attack detection system into production

Resource Requirements
Scholarly and industry publications such as journal articles, textbooks, conference
proceedings, technical reports, research reports, and online newspapers were used to
support the client-side detection system. This section addressed the resources that were
under the researcher’s control in order to complete the research:


Hardware (Cisco router, Cisco switch, Cisco wireless controller, Cisco wireless
access points, Lenovo laptops, Motorola Android smartphone);



Software (Linux OS, Java SE Development Kit, Netbeans IDE, Wireshark packet
analyzer, Kali Linux (Aircrack-ng), Hostapd, Android Mobile Hotspot and
Tethering);



Client-side evil twin attack detection system; and



Access to free open public Wi-Fi at a hotel (public Wi-Fi spaces)
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Summary
Based on Hevner et al.’s (2004) seven guidelines of DSR, Peffers et al.’s DSRM
(2008), and Hossen & Wenyuan’s (2014) study evaluation method this chapter of the
dissertation report delivered the structure for the development of design procedures and
specifications derived from DSR literature to guide the construction, implementation, and
evaluation of an effective client-side evil twin attack detection architecture artifact
(CSMETAD). The research problem and the methodology of how to realize the desired
outcome of building and evaluating the artifact to be used to support users of free open
public Wi-Fi was achieved by delineating a two phased research approach. The first
phase of the research emphasized the development of design principles, procedures and
specifications that guided the artifact design, construction, implementation, and
evaluation of the client-side evil twin attack detection artifact based on design science
methodologies. The second phase of the research evaluated the effectiveness and
efficiency of the artifact by implementing a prototype system.
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Chapter 4
Results
This chapter presents the results of the activities associated with the system
demonstration and evaluation phases described in previous chapter. The system
demonstration phase includes lab deployment activities. The system evaluation phase
includes the methods used to evaluate the artifact in the field, experiment results,
followed by an analysis of the artifact’s performance.

System Demonstration
Lab deployment activities involved testing and evaluation of the client-side mobile evil
twin attack detection system contained in a controlled environment as presented in
chapter 3. The prototype system was tested and evaluated in the lab to analyze the
requirements and demonstrate its effectiveness in a controlled environment. The lab
simulated the hotel public Wi-Fi hotspot and provided an effective environment suitable
for testing. Requirements were analyzed using observations and results from the lab
experiment. Over the two-week duration of the lab deployment activities, the author used
Hossen & Wenyuan’s (2014) evaluation methodology to collect and analyze the data.
Requirements Analysis
Several key requirements drove the research effort. These requirements were
analyzed in the lab to demonstrate the artifact’s effectiveness addressing the problem.
The key requirements include:
R1: It protects users whether or not they have connected to a free open public Wi-Fi
network in the past.
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R2: It protects users when not all the hotspot APs with the desired SSID are detected
during the initial wireless network scanning.
R3: It protects users when the client is not able to associate to all the APs in the public
Wi-Fi network.
R4: It protects users when the attacker sets up the mobile evil twin AP with the same
SSID, BSSID, and subnet of a legitimate AP.
R5: It protects users when the attacker blocks access to the public website used to get
ISP information.
R6: It protects users when the attacker presents an invalid certificate while retrieving ISP
information from a public website.
R7: After mobile evil twin AP attack detection, it connects users to a legitimate AP.
R8: It protects users for the duration of the public Wi-Fi connection, discovering and
reporting on new mobile evil twin access points.
The following provides the test procedures for each requirement and the results:
R1: It will protect users whether or not they have connected to a free open public Wi-Fi
network in the past.
This requirement was tested during phase 1 of the algorithm. To test this requirement,
the wireless client was set up with a previous connection to the public Wi-Fi network, in
this case the lab SSID (labwifi). The system was initialized by the user before visiting
the open public Wi-Fi hotspot. This is required only the first time the system is used in
the public Wi-Fi hotspot. Results show that the system iterated through all the 802.11
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wireless network connections and validated if connection autoconnect was enabled and
unencrypted. After validation, the system disabled autoconnect for all open
(unencrypted) 802.11 wireless network connections.
R2: It will protect the user when not all the hotspot APs with the desired SSID are
detected during initial wireless network scanning.
This requirement was tested during phase 2 of the algorithm. In phase 2, after the
system received a disassociated wireless card event, the system rescanned the wireless
network to rediscover APs with selected SSID that were not detected during the initial
wireless network scanning. APs with signal strength equal to or greater than -75 dBm
were added to the APs for selected SSID list. Results show that when the number of APs
for selected SSID was less than 1, the system presented the following message: “Your
device is out of range for the selected public Wi-Fi hotspot. Please move closer”. The
system then rescanned the public Wi-Fi network.
R3: It will protect the user when the client is not able to associate to all the APs in the
public Wi-Fi network.
This requirement was tested during phase 1 and 2 of the algorithm. In phase 1 and 2,
the system attempted to associate to an AP with a timeout of 5 seconds. The system
checked association status each second for 5 seconds. In phase 1, results show that when
the system was not able to associate to an AP within 5 seconds, the system updated the
APs for selected SSID list with association status as “false”, AP state as “unknown”, and
client DHCP address, Internet access, secured public website access, certificate status,
and global IP address as “not detected”. Next, the system attempted to associate to the
next AP in the APs for selected SSID list. In phase 1, when the system was not able to
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associate to any of the APs, it presented the following message: “There is not enough
information to categorize APs”, updated APs for selected SSID with AP state as
“unknown”, and the system ended. In phase 2, results show that when the system was
not able to associate to an AP within 5 seconds, it attempted to associate to the next AP
with the highest signal strength in the APs for selected SSID list. In phase 2, when the
system was not able to associate to any of the APs, it rescanned the public Wi-Fi
network.
R4 & R7 & R8: It will protect users when the attacker sets up the mobile evil twin AP
with the same SSID, BSSID (MAC address), and subnet of a legitimate AP. After
detection, it connects the user to a legitimate AP. Lastly, it protects the user for the
duration of the public Wi-Fi connection, discovering and reporting on new mobile evil
twin access points.
Requirements 4, 7, and 8 were tested during phase 2 of the algorithm. To test these
requirements, the system was run, collected data, detected only legitimate APs, connected
the user to a legitimate AP, and waited for a disassociated wireless card event. No evil
twin AP was present when the user ran the system. The author simulated the scenario
when the attacker arrived later at the public Wi-Fi hotspot, configured the mobile evil
twin AP with the same SSID, MAC address, and subnet of a legitimate AP, placed the
mobile evil twin AP closer to the user (better signal strength), and proceeded to
disassociate the user from the legitimate AP to force the user to connect to the mobile evil
twin AP.
The system, after detecting a disassociated wireless card event, it rescanned the
wireless network to rediscover APs with the same SSID that were not detected during the
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initial wireless network scanning. In this scenario, the rescan showed two APs, one with
signal strength equal to or greater than -75 dBm and one with signal strength less than -75
dBm. The system added all APs for selected SSID with signal strength equal to or
greater than -75 dBm to the APs for selected SSID list (new list). This resulted in only
one AP added. Since there were two APs with the same SSID, MAC address, and subnet,
the system only showed the AP that had the highest signal strength and ignored the other
AP. The system does not trust rescanned APs even if they have the same SSID, MAC
address and subnet of legitimate APs; therefore, the system proceeds to validate them
again. Next, the system validated if the number of APs for selected SSID was equal to or
greater than 1. Results show that when the number of APs for selected SSID was equal
to or greater than 1, the system retrieved learned ETA MAC addresses from learned ETA
MAC address list and removed them from the APs for selected SSID list. In this case, no
ETA MAC addresses were retrieved and removed. The system validated that the number
of APs for selected was equal to or greater than 1. Results show that when the number of
APs for selected SSID was equal to or greater than 1, the system attempted to associate to
the AP with the highest signal strength in the APs for selected SSID list. When the
system associated to the AP, obtained DHCP address, confirmed Internet access,
accessed secured public website and verified that the public website certificate was valid,
only then, the system obtained the global IP address. When the AP global IP address was
not the same as the trusted global IP address, the system printed access as “true”,
certificate status as “valid”, and the global IP address of the mobile evil twin AP. Next,
the system presented the following message: “CSMETAD has detected an ETA on the
public Wi-Fi hotspot”, added the AP MAC address to the Learned ETA MAC address
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list, disassociated from current AP and associated to the next AP with the highest signal
strength in the APs for selected SSID list. Since there were no more APs in the list, the
system displayed the following message: “CSMETAD finished iterating across the list of
APs and was not able to validate that the AP global IP was the same as the trusted global
IP” and proceeded to scan the public Wi-Fi network again.
The results of the rescan showed two APs, one with signal strength equal to or greater
than -75 dBm and one with signal strength less than -75 dBm. The system added all APs
for selected SSID with signal strength equal to or greater than -75 dBm to the APs for
selected SSID list. In this case, only one AP with the same MAC address as previously
learned ETA MAC address was added to the list. Same as above, since there were two
APs with the same SSID, MAC address, and subnet, the system only showed the AP that
had the highest signal strength and ignored the other AP. Next, the system validated if
the number of APs for selected SSID was equal to or greater than 1. Results show that
when the number of APs for selected SSID was equal to or greater than 1, the system
retrieved learned ETA MAC addresses from learned ETA MAC address list and removed
them from APs for selected SSID list, leaving no more APs in the list. The system then
validated that the number of APs for selected was equal to or greater than 1. Results
show that when the number of APs for selected SSID was less than 1, the system
presented the following message: “You are located on the vicinity of Evil Twin Attacks.
Please move to a different location within the public Wi-Fi Hotspot” and proceeded to
rescan the public Wi-Fi network.
The results of the rescan this time showed two APs, both with signal strength equal to
or greater than -75 dBm. The system added all APs for selected SSID with signal
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strength equal to or greater than -75 dBm to the APs for selected SSID list. In this case,
two APs were added to the list, one AP with the same MAC address as previously
learned ETA MAC address and a second AP. Same as above, since there were two APs
with the same SSID, MAC address, and subnet, the system only showed the AP that had
the highest signal strength and ignored the other AP. Next, the system validated if the
number of APs for selected SSID was equal to or greater than 1. Results show that when
the number of APs for selected SSID was equal to or greater than 1, the system retrieved
learned ETA MAC addresses from learned ETA MAC address list and removed them
from APs for selected SSID list, leaving only one AP in the list. The system then
validated that the number of APs for selected was equal to or greater than 1. Results
show that when the number of APs for selected SSID was equal to or greater than 1, the
system attempted to associate to the AP with the highest signal strength in the APs for
selected SSID list. When the system associated to the next AP in the list and obtained
DHCP address, confirmed Internet access, accessed secured public website and verified
that the public website certificate was valid, only then, the system obtained the global IP
address. When the AP global IP address was the same as the trusted global IP address,
the system printed access as “true”, certificate status as “valid”, and the global IP address
of the legitimate AP. Next, the system connected the user to the legitimate AP and
presented the following message: “Wi-Fi connection is safe. You are connected to a
legitimate AP”, and waited for a disassociated wireless card event. Results show that
when the system received a disassociated wireless card event, the system rescanned the
public Wi-Fi network and the algorithm phase 2 repeated (infinite loop).
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When the system associated to the next AP in the list but was not able to obtain the
DHCP address, confirm Internet access, access secured public website or verify that the
public website certificate was valid, the system disassociated from AP and associated to
the next AP in the APs for selected SSID list. When there were no more APs in the list,
the system rescanned the public Wi-Fi network.
R5: It protects the user when the attacker blocks access to the public website used to get
ISP information.
Requirement 5 was tested during phase 2 of the algorithm. To test this requirement,
the author simulated the scenario when the attacker blocks access to the secured public
website used to collect the global IP address using iptables rules.
From above example, when the system associated to an AP, obtained DHCP address,
and confirmed Internet access, it proceeded to access secured public website to obtain the
global IP. Results show that when the system was blocked access to the secured public
website, it printed access as “false”, certificate status as “not detected” and global IP as
“not detected”. Next, the system disassociated from AP and associated to the next AP in
the APs for selected SSID list.
R6: It protects the user when the attacker presents an invalid certificate while retrieving
ISP information from a public website.
To test an invalid public website certificate would require the creation of a fake
remote server which will be very expensive to set up. This requirement was tested only
in the lab. To test this requirement, two websites that provide invalid certificates were
used to simulate the attacker using a fake remote server to bypass detection procedure
(Google Open Source, n.d.). Results show that when the system verified that the public
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website certificate was invalid, the system printed access as “true”, certificate status as
“invalid”, and global IP as “not detected”. The system then updated the AP MAC
address list with AP state as “ETA”, added the AP MAC address to the Learned ETA
MAC address list, disassociated from AP, and associated to the next AP in the APs for
selected SSID list.
Appendix B shows Algorithm test cases and results. Appendix C shows CSMETAD
system results for each of the key requirements.

Lab – Performance
Performance metrics from Hossen & Wenyuan (2014) as depicted in chapter 3 were
used to calculate the effectiveness of the artifact in a controlled environment. The
findings showed that CSMETAD can detect mobile evil twin AP attacks effectively.
CSMETAD detected mobile evil twin attacks, with 100% accuracy, precision, and recall.
CSMETAD performance in detecting mobile evil twin attacks in the lab is depicted in
Figure 13.
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Figure 13. CSMETAD performance for mobile evil twin attacks in the lab.
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System Evaluation
At the conclusion of the lab deployment activities, the author travelled to Ecuador to
extensively evaluate the robustness of the client-side mobile evil twin attack detection
(CSMETAD) system in practice at a hotel public Wi-Fi hotspot that provides free open
public Wi-Fi in its public spaces (restaurant, lobby, coffee shop and bar). Initially, the
CSMETAD system aimed at searching for mobile evil twin attacks in the wild. Since no
evil twin AP attacks were detected during the field evaluation period, the author
proceeded to evaluate the system with the mobile evil twin AP used in the lab. Similar
approach was used by Hossen & Wenyuan’s study and the remainder of the client-side
evil twin attack detection studies referenced in this dissertation. Over the three-week
duration of the system evaluation, the author used Hossen & Wenyuan’s (2014)
evaluation methodology to collect and analyze the data. The client-side evil twin
detection method was evaluated with real-world scenarios.
Observations
During wild testing, the author ran the system in several locations in the hotel public
Wi-Fi hotspot during busy times and waited for attackers to perform mobile evil twin
attacks. During each run, the system collected data, connected the user to a legitimate AP
and waited for a disassociated wireless card event caused by an attacker (refer to scenario
1 below). If no disassociations were detected after 10 to 30 minutes, the author re-ran the
system. Results show that no mobile evil twin APs were detected during the field
evaluation period.
Since no mobile evil twin attacks were detected in the wild, the author proceeded to
evaluate the system with the mobile evil twin AP used in the lab. The author simulated
the scenario of when the user ran the system, the system collected data, connected the
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user to a legitimate AP, and waited for a disassociated wireless card event. Attackers
with mobile evil twin APs were not present when the user ran the system at the hotel
public Wi-Fi hotspot. Next, the attacker with a mobile evil twin AP arrived at the public
Wi-Fi hotspot, disassociated the user from the legitimate AP, and forced the user to
connect to the mobile evil twin AP. The system then proceeded to detect mobile evil
twin attacks, connect the user to a legitimate AP, and protect the user for the duration of
the public Wi-Fi connection. In the tests, the public website certificate was valid.
Detailed experimental results are described in the following paragraphs.
Scenario 1: User ran the system, system collected data, connected the user to a
legitimate AP, and waited for a disassociated wireless card event. Attacker with a
mobile evil twin AP was not present when the user arrived to the public Wi-Fi hotspot
and ran the system.
Scenario 1 - Basic Flow - Phase 1 – Data Collection
The system at the beginning of phase 1 disabled auto-connections to all open
(unencrypted) public Wi-Fi networks. The system then scanned the wireless network to
discover SSIDs in range and presented them to the user. After the user selected the hotel
public Wi-Fi hotspot SSID, the system created a list including all APs for selected SSID
with signal strength equal to or greater than -75 dBm. The system detected two APs.
The system then validated if the number of APs for selected SSID was equal to or greater
than 2. Results show that when the number of APs for selected SSID was equal to or
greater than 2, the system presented the following message: “There is sufficient
information to start detecting ETAs”.
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The system then started to iterate across all the APs and attempted to associate to each
AP in the APs for selected SSID list. After successful AP association, the system
proceeded to obtain client DHCP information, confirm Internet access, access secured
public website and verify that the public website certificate was valid. Results show that
when the system was able to associate to an AP, obtain client DHCP information,
confirm Internet access, access secured public website and verify that the public website
certificate was valid, only then, the system was able to obtain the global IP address. To
verify AP association, the system displayed the elements of the network interface specific
to the wireless operation. The system printed: “Client has associated to AP”. To verify
DHCP information, the system displayed configured network interface parameters. The
system printed: “Found IP address: xxx.xxx.xx.xx”. To verify Internet access, the system
attempted to access an URL to check Internet connection. If the system was able to
access the URL, then the system proceeded to approve terms of use. When redirection to
a captive portal was detected, the system accepted terms of use and checked the Internet
connection. The system printed: “CSMETAD was able to accept terms of use. Internet
access confirmed”. When redirection to a captive portal was not detected, Internet access
was confirmed. The system printed: “Internet access confirmed”. If the system was not
able to access the URL, then the system printed: “Terms of Use approval failed”. To
verify access to secured public website and that the public website certificate was valid,
the system displayed cipher suite parameters and printed secured public website access as
“true”, certificate status as “valid”, and global IP address results.
Once the system finished iterating throughout all the APs, the system determined the
trusted global IP address to be used by the system for the duration of the public Wi-Fi
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connection by validating the number of global IP address occurrences. Results show that
when the number of global IP address occurrences was equal to or greater than 2, the
system assigned the global IP address as the trusted global IP and proceeded to iterate
throughout all APs to categorize them as either “valid”, “ETA”, or “unknown”. In this
scenario, the AP global IP addresses in the list were the same as the trusted global IP
address; therefore, the system updated the APs for selected SSID list with AP state as
“valid”.
Scenario 1 - Alternative Flows - Phase 1 – Data Collection
During the initial phase 1 scan, results show that when the number of APs for selected
SSID was less than 2, the system presented the following message: “There is insufficient
information to detect ETAs”, and the system ended.
During AP association, results show that when the system was not able to associate to
an AP in the first attempt, the system slept for one second and re-attempted association.
The system attempted to associate to an AP for 5 seconds. When the system was not able
to associate to an AP in 5 seconds, it updated the AP state as “unknown” and attempted to
associate to the next AP in the APs for selected SSID list.
After successful AP association, results show that when the system was not able to
obtain DHCP information, confirm Internet access, access secured public website or
verify that the public website certificate was valid, the system updated the AP state as
“unknown”, disassociated from current AP and associated to the next AP in the APs for
selected SSID list.
During the determination of the trusted global IP, results show that when the number
of global IP address occurrences was less than 2, the system displayed the following
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message: “There is not enough information to categorize APs”, updated AP state as
“unknown”, and the system ended.
Scenario 1 - Basic Flow - Phase 2 – Detection and Protection
In phase 2, the system proceeded to rescan the public Wi-Fi network to rediscover
APs with selected SSID. The system added all APs for selected SSID with signal
strength equal to or greater than -75 dBm to the APs for selected SSID list (new list).
The system detected two APs with the same MAC addresses as phase 1. Next, the
system validated if the number of APs for selected SSID was equal to or greater than 1.
Results show that when the number of APs for selected SSID was equal to or greater than
1, the system retrieved learned ETA MAC addresses from learned ETA MAC addresses
list and removed learned ETA MAC addresses from APs for selected SSID list. In the
tests, since no mobile evil twin APs were detected in phase 1, no ETA MAC addresses
were retrieved and removed. The system then validated if the number of APs for selected
SSID continues to be equal to or greater than 1. Results show that when the number of
APs for selected SSID was equal to or greater than 1, the system started to iterate across
all the APs. First, the system attempted to associate to the AP with the highest signal
strength in the APs for selected SSID list. After successful AP association, the system
proceeded to obtain client DHCP information, confirm Internet access, access secured
public website and verify that the public website certificate was valid. Results show that
when the system was able to associate to an AP, obtain client DHCP information,
confirm Internet access, access secured public website and verify the public website
certificate was valid, only then, the system obtained the global IP address. To verify AP
association, the system displayed the elements of the network interface specific to the
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wireless operation. The system printed: “Client has associated to AP”. To verify DHCP
information, the system displayed configured network interface parameters. The system
printed: “Found IP address: xxx.xxx.xx.xx”. To verify Internet access, the system
attempted to access an URL to check Internet connection. If the system was able to
access the URL, then the system proceeded to approve terms of use. When redirection to
a captive portal was detected, the system accepted terms of use and checked the Internet
connection. The system printed: “CSMETAD was able to accept terms of use. Internet
access confirmed”. When redirection to a captive portal was not detected, Internet access
was confirmed. The system printed: “Internet access confirmed”. If the system was not
able to access the URL, then the system printed: “Terms of Use approval failed”. To
verify access to secured public website and that the public website certificate was valid,
the system displayed cipher suite parameters and printed secured public website access as
“true”, certificate status as “valid”, and global IP address results.
The system then validated if the AP global IP address was the same as the trusted
global IP address. Results show that the AP global IP address was the same as the trusted
global IP address, the system connected to the AP and presented the following message:
“Wi-Fi connection is safe. You are connected to a legitimate AP”. The system then
waited for a disassociated wireless card event.
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Scenario 1 - Alternative Flow – Phase 2 – Detection and Protection
During the rescan, results show that when the number of APs for selected SSID was
less than 1, the system presented the following message: “Your device is out of range for
the selected public Wi-Fi hotspot. Please move closer”. The system then rescanned the
public Wi-Fi network.
After retrieving the learned ETA MAC addresses from the learned ETA MAC
addresses list and removing learned ETA MAC addresses from APs for selected SSID
list, the system validated if the number of APs for selected SSID was equal to or greater
than 1. Results show that when the number of APs for selected SSID was less than 1, the
system presented the following message: “You are located in the vicinity of Evil Twin
Attacks. Please move to a different location within the public Wi-Fi hotspot”. The
system then rescanned the public Wi-Fi network.
During AP association, results show that when the system was not able to associate to
an AP in the first attempt, the system slept for 1 second and re-attempted association.
The system attempted to associate to an AP for 5 seconds. When the system was not able
to associate to an AP in 5 seconds, it attempted to associate to the next AP in the APs for
selected SSID list. When the system was not able to associate to any APs, it rescanned
the public Wi-Fi network.
After successful AP association, results show that when the system was not able to
obtain DHCP information, confirm Internet access, access to secured public website or
verify that the public website certificate was valid, the system disassociated from current
AP and associated to the next AP in the APs for selected SSID list.
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Scenario 2: User was connected to a legitimate AP. Attacker arrived at the public WiFi hotspot with a mobile evil twin AP, disassociated the user from legitimate AP, and
forced the user to connect to the mobile evil twin AP (higher signal strength). Attacker
set up the mobile evil twin AP with the same SSID, MAC address, and subnet as the
legitimate AP.
Scenario 2 - Basic Flow - Phase 2 – Detection and Protection
The system received a disassociated wireless card event caused by an attacker and
proceeded to rescan the public Wi-Fi network to rediscover APs with selected SSID.
Case 1: System detected two APs (One AP with signal strength equal to or greater than
-75 dBm and one AP with signal strength less than -75 dBm).
The system added all APs for selected SSID with signal strength equal to or greater
than -75 dBm to the APs for selected SSID list. This resulted in only one AP added to
the list. This AP had the same SSID, MAC address, and subnet of a legitimate AP. Next,
the system validated if the number of APs for selected SSID was equal to or greater than
1. Results show that when the number of APs for selected SSID was equal to or greater
than 1, the system retrieved learned ETA MAC addresses from learned ETA MAC
addresses list and removed learned ETA MAC addresses from APs for selected SSID list.
Since no mobile evil twin AP was detected in scenario 1, no ETA MAC addresses were
retrieved and removed. The system then validated if the number of APs for selected
SSID continues to be equal to or greater than 1. Results show that when the number of
APs for selected SSID was equal to or greater than 1, the system started to iterate across
APs. First, the system attempted to associate to the AP with the highest signal strength in
the APs for selected SSID list. After successful AP association, the system proceeded to
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obtain client DHCP information, confirm Internet access, access secured public website
and verify that the public website certificate was valid. Results show that when the
system was able to associate to an AP, obtain the client DHCP information, confirm
Internet access, access secured public website and verify that public website certificate
was valid, only then, the system obtained the global IP address. To verify AP
association, the system displayed the elements of the network interface specific to the
wireless operation. The system printed: “Client has associated to AP”. To verify DHCP
information, the system displayed configured network interface parameters. The system
printed: “Found IP address: xxx.xxx.xx.xx”. To verify Internet access, the system
attempted to access an URL to check Internet connection. If the system was able to
access the URL, then the system proceeded to approve terms of use. When redirection to
a captive portal was detected, the system accepted terms of use and checked the Internet
connection. The system printed: “CSMETAD was able to accept terms of use. Internet
access confirmed”. When redirection to a captive portal was not detected, Internet access
was confirmed. The system printed: “Internet access confirmed”. If the system was not
able to access the URL, then the system printed: “Terms of Use approval failed”. To
verify access to secured public website and that the public website certificate was valid,
the system displayed cipher suite parameters and printed secured public website access as
“true”, certificate status as “valid”, and global IP address results.
The system then validated if the AP global IP address was the same as the trusted
global IP address. Results show that the AP global IP address was not the same as the
trusted global IP address, the system detected an ETA, and presented the following
message: “CSMETAD has detected an ETA on the public Wi-Fi hotspot”, added the AP
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MAC address to the learned ETA MAC address list, disassociated from current AP and
associated to the next AP in the APs for selected SSID list.
Since there were no more APs in the list, the system displayed the following message:
“CSMETAD finished iterating across the list of APs and was not able to validate that the
AP global IP was the same as the trusted global IP” and proceeded to rescan the public
Wi-Fi network.
Case 2: System detected two APs (One of the APs had the same MAC address as
previously detected ETA. Both APs with signal strength equal to or greater than -75
dBm).
The system added all APs for selected SSID with signal strength equal to or greater
than -75 dBm to the APs for selected SSID list. Next, the system validated if the number
of APs for selected SSID was equal to or greater than 1. Results show that when the
number of APs for selected SSID was equal to or greater than 1, the system retrieved
learned ETA MAC addresses from learned ETA MAC addresses list and removed
learned ETA MAC addresses from APs for selected SSID list. In this case, the AP with
the same MAC address as previously detected ETA was removed from the APs for
selected SSID list. After removing learned ETA MAC addresses from APs for selected
SSID list, the system validated if the number of APs for selected SSID was equal to or
greater than 1. Results show that when the number of APs for selected SSID was equal
to or greater than 1, the system started to iterate across APs. The system associated with
the AP with the highest signal strength. After successful AP association, the system
proceeded to obtain client DHCP information, confirm Internet access, access secured
public website and verify that the public website certificate was valid. Results show that
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when the system was able to associate to an AP, obtain the client DHCP information,
confirm Internet access, access secured public website and validate public website
certificate was valid, only then, the system obtained the global IP address. To verify AP
association, the system displayed the elements of the network interface specific to the
wireless operation. The system printed: “Client has associated to AP”. To verify DHCP
information, the system displayed configured network interface parameters. The system
printed: “Found IP address: xxx.xxx.xx.xx”. To verify Internet access, the system
attempted to access an URL to check Internet connection. If the system was able to
access the URL, then the system proceeded to approve terms of use. When redirection to
a captive portal was detected, the system accepted terms of use and checked the Internet
connection. The system printed: “CSMETAD was able to accept terms of use. Internet
access confirmed”. When redirection to a captive portal was not detected, Internet access
was confirmed. The system printed: “Internet access confirmed”. If the system was not
able to access the URL, then the system printed: “Terms of Use approval failed”. To
verify access to secured public website and that the public website certificate was valid,
the system displayed cipher suite parameters and printed secured public website access as
“true”, certificate status as “valid”, and global IP address results.
The system then validated if the AP global IP address was the same as the trusted
global IP address. Results show that the AP global IP address was the same as the trusted
global IP address, the system connected to the AP and presented the following message:
“Wi-Fi connection is safe. You are connected to a legitimate AP”. Results show that
when the system connected to a legitimate AP, it then waited for a disassociated wireless
card event. When the system received a disassociated wireless card event, it proceeded to
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rescan the public Wi-Fi network protecting the user for the duration of the public Wi-Fi
connection discovering and reporting on new mobile evil twin APs. Algorithm phase 2
repeated (infinite loop).
Case 3: System detected two APs (One AP with the same MAC address as the previously
detected ETA and signal strength greater than -75 dBm and one AP with signal strength
less than -75 dBm).
The system added all APs for selected SSID with signal strength equal to or greater
than -75 dBm to the APs for selected SSID list. Only the AP with the same MAC
address as the previously detected ETA was added to the list. Next, the system validated
if the number of APs for selected SSID was equal to or greater than 1. Results show that
when the number of APs for selected SSID was equal to or greater than 1, the system
retrieved learned ETA MAC addresses from learned ETA MAC addresses list and
removed learned ETA MAC addresses from APs for selected SSID list. In this case, the
AP with the same MAC address as previously detected ETA was removed from the APs
for selected SSID list, leaving no more APs in the list. After removing learned ETA
MAC addresses from APs for selected SSID list, the system validated if the number of
APs for selected SSID was equal to or greater than 1. Results show that when the
number of APs for selected SSID was less than 1, the system presented the following
message: “You are located in the vicinity of Evil Twin Attacks. Please move to a
different location within the public Wi-Fi hotspot”. The system then rescanned the public
Wi-Fi network.
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Scenario 2 - Alternative Flow – Phase 2 – Detection and Protection
After the first rescan, results show that when the number of APs for selected SSID
was less than 1, the system presented the following message: “Your device is out of range
for the selected public Wi-Fi hotspot. Please move closer”. The system then rescanned
the public Wi-Fi network.
During AP association, results show that when the system was not able to associate to
an AP in the first attempt, the system slept for 1 second and re-attempted association.
The system attempted to associate to an AP for 5 seconds. When the system was not able
to associate to an AP in 5 seconds, it attempted to associate to the next AP in the APs for
selected SSID list. When the system was not able to associate to any APs, it rescanned
the public Wi-Fi network.
After successful AP association, results also show that when the system was not able
to obtain DHCP information, confirm Internet access, access secured public website or
verify public website certificate was valid, the system disassociated from current AP and
associated to the next AP with the highest signal strength in the APs for selected SSID
list.

173
Field – Performance
Performance metrics from Hossen & Wenyuan (2014) as presented in chapter 3 were
used to measure the effectiveness of the artifact in an uncontrolled environment.
CSMETAD detected mobile evil twin attacks, with 100% accuracy, precision, and recall.
CSMETAD performance in detecting mobile evil twin attacks is depicted in Figure 14.
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Figure 14. CSMETAD performance for mobile evil twin attacks in the field.

Field – Time Delay Analysis
Analysis of time delay was conducted using field data. Delay mainly consisted of
time to associate to APs, collect DHCP information, confirm Internet access, connect to
secured public website, verify that the public website certificate was valid, receive
response from webserver, and connect the user to a legitimate AP after detection of
mobile evil twin AP. The author measured the time delay for 3 main steps in the
detection algorithm. The test was repeated 50 times.
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a. Time to associate to an AP and obtain a valid IP address from the DHCP server.
The results show that the average time to associate to an AP was 1 second and the
average time to obtain a valid IP address from the DHCP server was 2 seconds. Total
of 3 seconds for both parameters. Many factors affect these values, such as wireless
network devices, wireless network’s connection, and DHCP server.
b. Time to confirm Internet access. The results show that the average to confirm
Internet access was 0.5 seconds. These time values depend on factors such as captive
portal and Internet speed.
c. Time to connect to secured public website, verify that the public website
certificate was valid, and receive a response from the webserver. The results
show that the average duration of time required to connect to the secured public
website, verify that the public website certificate was valid, and receive a response
from the webserver was 0.7 seconds. Many factors affect these values, such as
Internet speed, DNS response time, and webserver’s response time.
For the three AP scenario (two legitimate APs and one mobile evil twin AP), data
collection was completed within 8.2 seconds, mobile evil twin AP detection took
approximately 5.2 seconds and the connection to a legitimate AP after detection was
completed in 3.8 seconds.
Figure 15, 16 and 17 illustrate the results of the measurements.
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Figure 15. Time delay - Data Collection. a) connecting to legitimate AP1. (b) confirming
Internet access. (c) connecting to public website, verifying certificate, and receiving a
response from the webserver. d) connecting to legitimate AP2. (e) confirming Internet
access. (f) connecting to public website, verifying certificate, and receiving a response
from the webserver.
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Figure 16. Time delay - Mobile Evil Twin AP Detection. a) connecting to mobile evil
twin AP. (b) confirming Internet access. (c) connecting to public website, verifying
certificate, and receiving a response from the webserver.
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Figure 17. Time delay – Connection to legitimate AP after detection. a) connecting to
legitimate AP. (b) confirming Internet access. (c) connecting to public website, verifying
certificate, and receiving a response from the webserver.
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Summary of Results
As a result of this research and data analysis findings, experimental results show that
CSMETAD can effectively detect and protect users from mobile evil twin attacks in
public Wi-Fi hotspots with 100% accuracy, precision and recall. Data collection was
completed within 8.2 seconds, mobile evil twin AP detection took approximately 5.2
seconds and the connection to a legitimate AP after detection was completed in 3.8
seconds. Although, time delay may vary according to many factors as explained above,
these factors did not affect the detection effectiveness.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions, Implications, and Recommendations
This chapter presents the conclusions of this study, including its strengths, weakness,
and limitations. The chapter also includes the implications for actions and
recommendations for future research. This chapter concludes with a summary of the
study.
Conclusions
For this investigation, the author sought to develop a more effective, efficient, and
practical client-side evil twin attack detection system for wireless users to independently
detect and protect themselves from mobile evil twin attacks while using free open public
Wi-Fi hotspots. To this end, this was an experimental study that used Hevner et al.’s
(2004) seven guidelines of DSR, Peffers et al.’s DSRM (2008), and Hossen &
Wenyuan’s (2014) study evaluation methodology. The client-side evil twin attack
detection system was validated by conducting a three-week field study at a hotel public
Wi-Fi hotspot and tested against Hossen & Wenyuan’s (2014) method for detecting
mobile evil twin attacks.
Based on the analysis performed and the results achieved as presented in chapter 4, the
specifics objectives of the research questions in this study haven been met based on
evidence that is presented in the following pages and paragraphs.
The first research question asked for the requirements that the artifact must meet in
order to address the problem. The answer to the first research question is provided in the
form of requirements based on a thorough review of existing client-side evil twin attack
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detection literature addressing limitations regarding requirements, assumptions, and
evaluation approaches as presented in chapter 3.
The second research question asked for the major decision points in the design and
development process. The answer to this question is provided in the form of design
principles, procedures and specifications based on DSR that supported the artifact
construction, implementation, and evaluation of the client-side evil twin attack detection
system as presented in chapter 3.
The third research question asked for the way the product developed meet or fail to
meet the requirements specified. The answer to this question is provided in the form of
observations and results from the lab and field tested against Hossen and Wenyuan’s
detection method. Details are presented below:
R1: It will protect users whether or not they have connected to a free open public Wi-Fi
network in the past.
Experimental results indicate that the system successfully met this requirement by
disabling auto-connections to all open (unencrypted) public Wi-Fi connections,
protecting the user from automatically connecting to a previously connected AP
(potentially a mobile evil twin AP) when using the public Wi-Fi hotspot.
Hossen and Wenyuan’s method did not meet this requirement since it does not protect
users who have connected to an open (unencrypted) public Wi-Fi network in the past.
Hossen & Wenyuan’s method does not cover this scenario.
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R2: It will protect the user when not all the hotspot APs with the desired SSID are
detected during initial wireless network scanning.
Experimental results indicate that system successfully met this requirement. After the
system received a disassociated wireless card event, the system rescanned the wireless
network to rediscover APs with selected SSID that were not detected during the initial
wireless network scanning. If after the rescan, the system did not detect any APs, the
system rescanned the public Wi-Fi network. This approach allows for the system to work
effectively.
Hossen and Wenyuan’s method did not meet this requirement since it assumes that all
the public Wi-Fi APs are detected in the initial wireless network scanning, which in
practice is not always the case. Hossen and Wenyuan’s method does not cover the
scenario when not all the hotspot APs with the desired SSID are detected during the
initial wireless network scanning.
R3: It will protect the user when the client is not able to associate to all the APs in the
public Wi-Fi network.
Experimental results indicate that the system successfully met this requirement. The
system checked association to an AP with a timeout of 5 seconds. In cases when the
system was not able to associate to an AP within 5 seconds, it attempted to associate to
the next AP in the APs for selected SSID list. In phase 1, when the system was not able
to associate to any of the APs, the system updated AP state as “unknown” and the system
ended. In phase 2, when the system was not able to associate to any of the APs, the
system rescanned the public Wi-Fi network. This approach allowed for the system to be
practical and effective.
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Hossen and Wenyuan’s method did not meet this requirement since it assumes that the
client is able to associate to all the APs in the public Wi-Fi network, which in practice is
not always the case. Hossen and Wenyuan’s method does not cover the scenario when
the client is not able to associate to all the APs in the public Wi-Fi network.
R4: It will protect users when the attacker sets up the mobile evil twin AP with the same
SSID, BSSID (MAC address), and subnet of a legitimate AP.
Experimental results indicate that the system successfully met this requirement by
detecting disassociated wireless network events caused by an attacker, rescanning the
public Wi-Fi hotspot to rediscover APs with selected SSID, retrieving learned ETA MAC
address from learned ETA MAC addresses list and removing learned ETA MAC
addresses from APs for selected SSID list, validating APs even if they have the same
SSID, MAC address and subnet as a legitimate AP, verifying AP association, DHCP
information, Internet access, access to secured public website and public website
certificate, to be able to get the global IP address and compare it with trusted global IP
address. This approach allowed for the system to be effective.
Hossen and Wenyuan’s method did not meet this requirement since it only protects
users from mobile evil twin APs that have the same SSID. Method assumes that the AP
MAC addresses are unique and use that as a reference to switch between APs. Also,
Hossen & Wenyuan’s method assumes that the mobile evil twin AP is in a different
subnet as the legitimate AP. To avoid detection, the attacker could set up the mobile evil
twin AP with the same SSID, MAC address, and subnet of a legitimate AP. Also,
method assumes that the attacker is already in the hotspot and is connected when the
wireless user runs the detection system. In a real life environment, an attacker may not
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be present when the user connects to the hotspot. Hossen & Wenyuan’s method does not
cover the scenario when the attacker sets up the mobile evil twin AP with the same SSID,
MAC address, and subnet of a legitimate AP and when the attacker arrives at the public
Wi-Fi hotspot at a later time. Additionally, Hossen & Wenyuan assume that the client is
always able to associate to an AP, obtain DHCP address, confirm Internet access, and
access secured public website, which in practice is not always the case.
R5: It will protect users when the attacker blocks access to the public website used to get
ISP information.
Experimental results indicate that the system successfully met this requirement by
detecting public website access blocking, disassociating from AP and associating to the
next AP in the APs for selected SSID list.
Hossen and Wenyuan’s method did not meet this requirement since it does not protect
the user when the attacker blocks access to the public website used to get ISP
information. An attacker who is aware of the algorithm would try to block the user
access to the secured public website used to get ISP information. If the attacker blocks
access to the website, the method will not work.
R6: It will protect users when the attacker presents an invalid certificate while retrieving
ISP information from a public website.
This requirement was only simulated and tested in the lab. Lab results indicate that
the system successfully met this requirement by verifying public website certificates
presented by an attacker when the system access secured public website to retrieve ISP
information; and if invalid, adding AP MAC address to learned ETA MAC address list,
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disassociating from AP and associating to the next AP from the APs for selected SSID
list.
Hossen and Wenyuan’s method did not meet this requirement since it does not protect
the user when the attacker presents an invalid certificate while retrieving ISP information
from a public website. Method does not verify the public web server certificate. An
attacker who is aware of the algorithm would try to present an invalid certificate while
the system is retrieving ISP information. The attacker would create a fake remote server
to bypass detection procedure. If the attacker presents an invalid certificate, the method
will not work.
R7: It will, after mobile evil twin AP detection, connect the user to a legitimate AP.
Experimental results indicate that the system successfully met this requirement by
validating remaining APs after mobile evil twin AP detection, associating to the next AP
with the highest signal strength, verifying AP association, DHCP information, Internet
access, access to secured public website and public website certificate, to be able to get
the global IP address and compare it with trusted global IP address. This approach allows
for seamless and secured public Wi-Fi experience in a public Wi-Fi location.
Hossen and Wenyuan’s method did not meet this requirement since after mobile evil
twin AP detection, it does not connect the user to a legitimate AP. Method only warns
the user of the presence of an evil twin AP. Method does not cover the scenario when
after detection, it connects the user to a legitimate AP.
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R8: It will protect the user for the duration of the public Wi-Fi connection, discovering
and reporting on new mobile evil twin access points.
Experimental results indicate that the system successfully met this requirement by
detecting a disassociated wireless card event and rescanning the public Wi-Fi network
environment to rediscover and report on new mobile evil twin access points for the
duration of the public Wi-Fi connection. Algorithm phase 2 repeated (infinite loop). The
infinite loop approach allowed for the system to be practical and effective.
Hossen and Wenyuan’s method did not meet this requirement since it does not protect
the public Wi-Fi users for the duration of the Wi-Fi connection, discovering and reporting
on new mobile evil twin access points. Method assumes that the attacker is already in the
hotspot and is connected when the wireless user connects to the public Wi-Fi network. In
real life environment, an attacker may not be present when the user connects to the
hotspot. Method does not address the case where the attacker arrives later at the hotspot.
In regards to system performance, results show that CSMETAD can effectively detect
and protect users from mobile evil twin AP attacks in public Wi-Fi hotspots in various
real-world scenarios despite time delay caused by many factors. Time delay details are
provided separately for data collection, detection, and connection to legitimate AP to be
used as a baseline for future studies.
Strengths
The major strength of this investigation is that the system was designed and developed
based on a thorough review of the existing client-side evil twin attack detection solutions
literature and addressed limitations regarding requirements, assumptions, and evaluation
approaches. Additionally, the DSR principles, procedures and specifications that
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supported the construction, implementation, and evaluation of the client-side evil twin
attack detection system provided an approach to conducting field studies of a similar
nature with focus on multiple real-world scenarios.
Weakness
One weakness of this study is that the detection system built as part of this study does
not operate under the assumption that the attacker performs an evil twin attack using the
legitimate AP’s Internet access. However, combining the detection method with other
methods that were used to detect evil twin attacks using the legitimate AP’s Internet
access, such as the ones referenced in this dissertation, will provide a complete evil twin
attack detection system.
Limitations
One of the limitations in this study is that since the artifact was initially evaluated in
the wild, the author was not able to control when attackers were going to appear at the
hotel public Wi-Fi hotspot to perform mobile evil twin AP attacks. Since no evil twin
APs were detected during the field evaluation period, the author proceeded to test the
system using the lab mobile evil twin AP. Similar evaluation technique was used in
Hossen & Wenyuan’s and the remainder of client-side evil twin attack detection studies
referenced in this dissertation.
Another limitation in this investigation was evaluation costs that prevented the author
from evaluating the detection system using public Wi-Fi users (as users of the detection
system) and at a large scale. In order to analyze and evaluate the artifact using public
Wi-Fi users and at a large scale, the system would need to be made available to a large
number of actual users who can test the system in many public Wi-Fi locations for a
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defined period and report back to the author on detection effectiveness and efficiency.
This will improve the likelihood of detecting real mobile evil twin APs in the wild.
Despite evaluation cost limitations, the scope of the study was appropriate and consistent
with the budget.

Implications
Impact on the Field of Study
The goal of this study was to contribute to the body of knowledge of wireless security
research by developing a more effective, efficient, and practical client-side evil twin
attack detection system for wireless users to independently detect and protect themselves
from mobile evil twin attacks while using free open public Wi-Fi. The artifact was
designed, developed and evaluated based on a thorough review of the existing client-side
evil twin attack detection solutions literature and addressed limitations regarding
requirements, assumptions, and evaluation approaches. Based on design science research
(DSR) literature, Hevner’s seven guidelines of DSR, Peffer’s design science research
methodology (DSRM), and Hossen & Wenyuan’s (2014) study evaluation methodology,
the author developed design principles, procedures and specifications to guide the
construction, implementation, and evaluation of a prototype client-side evil twin attack
detection artifact. The author evaluated the client-side evil twin attack detection system
in a hotel public Wi-Fi environment. To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the
first academic study in this field that attempts to detect mobile evil twin APs in the wild
extensively at a public Wi-Fi hotspot. Since no evil twin APs were detected during the
field evaluation period, the author proceeded to test the system with the mobile evil twin
AP used in the lab. Adoption of this artifact by others will provide a detection method
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that can be improved to include additional real-world scenarios in studies of a similar
nature.
Implications for Future Research
Implications for future research include a large-scale evaluation with real traveling
users of the system in many public Wi-Fi hotspot locations. Because this study focused
on detecting mobile evil twin APs in a single public Wi-Fi hotspot, similar studies can be
conducted in many public Wi-Fi hotspots improving the likelihood of detecting real
mobile evil twin APs. Conducting such studies would require improvements to the
client-side mobile evil twin attack detection system. Suggested improvements are
presented in the section below.

Recommendations
The system limitations observed by the author during this investigation primarily
involved: (1) initializing the system before arriving to the hotspot to disable
autoconnection to previously connected open public Wi-Fi hotspots; (2) waiting for a
disassociated wireless card event to rescan the wireless network and connect to an AP
with better signal strength when the signal level is below a threshold; (3) costs of creating
a fake remote server to test the validity of a public website certificate; and (4) creating a
user interface for a large-scale evaluation in the wild. To address these limitations, the
author recommends the following: (1) disabling autoconnect when the user installs the
system; (2) rescanning the wireless network when the signal strength of an AP is below a
determined threshold; (3) testing SSL exceptions with a larger set of invalid certificates;
and (4) creating an effective graphical user interface. Adoption of these
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recommendations could provide overall improvements to the client-side mobile evil twin
attack detection system and facilitate broader adoption in similar studies.

To address the limitation of initializing the system before visiting the hotspot to
disable autoconnection to previously connected open Wi-Fi connections, the author
recommends disabling autoconnect when the user installs the system on his or her laptop.
This approach would consist of a subset application that when installed and run will
disable all previous open Wi-Fi connections.

Rescanning the wireless network when the signal strength of an AP is below a
determined threshold would facilitate not waiting for a disassociated wireless card event
to rescan the wireless network to connect to an AP that offers a better signal strength.

To address the limitation of costs of creating a fake remote server to test the validity
of a public website certificate, the author recommends instead expanding the simulation
approach used in this dissertation report to include testing of SSL exceptions with a larger
list of invalid certificates. An example of a website that includes a list on invalid SSL
certificates is badssl.com (Google Open Source, n.d.).

To address creating a user interface for a large scale evaluation in the wild, the author
recommends the development of a graphical user interface that displays simple user
messages communicating detection and protection results. The graphical user interface
should be designed to facilitate a wide adoption and usability of the system by nontechnical users.
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Summary
Users and providers benefit considerably from public Wi-Fi hotspots. Users receive
wireless Internet access and providers draw new prospective customers. While users are
able to enjoy the ease of Wi-Fi Internet hotspot networks in public more conveniently,
they are more susceptible to a particular type of fraud and identify theft, referred to as
evil twin attack (ETA). Through setting up an ETA, an attacker can intercept sensitive
data such as passwords or credit card information by snooping into the communication
links. Since the objective of free open (unencrypted) public Wi-Fi hotspots is to provide
ease of accessibility and to entice customers, no security mechanisms are in place. The
public’s lack of awareness of the security threat posed by free open public Wi-Fi hotspots
makes this problem even more heinous. Client-side systems to help wireless users detect
and protect themselves from evil twin attacks in public Wi-Fi hotspots are in great need.
The author explored the problem of the need for client-side detection systems that will
allow wireless users to help protect their data from evil twin attacks while using free open
public Wi-Fi. The client-side evil twin attack detection system developed as part of this
dissertation linked the gap between the need for wireless security in free open public WiFi hotspots and limitations in existing client-side evil twin attack detection solutions. The
goal of this research was to develop a more effective, efficient, and practical client-side
detection system for wireless users to independently detect and protect themselves from
mobile evil twin attacks while using free open public Wi-Fi hotspots.
To address the research problem and the methodology of how to accomplish the stated
goal of designing and building a more effective, efficient, and practical client-side artifact
to be used to detect mobile evil twin attacks, the author utilized a two phased research
approach. In phase one, the author developed design principles, procedures and
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specifications to guide the design, construction, implementation, and evaluation of the
prototype client-side evil twin detection artifact using Hevner’s seven guidelines of DSR,
Peffer’s design science research methodology (DSRM), and Hossen & Wenyuan’s (2014)
study evaluation methodology. In phase two, the author extensively evaluated the
performance of the client-side evil twin attack detection method by implementing a
prototype system. The prototype system was implemented and evaluated in two
environments. First, in a lab to analyze the requirements and demonstrate the
effectiveness in a controlled environment. Second, in the field at a hotel public Wi-Fi
hotspot to extensively evaluate the robustness of the system in practice. The prototype
system aimed at detecting real mobile evil twin APs in the wild at a hotel property that
provides free open public Wi-Fi in its public spaces. Since no real evil twin APs were
detected during the field evaluation period, the author proceeded to evaluate the system
with the mobile evil twin AP used in the lab. Similar approach was used by Hossen &
Wenyuan’s study and the remainder of the client-side evil twin attack detection studies
referenced in this dissertation.
The techniques to evaluate the effectiveness of the system were based on Hossen &
Wenyuan’s (2014) evaluation methodology which was published and validated. The
client-side evil twin detection method developed as part of this dissertation was tested
against Hossen & Wenyuan’s (2014) method for detecting mobile evil twin attacks. The
experimental results show that the CSMETAD system can effectively detect and protect
users from mobile evil twin AP attacks in public Wi-Fi hotspots in various real-world
scenarios despite time delay caused by many factors.
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At the conclusion of this study, the author addressed the observed limitations of the
study, discussed the implications for further research, and presented recommendations.
The major limitations of the study were being able to detect mobile evil twin APs in the
wild and evaluation costs. An implication for further research includes a large-scale
evaluation with real traveling users of the system in many public Wi-Fi hotspot locations.
Conducting such study would require improvements to the client-side mobile evil twin
attack detection system.
To address the limitations of initializing the system before arriving to the hotspot to
disable autoconnection to previous open public Wi-Fi connections, waiting for a
disassociated wireless card event to rescan the wireless network, costs of creating a fake
remote server to test the validity of a public website certificate, and creating a user
interface for a large scale evaluation in the wild, the author offered several
recommendations. These recommendations included disabling autoconnect when the user
install the system, rescanning the wireless network when the signal level of an AP is
below a determined threshold, testing SSL exceptions with a larger set of invalid
certificates, and creating an effective graphical user interface. Adoption of these
recommendations can provide overall improvements on the client-side mobile evil twin
attack detection method and facilitate broader adoption in field studies of a similar nature.
To provide visibility and distribution of the CSMETAD system design,
implementation, and evaluation process developed in this study, specifications and
procedures are communicated in the form of a solution manual that is available to all
academic institutions. Refer to Appendix D.
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Appendix A
Requirements and limitations mapping based on literature review

Requirements
1. Timing-based or
traceroute
2. Assume the attacker
uses the legitimate
wireless network gateway
3. Assume the attacker
uses a different gateway
from a legitimate AP
4. Assume attacker
performs a mobile attack
5. Require network
administrator assistance
or privileges
6. System is automated
with no intervention from
users
7. Require knowledge of
wireless hotspot network
infrastructure, AP
authorization list and/or
user/hosts (trained
knowledge)

Han et
al.
(2009)

Song et
al.
(2010)

Han et
al.
(2011)

Song et
al.
(2012)

Nikbakhsh
et al.
(2012)

Kim et
al.
(2012)

Lanze et
al. (2014)

Hsu et al.
(2015)

Szongott
et al.
(2015)

Y-

Monica
&
Ribeiro
(2011)
N

Y-

Y-

Y-

Y-

Y-

N

N

N

Y-

Y-

Y-

Y-

Y-

Y-

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N-

N-

N-

Y

Y-

Y-

N

Y-

(TMM)

Nakhila
et al.
(2015)

N

Hossen
&
Wenyuan
(2014)
Y-

Y-

n.a.

Y-

N

Y

N

n.a.

Y

Y

N

Y

N

n.a.

Y

Y

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N-

n.a.

Y

n.a.

N-

Y

Y

Y

Y-

N

N

N

N

Y-

N

N

(TMM)

N

N

(HDT)

(HDT)

(continued)
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Requirements
8. Require infrastructure
support (hotspot wireless
network modification,
extra devices/addl.
equipment, etc.)
9. Leverage a public
server
10. Work with any type of
IEEE 802.11 based
wireless networks
11. Work with Wi-Fi
enabled device
12. Work with free open
(unencrypted) public WiFi networks
13. Technology
independent (e.g. received
signal strength
fluctuation, network
saturation, network traffic
conditions, etc.)
14. Assume that the
BSSID of the hotspot APs
are unique and use that as
a reference to switch
between different APs
with the same SSID in the
hotspot

Han et
al.
(2009)

Song et
al.
(2010)

Han et
al.
(2011)

Monica
&
Ribeiro
(2011)

Song et
al.
(2012)

Nikbakhsh
et al.
(2012)

Kim et
al.
(2012)

Lanze et
al. (2014)

Hsu et al.
(2015)

Szongott
et al.
(2015)

Hossen
&
Wenyuan
(2014)

Nakhila
et al.
(2015)

N

Y-

N

Y-

Y-

N

N

N

Y-

Y-

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

N-

N-

N-

Y

N-

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

Y-

Y-

(continued)
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Requirements
15. Assume that the evil
twin AP is in the same
subnet as the legitimate
AP
16. Protect users when
the attacker blocks access
to the public website used
to get ISP information
17. Protect users when
the attacker presents an
invalid certificate while
retrieving ISP information
from public website
18. Assume detection of
all the APs in the public
Wi-Fi network during the
initial wireless network
scanning
19. Assume that the client
is able to associate to all
the APs in the public WiFi network
20. Assume that the user
has or has not connected
to the target public Wi-Fi
network in the past
21. Assume the attacker is
connected when the
wireless user connects to
the public Wi-Fi hotspot

Han et
al.
(2009)

Song et
al.
(2010)

Han et
al.
(2011)

Song et
al.
(2012)

Nikbakhsh
et al.
(2012)

Kim et
al.
(2012)

Lanze et
al. (2014)

Hsu et al.
(2015)

Szongott
et al.
(2015)

n.a.

Monica
&
Ribeiro
(2011)
n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

Nakhila
et al.
(2015)

n.a.

Hossen
&
Wenyuan
(2014)
N-

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

N-

N-

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

N-

Y

Y-

Y-

Y-

Y-

Y-

Y-

Y-

Y-

Y-

Y-

Y-

Y-

Y-

Y-

Y-

Y-

Y-

Y-

Y-

Y-

Y-

Y-

Y-

Y-

N-

N-

N-

N-

N-

N-

N-

N-

N-

N-

N-

N-

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y
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Requirements
22. Assume the attacker is
not connected when the
user connects initially to
the public Wi-Fi hotspots
and protect the wireless
user for the duration to
the public Wi-Fi network
connection
23. Warn the wireless
user of an evil twin attack
before any traffic is
transmitted
24. After evil twin
detection, the system connects the user to a
legitimate AP
25. Evaluated in lab
setting
26. Evaluated in the field
27. Used their own evil
twin AP in the evaluation
28. Aimed at detecting
real evil twin APs (wild)
29. Public Wi-Fi hotspots
30. Large scale evaluation

Han et
al.
(2009)

N-

Song et al.
(2010)

N-

Han et
al.
(2011)

N-

Monica &
Ribeiro
(2011)

N-

Song et al.
(2012)

N-

Nikbak
hsh et
al.
(2012)
N-

Kim et
al.
(2012)

Lanze et
al.
(2014)

Hsu et al.
(2015)

Szongott
et al.
(2015)

Hossen
&
Wenyuan
(2014)

Nakhila
et al.
(2015)

N-

N-

N-

N-

N-

N-

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

N-

N-

N-

N-

N-

N-

N-

N-

N-

N-

N-

N-

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

Y

Y
Y

Y
Y

Y
Y

Y
Y

Y
Y

N

Y
Y

N
Y

Y
Y

N
Y

Y
Y

N
Y

N-

N-

N-

N-

N-

N-

N-

N-

University

University

University

University

University

University
Cafes

University

University
Cafes
Restaurants
Airports

N

N

N

N

N

n.a.

N

Y
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Requirements
31. Evaluated for
performance

32. Language
33. Client Platform
34. Client OS

Han et
al.
(2009)

Song et al.
(2010)

Han et
al.
(2011)

Monica &
Ribeiro
(2011)

Song et al.
(2012)

Nikbak
hsh et
al.
(2012)

Kim et
al.
(2012)

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

(Detection
Accuracy,
Efficiency)

(Effectiveness,
Efficiency)

(Detection
Accuracy,
Efficiency)

(Effectiveness,
Efficiency)

(Effectiveness,
Efficiency)

(Accuracy,
True Positive
Rate (TPR),
False
Positive Rate
(FPR)

n.a.
laptop
Linux

n.a.
laptop
n.a.

n.a.
laptop
Linux

n.a.
laptop
Linux

n.a.
laptop
n.a.

n.a.
smartphone
Android

Lanze et
al.
(2014)

Hsu et al.
(2015)

Szongott
et al.
(2015)

Y*

Hossen
&
Wenyuan
(2014)
Y

Nakhila
et al.
(2015)

(Accuracy,
Precision,
Recall)

n.a.
laptop
n.a.

n.a.
laptop
Windows

Java
n.a.
n.a.

n.a.
smartphone
Android

Note. Y = included in solution based on literature; N = not included in solution based on literature; n.a. = could not be determined from the literature; - = solution limitation; * = no details provided;
blank = not applicable.

C
laptop
Linux
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Appendix B
Algorithm Test Cases and Results
Test
ID
1

Phase

2

1

3

1

4

1

5

1

1

Test Step

Expected Result

Actual Result

Status

System disables
“auto-connections”
to open public Wi-Fi
networks
System scans public
Wi-Fi network
User selects open
public Wi-Fi hotspot
SSID



System disabled autoconnections

As Expected

Pass



As Expected

Pass

As Expected

Pass

Number of APs for
selected SSID is less
than 2



System displayed list of
SSIDs in range
System created list of
APs for selected SSID
(signal strength ≥ -75
dBm)
System displayed
message: “There is
insufficient information
to detect ETAs”;
System ended
System displayed
message: “There is
sufficient information to
detect ETAs”;
System started to iterate
across all the APs in the
APs for selected SSID
list

As Expected

Pass

As Expected

Pass

Number of APs for
selected SSID is
equal to or greater
than 2








(continued)
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Test
ID
6

Phase

Test Step

Expected Result

1

AP iterator is greater
than the number of
APs for selected
SSID




7

1



8

1

AP iterator is less
than the number of
APs for selected
SSID
System is not able to
associate to an AP




9

1

System is able to
associate to AP




Actual Result

Status

System ended iteration;
System proceeded to
determine trusted global
IP address to be used for
the duration of the public
Wi-Fi connection
System attempted to
associate to AP on APs
for selected SSID list

As Expected

Pass

As Expected

Pass

System updated APs for
selected SSID list with
AP state = “unknown”;
System associated to the
next AP in the APs for
selected SSID list;
Back to step 6/7
System proceeded to
obtain Client DHCP
address for the user

As Expected

Pass

As Expected

Pass

(continued)
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Test
ID
10

Phase
1

Test Step
System is not able to
get Client DHCP
address for the user

Expected Result



11

1

12

1

13

1


System is able to get 
Client DHCP
address for the user
System is not able to 
accept terms of use
to access the Internet



System is able to

accept terms of use
to access the Internet

System updated APs for
selected SSID list with
AP state = “unknown”;
System disassociated
from current AP and
associated to the next AP
in the APs for selected
SSID list;
Back to step 6/7
System proceeded to
accept terms of use to
access the Internet
System updated APs for
selected SSID list with
AP state = “unknown”;
System disassociated
from current AP and
associated to the next AP
in the APs for selected
SSID list;
Back to step 6/7
System proceeded to
access secured public
website to retrieve global
IP address of the AP

Actual Result

Status

As Expected

Pass

As Expected

Pass

As Expected

Pass

As Expected

Pass

(continued)
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Test
ID
14

Phase
1

Test Step
System is not able to
access secured
public website

Expected Result



15

1

System is able to
access secured
public website

16

1

Public website
certificate is invalid










System updated APs for
selected SSID list with
AP state = “unknown”;
System disassociated
from current AP and
associated to the next AP
in the APs for selected
SSID list;
Back to step 6/7
System proceeded to
verify that the public
website certificate is
valid
System updated APs for
selected SSID list with
AP state = “ETA”;
System added AP MAC
address to the learned
ETA MAC address list;
System disassociated
from current AP and
associated to the next AP
in the APs for selected
SSID list;
Back to step 6/7

Actual Result

Status

As Expected

Pass

As Expected

Pass

As Expected

Pass

(continued)
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Test
ID
17

Phase

Test Step

Expected Result

1

Public website
certificate is valid



18

1

Number of
occurrences of a
global IP address is
less than 2





19

1

Number of
occurrences of a
global IP address is
equal to or greater
than 2








System proceeded to get
the global IP address of
the AP
System displayed
message: “There is not
enough information to
categorize APs”;
System updated APs for
selected SSID list with
AP state = “unknown”;
System ended
System displayed
message: “There is
enough information to
categorize APs”;
System set global IP as
the trusted global IP
address;
System started to
categorize APs;
System started to iterate
across all the APs in the
APs for selected SSID
list

Actual Result

Status

As Expected

Pass

As Expected

Pass

As Expected

Pass

(continued)
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Test
ID
20

Phase

21

1

22

1

1

Test Step

Expected Result

Actual Result

Status

AP iterator is greater
than the number of
APs for selected
SSID
AP iterator is less
than the number of
APs for selected
SSID




System ended iteration;
System moved to Phase 2
detection and protection

As Expected

Pass



System validated that the
global IP address is the
same as the trusted global
IP address

As Expected

Pass

Global IP address
for an AP is not the
same as the trusted
global IP address



System updated APs for
selected SSID list with
AP state = ETA;
System added AP MAC
address to the learned
ETA MAC address list;
System disassociated
from current AP and
associated to the next AP
in the APs for selected
SSID list;
Back to step 6/7

As Expected

Pass






(continued)
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Test
ID
23

Phase

Test Step

1

Global IP address
for an AP is the
same as the trusted
global IP address

Expected Result





System updated APs for
selected SSID list with
AP state = Valid;
System disassociated
from current AP and
associated to the next AP
in the APs for selected
SSID list;
Back to step 6/7

Actual Result

Status

As Expected

Pass

(continued)
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Test
ID
1

Phase

Test Step

2

System rescans
public Wi-Fi
network to
rediscover APs with
selected SSID





2

2

Number of APs for
selected SSID is less
than 1

3

2

Number of APs for
selected SSID is
equal to or greater
than 1

Expected Result








System displayed list of
SSIDs in range;
System created list of
APs for selected SSID
(signal strength ≥ -75
dBm) (new list)
System displayed
message: “Your device is
out of range for the
selected public Wi-Fi
hotspot. Please move
closer”;
Back to step 1
System retrieved learned
ETA MAC addresses
from Learned ETA
MAC addresses list;
System removed learned
ETA MAC addresses
from APs for selected
SSID list

Actual Result

Status

As Expected

Pass

As Expected

Pass

As Expected

Pass

(continued)
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Test
ID
4

Phase

Test Step

2

Number of APs for
selected SSID is less
than 1

5

2

6

2

Number of APs for
selected SSID is
equal to or greater
than 1
AP iterator is less
than the number of
APs for selected
SSID
AP iterator is greater
than the number of
APs for selected
SSID

7

2

8

2

System is not able to
associate to the AP

Expected Result













Actual Result

Status

System displayed
message: “You are
located on the vicinity of
Evil Twin Attacks.
Please move to a
different location within
the public Wi-Fi
Hotspot”;
Back to step 1
System started to iterate
across all the APs in the
APs for selected SSID
list
System rescanned public
Wi-Fi network;
Back to step 1

As Expected

Pass

As Expected

Pass

As Expected

Pass

System attempted to
associate to the AP with
highest signal strength in
the APs for selected
SSID list
System associated to the
next AP with the highest
signal strength in the APs
for selected SSID list;
Back to step 6/7

As Expected

Pass

As Expected

Pass

(continued)
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Test
ID
9

Phase

Test Step

2

System is able to
associate to an AP



10

2

System is not able to
get a Client DHCP
address for the user



11

2

12

2

System is able to get
Client DHCP
address for the user
System is not able to
confirm Internet
access

13

2

System is able to
confirm Internet
access

Expected Result








Actual Result

Status

System proceeded to
obtain Client DHCP
address for the user
System disassociated
from current AP and
associated to the next AP
in the APs for selected
SSID list;
Back to step 6/7
System proceeded to
confirm Internet access

As Expected

Pass

As Expected

Pass

As Expected

Pass

System disassociated
from current AP and
associated to the next AP
in the APs for selected
SSID list;
Back to step 6/7
System proceeded to
access secured public
website to retrieve global
IP address of the AP

As Expected

Pass

As Expected

Pass

(continued)
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Test
ID
14

Phase
2

Test Step
System is not able to
access secured
public website

15

2

System is able to
access secured
public website

16

2

Public website
certificate is invalid

Expected Result












System disassociated
from current AP and
associated to the next AP
in the APs for selected
SSID list;
Back to step 6/7
System proceeded to
verify that the public
website certificate is
valid
System displayed
message: “CSMETAD
has detected an ETA on
the public Wi-Fi
hotspot”;
System added AP MAC
address to the learned
ETA MAC address list;
System disassociated
from current AP and
associated to the next AP
in the APs for selected
SSID list;
Back to step 6/7

Actual Result

Status

As Expected

Pass

As Expected

Pass

As Expected

Pass

(continued)
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Test
ID
17

Phase

Test Step

Expected Result

2

Public website
certificate is valid



18

2

Global IP address
for an AP is not the
same as the trusted
global IP address






19

2

Global IP address
for an AP is the
same as the trusted
global IP address







System proceeded to get
the global IP address of
the AP
System displayed
message: “CSMETAD
has detected an ETA on
the public Wi-Fi
hotspot”;
System added AP MAC
address to the learned
ETA MAC address list;
System disassociated
from current AP and
associated to the next AP
in the APs for selected
SSID list;
Back to step 6/7
System displayed
message: “Wi-Fi
connection is safe. You
are connected to a
legitimate AP”;
System ended iteration;
System waited for a
disassociated wireless
card event

Actual Result

Status

As Expected

Pass

As Expected

Pass

As Expected

Pass

(continued)
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Test
ID
20

Phase

Test Step

2

System receives a
disassociated
wireless card event

Expected Result



System rescanned public
Wi-Fi network;
Back to step 1

Actual Result

Status

As Expected

Pass
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Appendix C
CSMETAD System Results – Key Requirements
Included herein are the CSMETAD system results for each of the key requirements. This output was generated by Netbeans.

R1: It will protect users whether or not they have connected to a free open public Wi-Fi network in the past.
Setting all connections with open security to autoconnect:no
-------------------------------------------------------------nmcli -f UUID,NAME,TYPE,AUTOCONNECT,AUTOCONNECT-PRIORITY,READONLY,ACTIVE,DEVICE,STATE connection show
UUID
NAME
TYPE
AUTOCONNECT AUTOCONNECT-PRIORITY
5664862b-502c-4199-954f-209819f1ffc5 labwifi
802-11-wireless yes
0

READONLY
no

ACTIVE
no

DEVICE
--

STATE
--

nmcli --fields connection.id,connection.type,connection.autoconnect,802-11-wireless.ssid,802-11-wireless.mode,802-11-wireless.channel,802-11wireless.seen-bssids,802-11-wireless.bssid,802-11-wireless-security.key-mgmt connection show 5664862b-502c-4199-954f-209819f1ffc5
connection.id:
connection.type:
connection.autoconnect:
802-11-wireless.ssid:
802-11-wireless.mode:
802-11-wireless.channel:
802-11-wireless.bssid:
802-11-wireless.seen-bssids:

labwifi
802-11-wireless
yes
labwifi
infrastructure
0
-58:BC:27:93:05:60

***Found an 802.11 connection with open security. Setting autoconnect: no***
nmcli con mod 5664862b-502c-4199-954f-209819f1ffc5 connection.autoconnect no
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R2: It will protect the user when not all the hotspot APs with the desired SSID are detected during initial wireless network scanning.
Start re-scanning the public Wi-Fi network to rediscover APs with selected SSID
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------Listing SSIDs in range on target OS linux
---------highestRssiApPerEssidBiDemArrList sorted by signal level, and Encryption off at top-----------------------------------------SSID
RSSI
Encryption
MAC address
labwifi
-76
off
58:BC:27:93:05:60
Malecon2018
-36
on
B0:7F:B9:74:52:CD
maleconJAL
-47
on
B0:7F:B9:81:28:AB
Listing Aps per Select SSID on target OS linux
SSID
RSSI Encryption
labwifi
-76
off
Not Add to apsPerEssidBiDemArrList
labwifi
-80
off
Not Add to apsPerEssidBiDemArrList

MAC address
58:BC:27:93:05:60

Frequency
2.412 GHz (Channel 1)

Signal Level -76 <

threshold -75.

58:BC:27:12:0C:10

2.462 GHz (Channel 11)

Signal Level -80 <

threshold -75.

---------apsPerEssidBiDemArrList sorted by signal level, above threshold-------------------------------------------------------------Empty
End re-scanning the public Wi-Fi network
Your device is out of range for the selected public Wi-Fi hotspot.

Please move closer.

Start re-scanning the public Wi-Fi network to rediscover APs with selected SSID
Listing SSIDs in range on target OS linux
---------highestRssiApPerEssidBiDemArrList sorted by signal level, and Encryption off at top-----------------------------------------SSID
RSSI
Encryption
MAC address
labwifi
-41
off
58:BC:27:93:05:60
Malecon2018
-37
on
B0:7F:B9:74:52:CD
maleconJAL
-46
on
B0:7F:B9:81:28:AB
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Listing Aps per Select ESSID on target OS linux
SSID
RSSI
labwifi
-41
Add to apsPerEssidBiDemArrList
labwifi
-57
Add to apsPerEssidBiDemArrList

Encryption
off

MAC address
58:BC:27:93:05:60

Frequency
2.412 GHz (Channel 1)

Signal Level -41 >= threshold -75.

off

58:BC:27:12:0C:10

2.462 GHz (Channel 11)

Signal Level -57 >= threshold -75.

---------apsPerEssidBiDemArrList sorted by signal level, above threshold-------------------------------------------------------------SSID
RSSI
Encryption
MAC address
Frequency
labwifi
-41
off
58:BC:27:93:05:60
2.412 GHz (Channel 1)
labwifi
-57
off
58:BC:27:12:0C:10
2.462 GHz (Channel 11)
End re-scanning the public Wi-Fi network
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R3: It will protect the user when the client is not able to associate to all the APs in the public Wi-Fi network.
Current AP MAC Address:58:BC:27:93:05:60

signal level:-37

Associate client to current AP
-------------------------------iwconfig wlp3s0 mode managed essid labwifi ap 58:BC:27:93:05:60
Checking association status
iwconfig wlp3s0
wlp3s0
IEEE 802.11 ESSID:"labwifi"
Mode:Managed Access Point: Not-Associated
Tx-Power=15 dBm
Retry short limit:7
RTS thr:off
Fragment thr:off
Encryption key:off
Power Management:off
inspect Association (1/5).Found value: Not-Associated
sleep 1 second
Checking association status
iwconfig wlp3s0
wlp3s0
IEEE 802.11 ESSID:"labwifi"
Mode:Managed Access Point: Not-Associated
Tx-Power=15 dBm
Retry short limit:7
RTS thr:off
Fragment thr:off
Encryption key:off
Power Management:off
inspect Association (2/5).Found value: Not-Associated
sleep 1 second
Checking association status
iwconfig wlp3s0
wlp3s0
IEEE 802.11 ESSID:"labwifi"
Mode:Managed Access Point: Not-Associated
Tx-Power=15 dBm
Retry short limit:7
RTS thr:off
Fragment thr:off
Encryption key:off
Power Management:off
inspect Association (3/5).Found value: Not-Associated
sleep 1 second
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Checking association status
iwconfig wlp3s0
wlp3s0
IEEE 802.11 ESSID:"labwifi"
Mode:Managed Access Point: Not-Associated
Tx-Power=15 dBm
Retry short limit:7
RTS thr:off
Fragment thr:off
Encryption key:off
Power Management:off
inspect Association (4/5).Found value: Not-Associated
sleep 1 second
Checking association status
iwconfig wlp3s0
wlp3s0
IEEE 802.11 ESSID:"labwifi"
Mode:Managed Access Point: Not-Associated
Tx-Power=15 dBm
Retry short limit:7
RTS thr:off
Fragment thr:off
Encryption key:off
Power Management:off
inspect Association (5/5).Found value: Not-Associated
sleep 1 second
Client was not able to associate to AP
CSMETAD will try to connect to another AP if available
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R4 & R7 & R8: It will protect users when the attacker sets up the mobile evil twin AP with the same SSID, BSSID and subnet of a
legitimate AP. After detection, it connects the user to a legitimate AP. Lastly, it protects the user for the duration of the public Wi-Fi
connection, discovering and reporting on new mobile evil twin access points.
Start re-scanning the public Wi-Fi network to rediscover APs with selected SSID
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------Listing SSIDs in range on target OS linux
---------highestRssiApPerEssidBiDemArrList sorted by signal level, and Encryption off at top-----------------------------------------SSID
RSSI
Encryption
MAC address
labwifi
-42
off
58:BC:27:93:05:60
Malecon2018
-37
on
B0:7F:B9:74:52:CD
maleconJAL
-46
on
B0:7F:B9:81:28:AB
Listing APs for selected SSID on target OS linux
SSID
RSSI Encryption
labwifi
-42
off
Add to apsPerEssidBiDemArrList
labwifi
-78
off
Not Add to apsPerEssidBiDemArrList

MAC address
58:BC:27:93:05:60

Frequency
2.412 GHz (Channel 1)

Signal Level -42 >= threshold -75.

58:BC:27:12:0C:10

2.462 GHz (Channel 11)

Signal Level -78 <

threshold -75.

---------apsPerEssidBiDemArrList sorted by signal level, above threshold-------------------------------------------------------------SSID
RSSI
Encryption
MAC address
Frequency
labwifi
-42
off
58:BC:27:93:05:60
2.412 GHz (Channel 1)
End re-scanning the public Wi-Fi network
Showing learned ETA MAC address
Empty
Remove learned ETA MAC addresses from re-scanned APs for selected SSID list
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---------AsPerEssidBiDemArrList AP MAC addresses, sorted by signal level, above threshold--------------------------------------------SSID
RSSI
Encryption
MAC address
Frequency
labwifi
-42
off
58:BC:27:93:05:60
2.412 GHz (Channel 1)
Now iterating across APs
-------------------------Current AP MAC Address:58:BC:27:93:05:60

signal level:-42

Associate client to current AP
-------------------------------iwconfig wlp3s0 mode managed essid labwifi ap 58:BC:27:93:05:60
Checking association status
iwconfig wlp3s0
wlp3s0
IEEE 802.11 ESSID:"labwifi"
Mode:Managed Frequency:2.412 GHz Access Point: 58:BC:27:93:05:60
Bit Rate=1 Mb/s
Tx-Power=15 dBm
Retry short limit:7
RTS thr:off
Fragment thr:off
Encryption key:off
Power Management:off
Link Quality=68/70 Signal level=-42 dBm
Rx invalid nwid:0 Rx invalid crypt:0 Rx invalid frag:0
Tx excessive retries:1 Invalid misc:0
Missed beacon:0
Client has associated to AP
Get client DHCP address
------------------------dhclient -timeout 20 wlp3s0
Checking if client has a valid IP address
------------------------------------------ifconfig wlp3s0
wlp3s0: flags=4163<UP,BROADCAST,RUNNING,MULTICAST> mtu 1500
inet 192.168.43.37 netmask 255.255.255.0 broadcast 192.168.43.255
inet6 fe80::8e70:5aff:fe82:9264 prefixlen 64 scopeid 0x20<link>
ether 8c:70:5a:82:92:64 txqueuelen 1000 (Ethernet)
RX packets 213 bytes 162995 (159.1 KiB)
RX errors 0 dropped 0 overruns 0 frame 0
TX packets 232 bytes 31821 (31.0 KiB)
TX errors 0 dropped 0 overruns 0 carrier 0 collisions 0
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Found IP address: 192.168.43.37
cat /etc/resolv.conf
nameserver 8.8.8.8
Confirm Internet access
------------------------Attempting to access URL to check Internet connection
URL response code: 200
First attempt to detect if client is behind a captive portal
HTML content omitted
A captive portal was not detected
Internet access confirmed
Access secured public website and verify if public website certificate is valid
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------Response Code : 200
Cipher Suite : TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
Cert
Cert
Cert
Cert

Type : X.509
Hash Code : 1749875764
Public Key Algorithm : RSA
Public Key Format : X.509

Cert
Cert
Cert
Cert

Type : X.509
Hash Code : -2059616493
Public Key Algorithm : RSA
Public Key Format : X.509

Cert
Cert
Cert
Cert

Type : X.509
Hash Code : 1215155824
Public Key Algorithm : RSA
Public Key Format : X.509
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Now printing secured public website object access, certificate status, global IP
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------Access: true
Certificate status: valid
Global IP: 174.194.14.15
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------CSMETAD has detected an ETA on the public Wi-Fi hotspot
CSMETAD added ETA MAC address to learned ETA MAC address list
CSMETAD will try to connect to another AP if available
CSMETAD finished iterating across the list of APs
CSMETAD was not able to validate that the AP global IP was the same as the trusted global IP
CSMETAD will scan the public Wi-Fi network again
Start re-scanning the public Wi-Fi network to rediscover APs with selected SSID
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------Listing SSIDs in range on target OS linux
---------highestRssiApPerEssidBiDemArrList sorted by signal level and encryption off at top------------------------------------------SSID
RSSI
Encryption
MAC address
labwifi
-9
off
58:BC:27:93:05:60
Malecon2018
-37
on
B0:7F:B9:74:52:CD
maleconJAL
-46
on
B0:7F:B9:81:28:AB
Listing APs for selected SSID on target OS linux
SSID
RSSI Encryption
MAC address
labwifi
-9
off
58:BC:27:93:05:60
Add to apsPerEssidBiDemArrList
labwifi
-78
off
58:BC:27:12:0C:10
Not Add to apsPerEssidBiDemArrList

Frequency
2.412 GHz (Channel 1)

Signal Level -9

2.462 GHz (Channel 11)

Signal Level -78 <

>= threshold -75.
threshold -75.
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---------apsPerEssidBiDemArrList sorted by signal level, above threshold-------------------------------------------------------------SSID
RSSI
Encryption
MAC address
Frequency
labwifi
-9
off
58:BC:27:93:05:60
2.412 GHz (Channel 1)
End re-scanning the public Wi-Fi network
Showing learned ETA MAC address
58:BC:27:93:05:60
Remove learned ETA MAC addresses from re-scanned APs for selected SSID list
You are located on the vicinity of Evil Twin Attacks. Please move to a different location within the public Wi-Fi hotspot.
Scanning the public Wi-Fi network again
Start re-scanning the public Wi-Fi network to rediscover APs with selected SSID
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------Listing SSIDs in range on target OS linux
---------highestRssiApPerEssidBiDemArrList sorted by signal level and encryption off at top------------------------------------------SSID
RSSI
Encryption
MAC address
labwifi
-9
off
58:BC:27:93:05:60
Malecon2018
-37
on
B0:7F:B9:74:52:CD
maleconJAL
-46
on
B0:7F:B9:81:28:AB

Listing APs for selected SSID on target OS linux
SSID
RSSI
labwifi
-9
Add to apsPerEssidBiDemArrList
labwifi
-53
Add to apsPerEssidBiDemArrList

Encryption
MAC address
off
58:BC:27:93:05:60
off

58:BC:27:12:0C:10

Frequency
2.412 GHz (Channel 1)

Signal Level -9

>=

threshold -75.

2.462 GHz (Channel 11)

Signal Level -53 >=

threshold -75.

---------apsPerEssidBiDemArrList sorted by signal level, above threshold-------------------------------------------------------------SSID
RSSI
Encryption
MAC address
Frequency
labwifi
-9
off
58:BC:27:93:05:60
2.412 GHz (Channel 1)
labwifi
-53
off
58:BC:27:12:0C:10
2.462 GHz (Channel 11)
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End re-scanning the public Wi-Fi network
Showing learned ETA MAC address
58:BC:27:93:05:60
Remove learned ETA MAC addresses from re-scanned APs for selected SSID list
---------AsPerEssidBiDemArrList AP MAC addresses, sorted by signal level, above threshold--------------------------------------------SSID
RSSI
Encryption
MAC address
Frequency
labwifi
-53
off
58:BC:27:12:0C:10
2.462 GHz (Channel 11)
Now iterating across APs
-------------------------Current AP MAC Address:58:BC:27:12:0C:10

signal level:-53

Associate client to current AP
-------------------------------iwconfig wlp3s0 mode managed essid labwifi ap 58:BC:27:12:0C:10
Checking association status
iwconfig wlp3s0
wlp3s0
IEEE 802.11 ESSID:"labwifi"
Mode:Managed Frequency:2.462 GHz Access Point: 58:BC:27:12:0C:10
Bit Rate=1 Mb/s
Tx-Power=15 dBm
Retry short limit:7
RTS thr:off
Fragment thr:off
Encryption key:off
Power Management:off
Link Quality=55/70 Signal level=-55 dBm
Rx invalid nwid:0 Rx invalid crypt:0 Rx invalid frag:0
Tx excessive retries:0 Invalid misc:0
Missed beacon:0
Client has associated to AP
Get client DHCP address
------------------------dhclient -timeout 20 wlp3s0
Checking if client has a valid IP address
------------------------------------------ifconfig wlp3s0
wlp3s0: flags=4163<UP,BROADCAST,RUNNING,MULTICAST> mtu 1500
inet 192.168.43.37 netmask 255.255.255.0 broadcast 192.168.43.255
inet6 fe80::8e70:5aff:fe82:9264 prefixlen 64 scopeid 0x20<link>
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ether 8c:70:5a:82:92:64 txqueuelen 1000 (Ethernet)
RX packets 266 bytes 200613 (195.9 KiB)
RX errors 0 dropped 0 overruns 0 frame 0
TX packets 298 bytes 40803 (39.8 KiB)
TX errors 0 dropped 0 overruns 0 carrier 0 collisions 0
Found IP address: 192.168.43.37
cat /etc/resolv.conf
nameserver 209.244.0.3
nameserver 209.244.0.4
Confirm Internet access
------------------------Attempting to access URL to check Internet connection
URL response code: 200
First attempt to detect if client is behind a captive portal
HTML content omitted
A captive portal was not detected
Internet access confirmed
Access secured public website and verify if public website certificate is valid
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------Response Code : 200
Cipher Suite : TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
Cert
Cert
Cert
Cert

Type : X.509
Hash Code : 1749875764
Public Key Algorithm : RSA
Public Key Format : X.509

Cert
Cert
Cert
Cert

Type : X.509
Hash Code : -2059616493
Public Key Algorithm : RSA
Public Key Format : X.509

Cert
Cert
Cert
Cert

Type : X.509
Hash Code : 1215155824
Public Key Algorithm : RSA
Public Key Format : X.509
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Now printing secured public website object access, certificate status, global IP
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------Access: true
Certificate status: valid
Global IP: 173.95.190.140
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------Wi-Fi connection is safe. You are connected to a legitimate AP.
running iwevent. waiting for event "Not-Associated"
Waiting for Wireless Events from interfaces...
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R5: It protects the user when the attacker blocks access to the public website used to get ISP information.
Access secured public website and verify if public website certificate is valid
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------Some other exception thrown:
java.net.ConnectException: Connection refused (Connection refused)
at java.net.PlainSocketImpl.socketConnect(Native Method)
at java.net.AbstractPlainSocketImpl.doConnect(AbstractPlainSocketImpl.java:350)
at java.net.AbstractPlainSocketImpl.connectToAddress(AbstractPlainSocketImpl.java:206)
at java.net.AbstractPlainSocketImpl.connect(AbstractPlainSocketImpl.java:188)
at java.net.SocksSocketImpl.connect(SocksSocketImpl.java:392)
at java.net.Socket.connect(Socket.java:589)
at sun.security.ssl.SSLSocketImpl.connect(SSLSocketImpl.java:668)
at sun.security.ssl.BaseSSLSocketImpl.connect(BaseSSLSocketImpl.java:173)
at sun.net.NetworkClient.doConnect(NetworkClient.java:180)
at sun.net.www.http.HttpClient.openServer(HttpClient.java:463)
at sun.net.www.http.HttpClient.openServer(HttpClient.java:558)
at sun.net.www.protocol.https.HttpsClient.<init>(HttpsClient.java:264)
at sun.net.www.protocol.https.HttpsClient.New(HttpsClient.java:367)
at sun.net.www.protocol.https.AbstractDelegateHttpsURLConnection.getNewHttpClient(AbstractDelegateHttpsURLConnection.java:191)
at sun.net.www.protocol.http.HttpURLConnection.plainConnect0(HttpURLConnection.java:1138)
at sun.net.www.protocol.http.HttpURLConnection.plainConnect(HttpURLConnection.java:1032)
at sun.net.www.protocol.https.AbstractDelegateHttpsURLConnection.connect(AbstractDelegateHttpsURLConnection.java:177)
at sun.net.www.protocol.http.HttpURLConnection.getInputStream0(HttpURLConnection.java:1546)
at sun.net.www.protocol.http.HttpURLConnection.getInputStream(HttpURLConnection.java:1474)
at java.net.HttpURLConnection.getResponseCode(HttpURLConnection.java:480)
at sun.net.www.protocol.https.HttpsURLConnectionImpl.getResponseCode(HttpsURLConnectionImpl.java:338)
at clientsidemobileeviltwinattackdetection.SecurePublicIpSite.detectGlobalIp(SecurePublicIpSite.java:51)
at
clientsidemobileeviltwinattackdetection.ClientSideMobileEvilTwinAttackDetection.main(ClientSideMobileEvilTwinAttackDetection.java:625)
Now printing secured public website object access, certificate status, global IP
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------Access: false
Certificate status: not detected
Global IP: not detected
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------CSMETAD cannot access secured public website
CSMETAD will try to connect to another AP if available
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R6: It protects the user when the attacker presents an invalid certificate while retrieving ISP information from a public website.
Access secured public website and verify if public website certificate is valid
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------SSL exception thrown:
javax.net.ssl.SSLHandshakeException: sun.security.validator.ValidatorException: PKIX path building failed:
sun.security.provider.certpath.SunCertPathBuilderException: unable to find valid certification path to requested target
at sun.security.ssl.Alerts.getSSLException(Alerts.java:192)
at sun.security.ssl.SSLSocketImpl.fatal(SSLSocketImpl.java:1949)
at sun.security.ssl.Handshaker.fatalSE(Handshaker.java:302)
at sun.security.ssl.Handshaker.fatalSE(Handshaker.java:296)
at sun.security.ssl.ClientHandshaker.serverCertificate(ClientHandshaker.java:1514)
at sun.security.ssl.ClientHandshaker.processMessage(ClientHandshaker.java:216)
at sun.security.ssl.Handshaker.processLoop(Handshaker.java:1026)
at sun.security.ssl.Handshaker.process_record(Handshaker.java:961)
at sun.security.ssl.SSLSocketImpl.readRecord(SSLSocketImpl.java:1062)
at sun.security.ssl.SSLSocketImpl.performInitialHandshake(SSLSocketImpl.java:1375)
at sun.security.ssl.SSLSocketImpl.startHandshake(SSLSocketImpl.java:1403)
at sun.security.ssl.SSLSocketImpl.startHandshake(SSLSocketImpl.java:1387)
at sun.net.www.protocol.https.HttpsClient.afterConnect(HttpsClient.java:559)
at sun.net.www.protocol.https.AbstractDelegateHttpsURLConnection.connect(AbstractDelegateHttpsURLConnection.java:185)
at sun.net.www.protocol.http.HttpURLConnection.getInputStream0(HttpURLConnection.java:1546)
at sun.net.www.protocol.http.HttpURLConnection.getInputStream(HttpURLConnection.java:1474)
at java.net.HttpURLConnection.getResponseCode(HttpURLConnection.java:480)
at sun.net.www.protocol.https.HttpsURLConnectionImpl.getResponseCode(HttpsURLConnectionImpl.java:338)
at clientsidemobileeviltwinattackdetection.SecurePublicIpSite.detectGlobalIp(SecurePublicIpSite.java:51)
at
clientsidemobileeviltwinattackdetection.ClientSideMobileEvilTwinAttackDetection.main(ClientSideMobileEvilTwinAttackDetection.java:325)
Caused by: sun.security.validator.ValidatorException: PKIX path building failed:
sun.security.provider.certpath.SunCertPathBuilderException: unable to find valid certification path to requested target
at sun.security.validator.PKIXValidator.doBuild(PKIXValidator.java:387)
at sun.security.validator.PKIXValidator.engineValidate(PKIXValidator.java:292)
at sun.security.validator.Validator.validate(Validator.java:260)
at sun.security.ssl.X509TrustManagerImpl.validate(X509TrustManagerImpl.java:324)
at sun.security.ssl.X509TrustManagerImpl.checkTrusted(X509TrustManagerImpl.java:229)
at sun.security.ssl.X509TrustManagerImpl.checkServerTrusted(X509TrustManagerImpl.java:124)
at sun.security.ssl.ClientHandshaker.serverCertificate(ClientHandshaker.java:1496)
... 15 more
Caused by: sun.security.provider.certpath.SunCertPathBuilderException: unable to find valid certification path to requested target
at sun.security.provider.certpath.SunCertPathBuilder.build(SunCertPathBuilder.java:141)
at sun.security.provider.certpath.SunCertPathBuilder.engineBuild(SunCertPathBuilder.java:126)
at java.security.cert.CertPathBuilder.build(CertPathBuilder.java:280)
at sun.security.validator.PKIXValidator.doBuild(PKIXValidator.java:382)
... 21 more
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Now printing secured public website object access, certificate status, global IP
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------Access: true
Certificate status: invalid
global IP: not detected
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------CSMETAD has detected an ETA on the public Wi-Fi hotspot
CSMETAD added ETA MAC address to learned ETA MAC address list
CSMETAD will try to connect to another AP if available
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Appendix D
CSMETAD System Solution Manual
1. Physical network connectivity design
The certified equipment included in Hossen & Wenyuan’s (2014) study was replaced
for the CSMETAD system to expand and provide protection to traveling users that utilize
a different mobile platform and operating system in free open public Wi-Fi hotspots. The
following is a list of replacement hardware and software included in the design of the
CSMETAD system that is central to this dissertation report:
1. Client Platform: Hossen & Wenyuan’s study’s artifact was built for smartphone
platforms. CSMETAD was built for laptop platforms. The client laptop platform for
this study is a Lenovo Thinkpad laptop.
2. Client Operating System (OS): Hossen & Wenyuan’s study’s artifact was built for
Android operating system. CSMETAD was built for Linux operating system. The
Linux OS version for this study is 7.3.1611.
3. Client Programming Language: Hossen & Wenyuan’s study’s artifact’s
programming language was not provided in their study. CSMETAD was built using
Java programming language. The Java SE Development Kit is version 1.8.0_131 (64
bits) and the NetBeans Integrated Development Environment is version 8.1.
4. Mobile Evil Twin AP: Hossen & Wenyuan (2014) performed the evaluation using a
smartphone with mobile AP functionality as the evil twin AP (Nexus 4 Android
smartphone with 3G data subscription and Android mobile hotspot and tethering).
CSMETAD was evaluated using a laptop and smartphone with mobile AP
functionality as the evil twin AP (Lenovo Thinkpad laptop, Kali Linux (Aircrack-ng)

227
and Hostapd, Motorola Moto e5smartphone with 4G data subscription and Android
mobile hotspot and tethering).

2. Logical prototype topology design diagram

ROUTER1
Cisco Valet M10
IP: 192.168.43.1
Subnet: 255.255.255.0
MAC: 687F74CCC7AE
INTERNET
INTERNET

WIRELESS CONTROLLER
Cisco 2504
IP: 192.168.43.10
Subnet: 255.255.255.0
MAC: DCEB9495C4A0

P1

Cisco 2500 Series Wireless Controller

P1
Model 2504

RESET

CONSOLE

SWITCH1
Cisco Catalyst 3560 PoE-24
IP: 192.168.43.250
Subnet: 255.255.255.0
MAC: 001193654FC0

1x

POE
1

2

3

4

PWR

SYS

ALM

3x
Catalyst 3560
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

1X

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

SERIES

PoE-24

24

11X

13X

23X

12X

14X

24X

SYST
RPS
STAT
DUPLX
SPEED
POE

1
2X

2

MODE

5x

7x

EVIL TWIN AP

WIRELESS
CLIENT

AP1 (Legitimate)
Cisco Access Point 3502I-A-K9
MAC (2.4GHz): 58:BC:27:93:05:60
Channel 1

AP2 (Legitimate)
Cisco Access Point 3502I-A-K9
MAC (2.4GHz): 58:BC:27:12:0C:10
Channel 11
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3. Artifact construction specifications
Wireless Client
The hardware and software specifications for the wireless client are described as
follows:
Hardware
The Lenovo Thinkpad Laptop specifications can be retrieved from
https://support.lenovo.com/mn/en/solutions/pd027202
Software
The Linux OS 7.3.1611 specifications designed for inclusion into the CSMETAD
system can be retrieved from https://wiki.centos.org/Manuals/ReleaseNotes/CentOS7
The Java SE Development Kit 1.8.0_131 (64 bits) programming language
specifications designed for inclusion into the CSMETAD system can be retrieved from
https://docs.oracle.com/javase/specs/jls/se8/jls8.pdf
The NetBeans Integrated Development Environment 8.1 specifications designed for
inclusion into the CSMETAD system can be retrieved from
https://netbeans.org/community/releases/81/relnotes.html
The Wireshark Packet Analyzer 2.0.0 software was installed in the client specifically
for network packet analysis purposes. The specifications can be retrieved from
https://www.wireshark.org/docs/relnotes/wireshark-2.0.0.html
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Mobile Evil Twin AP
The hardware and software specifications for the mobile evil twin AP are described as
follows:
Hardware
The Motorola Moto e5 smartphone specifications can be retrieved from
https://www.motorola.com/us/products/moto-e-plus-gen-5
The Lenovo Thinkpad Laptop specifications can be retrieved from
https://www.lenovo.com/us/en/laptops/thinkpad/thinkpad-x/Thinkpad-X1-Carbon-4thGen/p/22TP2TXX14G
Software
The Android Mobile Hotspot and Tethering specifications can be retrieved from
https://www.verizonwireless.com/support/knowledge-base-217411/
The Kali Linux 4.14.0 (Aircrack-ng) specifications can be retrieved from
https://www.kali.org/news/kali-linux-2018-1-release/
The Hostapd v2.7 specifications can be retrieved from http://w1.fi/hostapd/

Lab Network
The hardware and software specifications for the lab network are described as follows:
The Cisco M10 router specifications documented in an installation guide (Cisco
Systems, 2010) can be retrieved from
http://downloads.linksys.com/downloads/userguide/1224655305646/Valet_Valet_Plus_
M10_M20_UG_US_V10_D-WEB_3425-014530.pdf
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The Cisco 3560 switch specifications documented in a spec sheet (Cisco Systems,
2009) can be retrieved from
http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/collateral/switches/catalyst-3560-seriesswitches/product_data_sheet09186a00801f3d7d.pdf
The Cisco 2504 wireless controller specifications documented in a spec sheet (Cisco
Systems, 2016) can be retrieved from
http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/collateral/wireless/2500-series-wirelesscontrollers/data_sheet_c78-645111.pdf
The Cisco 3502I wireless access point specifications documented in a spec sheet
(Cisco Systems, 2012) can be retrieved from
http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/collateral/wireless/aironet-1250series/data_sheet_c78-594630.pdf
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4. Minimum hardware and software requirements
The components and costs to build the CSMETAD system and lab as defined in this
dissertation report are listed in below table.
Evil Twin Detection Lab Environment Components and Costs
Component
Quantity
Hardware
Cisco 3560 Switch
1
Cisco Router M10
1
Cisco Wireless
1
Controller 2504
Cisco Access Point
1
3502I-A-K9 (AP1)
(legitimate AP)
Cisco Access Point
1
3502I-A-K9 (AP2)
(legitimate AP)
Lenovo Laptop
2
Motorola Moto e5
1
Android smartphone
USB wireless adapter
1
Ethernet cables
Software
Wireshark Packet
Analyzer 2.0.0
Java SE Development
Kit 1.8.0_131
NetBeans IDE 8.1
Linux Centos 7.3.1611
Kali Linux
4.14.0 (Aircrack-ng)
Hostapd v2.7
Android Mobile
Hotspot &Tethering
Switch IOS
Router IOS
Controller IOS
APs IOS
Total

Estimated Cost
$150
$200
$490
$80

$80

$2,500
$150
$40
$30

1

Free

1

Free

1
1
1

Free
Free
Free

1
1

Free
Free

1
1
1
3

Included
Included
Included
Included
$3,720
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5. Step-by-step artifact construction procedures
Construction of the CSMETAD system was based primarily on Hevner’s principles 1
and 5 through the creation of a viable artifact that relies on the application of rigorous
construction methods.
Lab Environment - Steps:
1. Unpacking and assembling the equipment.
2. The Linux Centos 7.3.1611 OS was installed and configured in the Lenovo Thinkpad
laptop (client) in accordance with the installation guide (Centos, 2016) retrieved from
https://wiki.centos.org/Manuals/ReleaseNotes/CentOS7
3. The Java SE Development Kit 1.8.0_131 (64 bits) software was installed and
configured in the Lenovo Thinkpad laptop (client) in accordance with the installation
guide (Oracle, 2016) retrieved from
http://docs.oracle.com/javase/8/docs/technotes/guides/install/index.html
4. The NetBeans Integrated Development Environment 8.1 software was installed and
configured in the Lenovo Thinkpad laptop (client) in accordance with the installation
guide (Netbeans, 2015) retrieved from
https://netbeans.org/community/releases/81/install.html
5. The Wireshark Packet Analyzer 2.0.0 software was installed and configured in the
Lenovo Thinkpad laptop (client) in accordance with the installation guide (Wireshark,
2014) retrieved from https://www.wireshark.org/docs/wsug_html/
6. The Kali Linux 4.14.0 (Aircrack-ng) was installed and configured in the Lenovo
Thinkpad laptop (ETA) in accordance with the installation guide (Kali, 2018)
retrieved from https://docs.kali.org/category/installation
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7. The Hostapd v2.7 was installed and configured in the Lenovo Thinkpad laptop (ETA)
in accordance with the installation guide (Hostapd, 2013) retrieved from
https://w1.fi/hostapd/
8. The Motorola smartphone was configured with tethering in accordance with the
instructions (Motorola, 2018) retrieved from
https://www.verizonwireless.com/support/knowledge-base-217411/
9. The Cisco M10 router was installed and configured in accordance with the
installation guide (Cisco Systems, 2010) retrieved from
http://downloads.linksys.com/downloads/userguide/1224655305646/Valet_Valet_Plu
s_M10_M20_UG_US_V10_D-WEB_3425-014530.pdf
10. The Cisco 3560 switch was installed and configured in accordance with the
installation guide (Cisco Systems, 2010) retrieved from
http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst3560/hardware/installation
/guide/3560hig.pdf
11. The Cisco 2504 wireless controller was installed and configured in accordance with
the installation guide (Cisco Systems, 2017) retrieved from
https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/support/docs/wireless/2500-series-wirelesscontrollers/113034-2500-deploy-guide-00.html
12. The Cisco 3502I access points was installed and configured in accordance with the
installation guide (Cisco Systems, 2014) retrieved from
http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/wireless/access_point/3500/quick/guide/ap350
0getstart.pdf
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Figure 9. Lab network.

Figure 10. Lab wireless client and mobile evil twin AP.
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Client-side Mobile Evil Twin AP Detection (CSMETAD) Algorithm - Steps:
Phase 1: Data Collection
Basic Flow:
1. System is initialized by the user before using the free open public Wi-Fi network.
2. System detects operating system.
3. System detects wireless network card.
4. System disables “auto-connections” to all public Wi-Fi networks.
5. System scans the public Wi-Fi network to discover available SSIDs (encrypted and
unencrypted).
6. System creates list of SSIDs in range.
7. System presents SSIDs in range to the user.
8. User selects unencrypted public Wi-Fi hotspot SSID.
9. System creates list of APs for selected SSID with signal level equal to or greater than
-75dBm.
10. System validates that the number of APs for selected SSID is equal to or greater
than 2. (Alternative Flow “a”)
11. IF number of APs for selected SSID is equal to or greater than 2 THEN System
displays message: “There is sufficient information to start detecting ETAs.”
12. System stops the network manager.
13. System activates wireless network card.
14. System starts iterating across all the APs in the APs for selected SSID list.
15. System associates to the AP in the APs for selected SSID list. (Alternative Flow
“b”)
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16. IF System is able to associate to the AP THEN System gets a Client DHCP address
for the user. (Alternative Flow “c”)
17. IF System is able to get a Client DHCP address for the user THEN System accepts
terms of use to access the Internet. (Alternative Flow “d”)
18. IF System is able to accept terms of use to access the Internet THEN System connects
to secured public website to retrieve global IP address of the AP. (Alternative Flow
“e”)
19. IF System is able to connect to the secured public website THEN System verifies that
the public website certificate is valid. (Alternative Flow “f”)
20. IF the public website certificate is valid only THEN System is able to get the global
IP address of the AP.
21. IF System ends iterating across APs in APs for selected SSID list THEN System
validates that the number of occurrences of a global IP address is equal to or
greater than 2. (Alternative Flow “g”)
22. IF the number of occurrences of a global IP address is equal to or greater than 2
THEN System has enough information to start categorizing APs and sets global IP as
the trusted global IP address to be used for the duration of the public Wi-Fi
connection.
23. System starts categorizing APs.
24. System starts iterating across all the APs in the APs for selected SSID list.
25. System validates that the global IP address for an AP is the same as the trusted global
IP address. (Alternative Flow “h”)
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26. IF the global IP address for an AP is the same as the trusted global IP address THEN
System categorizes the AP as “valid”. System disassociates from current AP and
associates to the next AP on the APs for selected SSID list.
27. IF System ends iterating across APs in APs for selected SSID list THEN System
moves to Phase 2 detection and protection.
Alternative Flows:
a) number of APs for selected SSID is less than 2
On step 10 of the Basic Flow:
1. IF the number of APs for selected SSID is less than 2 THEN
2. System displays message: “There is insufficient information to detect ETAs.”
3. System ends.
b) system is not able to associate to an AP
On step 15 of the Basic Flow:
1. IF System is not able to associate to an AP THEN
2. System updates the APs for selected SSID list with the following results:
a. Association status = false
b. Client DHCP address = not detected
c. Internet access = not detected
d. Secured public website access = not detected
e. Certificate status = not detected
f. Global IP address = not detected
g. AP state = unknown
3. System associates to the next AP in the APs for selected SSID list.
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4. Flow of events returns to step 15 of the Basic Flow.
5. System ends.
c) system is not able to get a Client DHCP address for the user
On step 16 of the Basic Flow:
1. IF System is not able to get a Client DHCP address for the user THEN
2. System updates the APs for selected SSID list with the following results:
a. Client DHCP address = not detected
b. Internet access = not detected
c. Secured public website access = not detected
d. Certification status = not detected
e. Global IP address = not detected
f. AP state = unknown
3. System disassociates from current AP and associates to the next AP on the APs for
selected SSID list.
4. Flow of events returns to step 15 of the Basic Flow.
d) system is not able to accept terms of use to access the Internet
On step 17 of the Basic Flow:
1. IF System is not able to accept terms of use to access the Internet THEN
2. System updates the APs for selected SSID list with the following results:
a. Internet access = false
b. Secured public website access = not detected
c. Certification status = not detected
d. Global IP address = not detected
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e. AP state = unknown
3. System disassociates from current AP and associates to the next AP on the APs for
selected SSID list.
4. Flow of events returns to step 15 of the Basic Flow.
e) system is not able to access secured public website
On step 18 of the Basic Flow:
1. IF System is not able to access secured public website THEN
2. System updates the APs for selected SSID list with the following results:
a. Secured public website access = false
b. Certification status = not detected
c. Global IP address = not detected
d. AP state = unknown
3. System disassociates from current AP and associates to the next AP on the APs for
selected SSID list.
4. Flow of events returns to step 15 of the Basic Flow.
f) invalid certificate
On step 19 of the Basic Flow:
1. IF System receives an invalid certificate message THEN
2. System updates the APs for selected SSID list with the following results:
a. Certification status = invalid
b. Global IP address = not detected
c. AP state = ETA
3. System adds AP MAC address to the learned ETA MAC address list.
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4. System disassociates from current AP and associates to the next AP on the APs for
selected SSID list.
5. Flow of events returns to step 15 of the Basic Flow.
g) number of occurrences of a global IP address is less than 2
On step 21 of the Basic Flow:
1. IF System determines that number of occurrences of a global IP address is less than 2
THEN
2. System displays message: “There is not enough information to categorize APs”
3. System updates the APs for selected SSID list with the following result:
a. AP state = unknown
4. System ends.
h) global IP address for an AP is not the same as the trusted global IP address
On step 25 of the Basic Flow:
1. IF System determines that the global IP address for an AP is not the same as the
trusted global IP address THEN
2. System categorizes the AP as “ETA”.
3. System updates the APs for selected SSID list with the following result:
a. AP state = ETA
4. System adds the AP MAC addresses to the learned ETA MAC address list.
5. System disassociates from current AP and associates to the next AP on the APs for
selected SSID list.
6. Flow of events returns to step 25 of the Basic Flow.
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Input and Output details:
1. SSIDs in range list = list of AP MAC address, signal level/RSSI, encryption status,
frequency, and channel. This list contains APs with encryption on and off.
2. APs for selected SSID list = list of AP MAC address, signal level/RSSI, encryption
status, frequency, channel, Client DHCP address, Internet access, secured public
website access, certification status, global IP address, and AP state. This list contains
only the APs with encryption off and signal/RSSI level equal to or greater than
-75dBm.
3. Learned ETA MAC address list = list of ETA MAC addresses.
Rule details:
1. Number of APs for selected SSID = the number of APs for selected SSID must be
equal to or greater than 2.
2. Number of occurrences of a global IP address = the number of occurrences of a
global IP address must be equal to or greater than 2.
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Figure 11. CSMETAD Algorithm Flow – Phase 1 Data Collection.

243
Phase 2: Detection & Protection
Basic Flow:
1. System rescans the public Wi-Fi network to rediscover APs with selected SSID.
2. System creates list of SSIDs in range.
3. System adds all the APs for selected SSID with signal level equal to or greater than
-75 dBm to the APs for selected SSID list (new list).
4. System validates that number of APs for selected SSID is equal to or greater than 1.
(Alternative Flow “a”)
5. IF number of APs for selected SSID is equal to or greater than 1 THEN System
retrieves learned ETA MAC addresses from learned ETA MAC address list. This
list includes all ETA MAC addresses learned from the beginning of the program.
6. System removes learned ETA MAC addresses from APs for selected SSID list.
7. System validates that the number of APs for selected SSID is equal to or greater
than 1. (Alternative Flow “b”)
8. IF number of APs for selected SSID is equal to or greater than 1 THEN System
starts iterating across all the APs in APs for selected SSID list.
9. Systems associates to the AP with the highest signal strength in the APs for selected
SSID list. (Alternative Flow “c”)
10. IF System is able to associate to the AP THEN System gets a Client DHCP address
for the user. (Alternative Flow “d”)
11. IF System is able to get a Client DHCP address for the user THEN System confirms
access to the Internet. (Alternative Flow “e”)
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12. IF System is able to confirm access to the Internet THEN System connects to secured
public website to retrieve global IP address of the AP. (Alternative Flow “f”)
13. IF System is able to access secured public website THEN System verifies that the
public website certificate is valid. (Alternative Flow “g”)
14. IF the public website certificate is valid only THEN System is able to get the global
IP address for the AP.
15. System validates that the global IP address for the AP is the same as the trusted global
IP address. (Alternative Flow “h”)
16. IF the global IP address for the AP is the same as the trusted global IP THEN the
System displays message: “Wi-Fi connection is safe. You are connected to a
legitimate AP”.
17. System ends iterating across APs in APs for selected SSID list.
18. System waits for a disassociated wireless card event.
19. IF System receives a disassociated wireless card event THEN System proceeds to
rescans the public Wi-Fi network. Algorithm phase 2 repeats (infinite loop).
Alternative Flows:
a) number of APs for selected SSID is less than 1
On step 4 of the Basic Flow:
1. IF the number of APs for selected SSID is less than 1 THEN
2. System displays message: “Your device is out of range for the selected public Wi-Fi
hotspot. Please move closer”.
3. Flow of events returns to step 1 of the Basic Flow.

245
b) number of APs for selected SSID is less than 1
On step 7 of the Basic Flow:
1. IF the number of APs with the selected SSID is less than 1 THEN
2. System displays message: “You are located on the vicinity of Evil Twin Attacks.
Please move to a different location within the public Wi-Fi Hotspot”.
3. Flow of events returns to step 1 of the Basic Flow.
c) system is not able to associate to an AP
On step 9 of the Basic Flow:
1. IF System is not able to associate to an AP THEN
2. System associates to the next AP with the highest signal strength on the APs for
selected SSID list.
3. Flow of events returns to step 9 of the Basic Flow.
d) system is not able to get a Client DHCP address for the user
On step 10 of the Basic Flow:
1. IF the System is not able to get a Client DHCP address for the user THEN
2. System disassociates from current AP and associates to the next AP with the highest
signal strength on the APs for selected SSID list.
3. Flow of events returns to step 9 of the Basic Flow.
e) system is not able to confirm access to the Internet
On step 11 of the Basic Flow:
1. IF the System is not able to confirm access to the Internet THEN
2. System disassociates from current AP and associates to the next AP with the highest
signal strength on the APs for selected SSID list.
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3. Flow of events returns to step 9 of the Basic Flow.
f) system is not able to access secured public website
On step 12 of the Basic Flow:
1. IF the System is not able to access secured public website THEN
2. System disassociates from current AP and associates to the next AP with the highest
signal strength on the APs for selected SSID list.
3. Flow of events returns to step 9 of the Basic Flow.
g) invalid certificate
On step 13 of the Basic Flow:
1. IF the System receives an invalid certificate message THEN
2. System has detected an ETA on the public Wi-Fi network. System displays message:
“CSMETAD has detected an ETA on the public Wi-Fi hotspot”.
3. System adds the AP MAC address to the learned ETA MAC address list (if ETA is
not in the list).
4. System disassociates from current AP and associates to the next AP with the highest
signal strength on the APs for selected SSID list.
5. Flow of events returns to step 9 of the Basic Flow.
h) global IP address for an AP is not the same as the trusted global IP address
On step 15 of the Basic Flow:
1. IF the System determines that the global IP address for an AP is not the same as the
trusted global IP address THEN
2. System has detected an ETA on the public Wi-Fi network. System displays message:
“CSMETAD has detected an ETA on the public Wi-Fi hotspot”.
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3. System adds the AP MAC address to the learned ETA MAC address list (if ETA is
not in the list).
4. System disassociates from current AP and associates to the next AP with the highest
signal strength on the APs for selected SSID list.
5. Flow of events returns to step 9 of the Basic Flow.
Input and Output details:
1. APs for selected SSID list = list of AP MAC address, signal level/RSSI, encryption
status, frequency, channel, Client DHCP address, Internet access, secured public
website access, certification status, global IP address, and AP state. This list contains
only the APs with encryption off and signal level equal to or greater than -75dBm.
2. Learned ETA MAC address list = list of ETA MAC addresses.
Rule details:
1. Number of APs for selected SSID = the number of APs for selected SSID must be
equal to or greater than 1.
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Figure 12. CSMETAD Algorithm Flow – Phase 2 Detection & Protection.
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6. Step-by-step artifact testing procedures
Rigorous testing took place with the CSMETAD system based on Hevner’s DSR
principle 5 in order to verify that the architecture components were working effectively
according to the design.
Lab Environment Testing
1. The TCP/IP utility “ifconfig” was used to verify the correct address configuration of
the lab equipment, once the devices in the topology were connected, configured and
developed in the construction phase.
2. The Cisco Operating System “show run” command was used to prove and
troubleshoot the configuration of the router, switch, wireless controller, and wireless
access points.
3. The TCP/IP utility “ping” was used to verify connectivity between router, switch,
wireless controller, and wireless access points.
4. The TCP/IP utility “traceroute” was used to discover the path between devices across
the topology.
Appendix B shows Algorithm test cases and results.
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7. Transition client-side mobile evil twin attack detection system into production
Artifact Production
After the construction was complete, the CSMETAD system was brought into
production mode. CSMETAD initially aimed at detecting real mobile evil twin AP
attacks in the wild at a hotel property. Since no mobile evil twin APs were detected in
the wild during the field evaluation period, the author proceeded to evaluate the system
with the mobile evil twin AP used in the lab.

Artifact Evaluation
The client-side mobile evil twin attack detection system was evaluated based on
Hevner’s principle 3 that asserts that the utility, quality, and efficacy of a design artifact
must be rigorously validated via well executed evaluation methods. The author
extensively evaluated the performance of the client-side evil twin attack detection method
by implementing a prototype system. The prototype system was evaluated in two
environments. First, in a lab to analyze the requirements and demonstrate the
effectiveness in a controlled environment. Second, in the field at a hotel public Wi-Fi
hotspot to extensively evaluate the robustness of the system in practice. The client-side
mobile evil twin attack detection system aimed at detecting real mobile evil twin AP
attacks in the wild at a hotel property that provide free open public Wi-Fi. Since no real
mobile evil twin AP attacks were detected in the wild during the field evaluation period,
the author proceeded to evaluate the system with the mobile evil twin AP used in the lab.
Similar approach was used by Hossen & Wenyuan’s study and the remainder of the
client-side evil twin attack detection studies referenced in this dissertation.
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The client-side evil twin detection method developed as part of this dissertation was
tested against Hossen & Wenyuan’s (2014) method for detecting mobile evil twin
attacks. The experiments aimed at showing that the detection system developed can
detect mobile evil twin attacks more effectively and efficiently.
The techniques to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of the system were based
on Hossen & Wenyuan’s (2014) evaluation methodology which has been published and
validated and included the following:
1. Collected data from a hotel public Wi-Fi hotspot (public spaces).
2. Ran the experiments on both weekdays and weekends for a period of 5 weeks (2
weeks at the lab and 3 weeks at the hotel).
3. Collected approximately 300 hours of data.
4. Collected more than 151,000 instances of data.
5. Ran the detection system 140 times at the lab and 210 times at a hotel public Wi-Fi
hotspot.
6. Monitored the network with Wireshark packet analyzer.
For efficiency, the author used Hossen and Wenyuan’s technique to measure time
delay but also leveraged Nakhila et al.’s technique to improve upon Hossen and
Wenyuan’s. Nakhila et al. included a complete list of measurements and factors
impacting efficiency.
In this study, the author used a researcher-participant approach. According to Richey
and Klein (2007), researchers are often the designer/ developers. In other words, by
design they “go native” and observe themselves. “The researcher who ceases to be
conscious of the observer role is said to be going native” (Singleton & Straits, 2005). In
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this study, the author participated as the user of the client-side evil twin attack detection
system and the researcher observing the client-side evil twin attack detection system
performance.
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